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The following study argues that existing historical interpretations of how and why the
unification of British North America came about in 1867are flawed. It contends that rather
than a movement propelled mainly by colonial politicians in response to domestic pressures
-  as  generally  portrayed  in  Canadian-centric  histories  of  Confederation  -  the  imperial
government in Britain actually played a more active and dynamic role due to the strategic
and political pressures arising from the American Civil War. Rather than this being a basic
‘withdrawal’, or ‘abandonment’ in the face of US power as is argued on the rare occasions
diplomatic or strategic studies touch upon the British North American Act: this thesis argues
that the imperial motivations were more far-reaching and complex.  The British policy on
union was bound up with the wish to make the provinces more responsible for defence, a
need  greatly  intensified  by  the  Civil  War;  however  this  imperative  was  meant  to  help
preserve the North American colonies in the empire and even more vitally outside of the orbit
of the United States. From the metropolitan government’s point of view Confederation had its
genesis in the antebellum period and was a long-term aim - not only to secure the British
North  America  -  but  even fact  to  counter  United  States  hegemony  in  on the  continent.
Therefore rather than being conceived as a ‘retreat’, it was an overarching plan to challenge
Federal preponderance in North America. Due to the security dilemmas arising from the Civil
War the long-term nature of this scheme became unworkable and was therefore accelerated
to become a short-term response to a strategic dilemma.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The following thesis offers a new interpretation of the forces and motivations which
led to the Confederation of Canada in 1867, reconsidering arguments about the effects of
the  American  Civil  War  and  the  role  of  the  British  government  and  in  the  coming  of
unification. Specialist studies of the events leading to the British North America Act have
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almost exclusively been written in terms of how unification was experienced – and effected –
by the provinces themselves, while diplomatic and political accounts of Britain in the Civil
War generally overlook the vital position of Canada. On occasions when histories do touch
on the imperial view of unification, it is normally regarded as a ‘withdrawal’ stimulated by a
realisation  of  US  dominance  on  the  continent.1 This  thesis  will  display  that  these
interpretations  do  not  stand  up  to  scrutiny.  Canadian-centric  histories  of  confederation
underplay the British role and the larger strategic issues at stake, while notions of military
‘withdrawal’ oversimplify the imperial aims of the unification policy.
Confederation  began  as  an  imperial  plan  to  offset  the  spread  of  Federal
republicanism in North America and in this respect, far from being a withdrawal or retreat,
was a concerted attempt to nurture a balance of power on the continent. This was a long-
term project considered to be attainable in the antebellum era when, as will be shown, in
itself US military capability held little concern for British statesmen. Overwhelming Federal
militarisation however and difficulties afflicting relations with the United States between 1861
and 1865 drastically upset this sense of relative military assuredness, leading the imperial
government  to  appeal  to  unification  long  before  it  had  intended.  At  the  same  time
Confederation was adopted as a policy to impress some of the responsibility for defence
onto the North American provinces themselves. While this necessity was intensified by the
Civil  War,  the imperative to reduce Britain’s  military  commitment  to  the provinces -  and
indeed possessions across the empire - was an ongoing process that predated the 1860’s. It
was motivated by the need to economise, as well as realisation that British power would find
itself spread dangerously thin if engaged in crises or conflicts in different parts of the globe.
Imperial policy held that increased autonomy, as well as the establishment of a larger central
government,  would  increase  the  sense  of  colonial  responsibility  for  this  greater  state’s
protection.  Britain would  continue to support  the provinces,  primarily  with its sea power,
1
 Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815 – 1908, 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 302-3.
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however defence on the ground would be provided for by the new unified government. In this
sense Confederation was not ‘abandonment’, and was only a ‘withdrawal’ in the sense that
local security would be incumbent on the colonies.
British North American unification therefore was favoured as a gradual policy both for
challenging the United States as a regional  power  and for  reducing Britain’s  continental
commitment. These may appear as divergent and even contradictory aims - and perhaps
lacked realism - however this thesis will argue that the imperial government believed them
viable  due to  the essential  military  equilibrium in  North  America.  The feeling  of  relative
security was destroyed by the growth of  American power in the Civil  War and therefore
severely intensified the urgency of their achievement.  It will be contended that the long term
strategy of achieving British North American strength through unification transformed into a
short term answer to a strategic dilemma. 
This  argument  challenges  the  prevalent  interpretation  in  most  histories  of
Confederation which are generally Canada-centric in their scope. The common arguments
as  to  why  British  North  American  union  came  about  are  that  the  Canadian  coalition
government pioneered a scheme for provincial union in order to unshackle themselves from
the political instability in their own legislature and that this plan was accepted by the various
provincial communities due to the perceived benefits that union would bring. These primary
benefits  were  the  facilitation  of  interprovincial  trade,  improved  defence,  enablement  of
expansion to the Northwest, and the building of a continental or ‘intercolonial’ railroad. The
dominant  interpretation  of  Confederation  has  commonly  been  that  while  the  British
supported it, the politicians in the colonies themselves driven by these goals did the most to
achieve  union.  A  recurring  historiographical  problem  with  accounts  of  Confederation
therefore has been a tendency to examine it from the provincial perspective rather than the
imperial, or indeed, as a shared experience. This partiality towards the Canadian role may in
part be explained by the fact that the some of the most influential texts, for instance Donald
Creighton’s  The Road to Confederation  (1964) and W.L. Morton’s  The Critical Years: The
5
Union  of  British  North  America  (1967),  were  written  to  coincide  with  the  centenary  of
Confederation’s accomplishment, and therefore emphasise – and hugely acclaim –politicians
in the colonies as great statesmen and nation-builders, an approach also true of a group of
biographies written in this era. 
The triumphalism of these accounts can also be attributed to the fact that, not only
had the 1960s brought the hundred-year anniversary of Confederation, but had witnessed a
period  of  political  unrest  within  the  French  Canadian  communities,  encouraging  a
nationalistic agenda in writing about the birth of modern Canada.2 This is one reason for
Britain’s  role in,  and rationale  for,  British North American union being overlooked in  the
literature.  On a more practical  level  these studies  are  often limited  in  terms of  imperial
considerations  due  to  the  fact  that,  in  light  of  their  focus,  their  source  material  is
predominantly Canadian. When British sources are consulted it understandably tends to be
the records of the Colonial Office and on occasions the Foreign Office. As will be argued
here, from Britain’s point of view Confederation was, under the strains of the time, a political
manoeuvre with a largely strategic motivation and therefore the imperial role can better be
appreciated through the added consultation of War Office and Admiralty files.
The historiography on Confederation too, can reflect an unconscious bias due to the
era works were written in. Robin Winks for example in The Civil War Years: Canada and the
United States (1960) examined the crises facing the province in the 1860s and subsequently
challenged the persistent myth of British North America’s ‘undefended frontier’ in the 1800’s.
Winks attributed its persistence in the literature to a dominant twentieth century factor: the
two World Wars.3 Similarly scholarly appreciation of the difficult relations between Britain and
the Union during the conflict were arguably for a long time stifled by the Anglo-American
2
 Phillip Bucknor in Ged Martin, Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation, 
1837-67, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), p. 4.
3
 Robin Winks, The Civil War Years: Canada and the United States, 4th ed. (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), p. xvii.
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rapprochement of the twentieth century and an emphasis on British-American co-operation.
Similarly much of the bibliography of British imperial defence can be argued to have been
unduly influenced by subsequent history. The pervading influence of the First World War
draws academic inquiry to the rising strategic challenge of a unified Germany and leads to
neglect of the issues Britain faced with older nineteenth-century competitors such as the
United States.
This  is  perhaps  one  element  of  why  historical  studies  have  not  more  regularly
considered the imperial aspect of Britain in the American Civil War. Another explanation may
be the fact  that  the unique military history of  the Civil  War itself  preoccupies historians.
Indeed few conflicts are so widely written about, in part attributable to the drama, tragedy
and romance perceived in mercurial figures such as Abraham Lincoln and Robert E. Lee,
and  clashes  such  as  Gettysburg  and  Appomattox.  It  might  also  be  speculated  that  as
Confederation  (when  it  is  mentioned  in  an  imperial  context)  is  generally  seen  as  an
ignominious British withdrawal from North America, UK historians are put off by a potentially
inglorious  chapter  in  colonial  history.  Nonetheless  the  following  study  argues  that  the
paradigm of Confederation as an imperial policy driven forward by the Civil War can only be
considered  with  reference  to  the  interplay  between  British-American  relations,  colonial
defence, and continental union. In order to contextualise this thesis it is therefore necessary
to briefly discuss the main bibliographical works which relate to the main elements in play,
divided broadly  between diplomatic  studies of Britain and the Civil  War, military/strategic
studies, and histories of Confederation itself.
Diplomatic studies
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Studies of Anglo-American relations in the Civil War often focus on the question of
potential  British  intervention  and  recognition  of  the  South,  one  of  the  historiographical
controversies over British policy being whether the imperial government tacitly supported the
Confederacy as a means to establish a new North American balance of power though an
independent Southern nation.  Ephraim Adams’s  Great Britain and the American Civil War
(1924) was one of the first diplomatic studies and this was the question Adams set out to
investigate4,  also investigated by Donaldson Jordan and Edwin Pratt in their study of Old
World reactions to the conflict Europe and the American Civil War (1931). Adams found the
answer to this in the negative, referring to the British struggle over extending the electoral
franchise, and argued that the Civil War triumph of the North had a signal effect by giving
validation  to  broad-based  democracy.  R.J.M.  Blackett  reached  a  similar  conclusion  in
Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil  War  (2001), describing the fillip that Union
victory gave to abolitionists and reformers. In assessing that the imperial government did not
seek to  aid  the dismantlement  of  the  United States  however  Ephraim Douglass  Adams
observed a continuity of British policy. Contextualising Britain’s geopolitical outlook prior to
the  Civil  War  Adams  declared  that  Britain  had  come  to  acquiesce  in  US  continental
dominance5, a judgement that Kenneth Bourne later reached as well. It will be contended
that the imperial government continued to aim at the restriction of Federal growth right up to
and including the Civil War, particularly as a means to secure British North America outside
of  the  United  States.  Indeed,  the  Confederation  of  Canada  was  an  antebellum  policy
intended to nurture a balance of power in the region and emerged from a long gestation
period in 1864-1867 in response to a startling and rapid growth of Federal military capability.
Howard  Jones  too  examined  the  possibility  that  Britain  might  have  perfidiously
attempted to alter  the continental  balance by intervening on the South’s  behalf,  both in
4
 Ephraim Douglas Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War, (Middlesex: The
Echo Library, 2006), p. 7.
5
 Ibid., p. 15.
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Union in Peril:  The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil  War (1992)  and the more
specialist study of abolitionism’s effect on transatlantic relations Abraham Lincoln and a New
Birth of Freedom: The Union & Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War (1999).6  Union in
Peril  however appeared unable to resolve why an interventionist policy did not come into
being and there is confusion in the arguments including the significance or otherwise of
emancipation. This study will argue that the prime issue preventing British intervention was
the fear  of  war  with  the Union,  particularly  considering the prospect  of  facing a military
calamity in British North America. 
Unfortunately Jones - perhaps hamstrung by his own remit to convey the importance
of diplomacy - like Adams did not enter into discussion of British North American defence or
the general imperial security concerns arising from the Civil War. Comprehension of the key
question  of  British  North  American  security  also  suffers  within  many  studies  of  Anglo-
American relations in the Civil War, limited as they are by a diplomatically-oriented selection
of sources. The confines of Jones’s focus, drawing his British sources exclusively from the
records of the Foreign Office and private paper collections of the key diplomats, inhibited the
scope to consider how questions of diplomacy and intervention might have been influenced
by imperial defence and global strategy. Tellingly however, precisely the reverse problem
occurs when considering military and strategic studies of Britain and the Civil War. 
Imperial defence and strategic histories
Jeremy Black’s  Fighting for  America:  The Struggle for Mastery in North America,
1519 – 1871 (2011) and Kenneth Bourne’s influential  Britain and the Balance of Power in
North America, 1815 – 1908 (1967) considered the gauntlet laid down by US power in the
Civil  War  era  to  British  defence-policy  and global  strategy,  albeit  while  charting  military
6
 Howard Jones, Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War, 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), p. 1.
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developments on the continent  across much broader epochs.  They therefore only briefly
considered the security dilemmas facing British North America between 1861 and 1865.
Black’s  work  complemented  his  earlier  Crisis  of  Empire  which  highlighted  that  the  ties
between  Britain  and  the  United  States  have  been  strongest  when  a  major,  usually
ideological,  third-party  threat  has  existed,  for  instance  Nazi  Germany,  Soviet  Russia  or
present  day  international  terrorism.  Black  argued that  in  the  nineteenth  century  imperial
competition between the powers was the source of great Anglo-American antagonism on the
continent. It will be argued here that in the Victorian period the bases of potential hostility
also ran along more arcane lines and that the imperial government looked to resist American
expansion  –  particularly  into  its  own  possessions  –  out  of  a  concerted  opposition  to
Republican democracy, believing it to be dangerously excessive.  A large cross-section of
Britain’s educated classes held to the opinion that Washington was too beholden to public
opinion and consequently ‘governed by a mob’, The Times for example printing sardonically
in  1855  that  “the  American  people  are  so  free  that  they  will  not  be  controlled  by  a
government  of  their  own choosing.”7 This  cynicism and  mistrust  of  US democracy  to  a
degree formed the ideological conflict of the day and  was one of the factors which made
British statesmen recoil from US republicanism spreading over British North America. 
Kenneth Bourne’s work veered more towards the geostrategic issues rather than the
ideological or political. Whereas Jones and Adams researched mainly in diplomatic archives,
Bourne’s source material was based on records of the War Office and the Admiralty files, as
well as personal paper collections.8 As alluded to, the diplomatic issues arising from the Civil
War not only had a direct bearing on the military security of British North America, but often
actually  arose from breaches,  or  alleged breaches,  of  British neutrality  committed in  the
provinces.  Diplomatic  relations  and  imperial  defence  policy  therefore  were  inextricably
7
14 The Times, 10 May 1854.
8
15 Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, p. vii.
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linked. Even Bourne subsequently acknowledged that - having passed over Foreign Office
documents  in  his  research  -  the  personal  writings  of  diplomatists  became  essential  to
comprehending the imperial government’s geostrategic outlook.9
Like Adams, Bourne reached the conclusion that by the 1860s Britain had largely
reconciled itself to the ultimate preponderance of United States power in North America. This
smoothed  the  transition  to  strong  Anglo-American  relations  -  though  the  process  was
delayed by the diplomatic problems arising from the Civil War.10 Bourne’s belief that the wars
of German unification might have accelerated the British-American accord was based on his
assessment  that  American  affairs  were  “subordinate”  to  concerns  in  Europe  when
formulating  British  foreign  policy.11 Likewise,  in  Bourne’s  other  major  contribution  to  the
history of British politicking in the nineteenth-century The Foreign Policy of Victorian England
Bourne emphasised that Europe remained Britain’s largest security concern. The need to
preserve its important markets required ensuring that a rival power did not attain political
dominance over the continent and control of its vital military bases. Bourne argued that this
preoccupation  with  European  matters  helped  speed  Britain’s  acknowledgement  of  US
hegemony in North America. The following thesis argues that Britain’s acceptance of US
dominance  was  less  straightforward  and  that  the  imperial  policy  of  uniting  British  North
America was actually born in the antebellum period out of defiance to Republican growth.  
In Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815 – 1908 however Bourne
saw the  Trent affair  as  the vital  watershed  for  Britain’s  position  on  the  continent.  Only
mentioning Confederation in passing and not entering into any comprehensive discussion on
it, Bourne described union as a political resort in order to complete the military ‘withdrawal’
9
 Ibid., p. x.
10
 Ibid., p. 205.
11
 Ibid., p. 407.
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from the continent.12 It will be contended that Bourne misunderstood the imperial rationale
for unification. The British aim of making the provinces undertake a greater share of the duty
for defence was a central part of the union policy and, though predating the Civil War, was
greatly  intensified  by  the  problems  of  colonial  security  emerging  from  it.  Therefore  the
Canadian reticence to take measures towards defence should not  be considered as the
‘excuse’ for the imperial policy of confederation, but a fundamental reason behind it.
Scholars  in  the Bourne camp however  have seen the unification  of  British  North
America as evidence of imperial ‘retreat’ in the face of Federal militarism.13 It will be shown
that, as much as Britain indeed turned to confederation due to the pressures arising from the
American  conflict,  that  the  view  of  unification  as  ‘retreat’  or  ‘withdrawal’  requires  some
modification.  Confederation  began  as  a  concerted  policy  to  challenge  United  States
dominance – before Federal power truly found expression through the Civil War. When this
radical transformation took place between 1861 and 1865, unification became less about
long-range planning than about enacting the scheme before a potential military disaster took
place in British North America. 
These advances in American capabilities since the countries had last been at war
were made clear  in  an 1865 report  on  Canadian  defence composed by Captain  J.  L.A
Simmons.  Simmons  summarised  America’s  crucial  logistics  advantages  and  general
advances in manpower since the War of 1812, stating that: “these changes consist in a vast
increase  of  population  in  the  United  States,  from  10,000,000  to  31,000,000;  in  the
construction of railroads and communications by which armies can be supplied and move in
directions  and  with  a  rapidity  which  before  was  impossible.”  Moreover,  it  was  not  only
Federal  logistics which had undergone a marked revision through the Civil  War, but the
12
 Ibid., pp. 302-3.
13
 Howard J. Fuller, “The Absence of Decisive Results: British Assessments of Union 
Combined Operations” in Craig L. Symonds, ed., Union Combined Operations in the Civil 
War, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 126.
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quality of their armies. As will be seen, contrasting vividly with the derisory appraisals of the
Northern ‘hired hands’ perceived to be manning the Union forces early in the Civil War, later
reports warned of the great strides and improvements made in their operational abilities.
Simmons described for example “the development of a numerous and highly efficient army,
commanded by generals who ... have acquired, in four years of warfare on a scale such as
seldom been exceeded, a larger war experience than the great majority of the generals of
Europe, and have, by the operations which they have conducted, proved themselves adepts
in  strategy  and  very  skilful  tacticians.”14 That  Confederation  was  essentially  a  political
response to a military problem however is a fundamental point, and brings us back to the
premise that a fuller understanding of the imperial response to the Civil War necessitates
contemplation of War Office and Admiralty sources  as well as  records of the Foreign and
Colonial Offices. 
This is further substantiated by the fact that analysts of nineteenth-century imperial
defence  have  often  argued  that  protection  was  not  achieved  by  conventional  military
readiness but by deterrence and diplomacy. Andrew Lambert for example has concluded in
essays such as “The Royal Navy, 1856-1914: Deterrence and the Strategy of World Power”
(1995)  and “Royal  Navy  and the  Defence  of  Empire”  (2008),  that  colonial  security  was
provided for not by local defences, but by the prevention of war in the first place through the
coercing  effect  of  British  sea  power.15 Consequently  the  Civil  War’s  most  serious
international incident the Trent affair was seen by Lambert not only as a diplomatic victory
for Britain, but also as evidence that the Anglo-American power relationship firmly favoured
the British Empire.16 
14
 J. L. A Simmons, , Defence of Canada Considered as an Imperial Question with 
Reference to War with America, (London, 1865), p. 24.
15
 Andrew Lambert, Royal Navy and the Defence of Empire, in Greg Kennedy, ed., 




Lambert argued therefore that this “deterrent strategy” was prosecuted successfully
by Britain during the Civil War and goes so far as to argue that the United States did not
pose a significant threat to Britain at the time of the conflict. Lambert found in the strategic
picture facing Britain justification for Kenneth Bourne’s argument in terms of the European
preoccupation of foreign policy.17 This assertion that British North American security rested
safely on deterrence was a manifestation of Lambert’s argument that British naval superiority
- as opposed to military strength on the ground - provided a dependable hands-off warning
to any hostile powers threatening imperial possessions.18 
The present study will challenge this assertion and argue that, while the Royal Navy
previously had afforded British leaders a sense of security in their dealings with the US, by
1864 if not earlier this had changed. Due to Federal army and navy expansion, technological
developments, fractious relations with the Union and a resulting British anxiety about going
to war; the imperial government found it did not possess this ‘irresistible diplomatic weight’ in
dealing  with the United States.  A sense of  panic  over the need to erect  fortifications  in
Canada as the Civil  War drew to a close - and hence an increased imperial vigour over
achieving  Confederation  –  provided  evidence  of  a  confidence  crisis  in  Britain  over  the
limitations of the security offered by the Royal Navy. It was summed up as early as February
1862 in a crucial  report  made to the War Office by the inspector-general of fortifications
Colonel Burgyonne. Comparing the problems British North America faced to the colonies of
Australia, Burgyonne wrote: “that any of our colonies can obtain absolute protection from our
Navy is a fallacy. The only foreign possessions that can take absolute care of themselves
are the Australian settlements; they have so large a British population and so much wealth;
while  they  are  too  far  removed  from any  possible  enemy to  be  attacked  by  any  force
sufficiently considerable for their conquest.” With the chief source of deterrence, British sea
 Ibid., p. 123.
17
 Ibid., p. 114.
18
 Ibid., pp. 111-24.
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power nullified,  concern centred on defence on the ground and in the case of the North
American  provinces  the perennial  issue  was  with  who  should  rest  the  responsibility  for
defence, Burgyonne going on to describe that the Canadian people did not believe it right to
commit the provinces’ own revenues towards security.
Lambert’s conviction however that British power provided sufficient leverage for the
imperial government to maintain its position in relation to the United States were echoed by
Brian  Holden  Reid  in  his  article  “Power,  Sovereignty  and  the  Great  Republic:  Anglo-
American Diplomatic Relations in the Era of the Civil War”. Holden Reid refuted arguments
such as those of Kenneth Bourne that Britain undertook a ‘withdrawal’ in the face of Federal
pressure,  and  concurred  with  Lambert’s  view  of  a  strong-armed  and  effective  British
diplomacy.19 It will be argued here that the maintenance of peace with the United States was
more complex than simply deterrence based on than on the power of the Royal Navy. The
North’s climb-down over the Trent incident for instance can be attributed, not necessarily to
fear of the Royal Navy of  itself,  but  the fact that  it  stood to lose the South if  becoming
embroiled with Britain.
British perceptions and assessments of their predicament in the North Atlantic were
necessarily  influenced  by  their  standing  in  Europe.  Here  Holden  Reid’s  analysis  again
deviated from that of Bourne, in that while  both emphasised the prioritising of European
affairs, Holden Reid considered this to be evidence that Britain felt secure in its position in
North America. The following thesis contends that these issues - particularly arresting the
growth of Russia and defences in the colonies - were inextricably linked to the problems
Britain faced in North America. The severe requirement for improved fortifications in Canada
– in spite of Lambert’s suggestion that such defences were essentially redundant in view of
the deterrent effect of the Royal Navy – led to a divisive debate in England about British
19
 Brian Holden Reid, “Power, Sovereignty and the Great Republic: Anglo-American 
Diplomatic Relations in the Era of the Civil War”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 
(June 2003), p. 47.
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North American security in 1865 and was a direct outcome of the problem posed by Federal
mobilisation and uncertain diplomatic relations with the North. These issues are significant
because the reluctance to pay for defensive works that the home government felt should fall
under  the jurisdiction of  the provinces themselves was a fundamental part  of  the British
policy on Confederation.  The imperial  goal  of  unification had always been based on the
notion the new central assembly would assume increased responsibility for security – and by
May 1865 British support had already been conferred for the ‘Quebec Resolutions’ whereby
Article 67 explicitly stated that the new united legislature would undertake all measures for
local  defence.  As  a  result  the  imperial  government  initially  wished  Confederation  to  be
completed first and the defence negotiations to be conducted after. The security crisis that
sprung  from  imminent  Federal  conquest  of  the  South  however  rendered  this  ultimatum
unworkable  and  led  to  the  fortification  debates  –  further  evidence  that  Britain  did  not
seriously  mean  to  abandon  the  provinces.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  in  spite  of  the
accusations  of  a  lack  or  urgency,  the  appropriation  for  the  building  of  the  defences  at
Quebec was voted for by the imperial parliament. 
Histories of Confederation
In The Civil War Years: Canada and the United States Winks took a different stance
on these issues of Canadian defence readiness, deterrence of the US, and imperial support
for Confederation. Winks argued that provincial determination to resist annexation provided
a warning to the Federals in the wake of the Trent affair and that the imperial government’s
acceptance of union owed not to the winter crisis of 1861-2 but to the Confederate attempts
to embroil Britain by launching a raid into Vermont from Canada in October 1864.20 It will be
contended here that the Trent crisis was far more impactful than Winks suggests, and that
far from galvanising British North Americans into defensive action, the incident reinforced a
view in Canada that any resort to conflict would result from failed diplomacy between Britain
20
 Winks, The Civil War Years, pp. 102-3.
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and the US (the type of diplomatic crisis Winks wrongly dismisses as existing in the Trent
affair) and therefore that it would be Britain’s responsibility to wage war and not Canada’s.
Within months of the crisis moreover the Canadian government stood down over the defeat
of a bill to reconstitute its local militia – hardly evidence of a galvanised defence – and this
played a major part  in imperial-provincial  relations and,  again,  British desire to unify the
provinces. The more critical discrepancy with Winks’s argument therefore is his assertion
that the St. Albans incident helped gain Colonial Office backing for British North American
unification.  The following  study will  display  that  while  the raid had an effect  in  securing
provincial backing for union, imperial sponsorship both predated October 1864 and rather
stemmed from the more long-standing ideological and strategic motivations alluded to.
Nonetheless  in  another  seminal  work  on  Confederation,  The Critical  Years:  The
Union of British North America, W. L. Morton concluded that unification and defence were
not so linked by the imperial government. It is challenged here that British effort to ‘define
and limit’ their defence commitment were part of the same policy that drove the imperial wish
for union. It was not the case that Britain would withdraw its military support, allowing the
provinces to fall  to the United States and relinquishing any chance for  them to become
united:  rather  Confederation  was a  measure encouraged  by the imperial  government  to
improve  their  defensibility  against  any  hostile  incursions  from  the  US  to  begin  with.
Increased security would theoretically stem from greater responsibility being taken by the
new  central  British  North  American  government.  It  is  argued  therefore  that  the  term
‘withdrawal’ is too simplistic - when used as Morton does here - to assert that British policy
was a basic fear-driven response to American power. Morton’s suggestion that Britain would
contemplate  abandoning  the  provinces  and  therefore  jeopardise  the  unification  scheme
represents a Canadian-centric view of Confederation, in that it implies that the motivation to
effect union existed primarily with the colonies themselves. On top of this Morton’s tendency
to portray union as a Canadian ‘success story’  led him to emphasise the obstacles and
challenges Canada faced whether real or, at times, imagined. Morton for instance, having
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suggested  that  the  Canadian  delegation  surmounted  the  obstacle  of  potential  British
‘withdrawal’  in  order  to  proceed with  the scheme for  union,  then claims that  the added
impediment  existed of  a  shortage of  time.21 This  study  will  argue that  even against  the
divisive backdrop of the crisis over reform British statesmen across all  party and political
lines were determined to affect British North American union at an early juncture. 
Similar observations can be made of Donald Creighton’s The Road to Confederation
which charted the coming of British North American union in terms of the political experience
and problems of the provinces themselves. In mapping out the provincial journey Creighton’s
analysis  relied  almost  exclusively  on  Canadian  archives  and  did  not  integrate  Foreign,
Colonial or War Office sources. That the paradigm of the imperial response to the Civil War
was neglected is clear in that Creighton’s analysis begins in 1863, the year following the
Trent affair and the intervention crisis. Creighton’s narrative in particular is celebratory in its
account of how the “Fathers of Confederation” overcame scepticism and resistance from the
parochial local legislatures of the Maritime Provinces as well as the imperial government.
These ‘anti-confederates’ are dismissed as insular and reactionary while the unionists who
favoured Confederation are portrayed as great visionaries and statesmen. Creighton argued
that the coalition government of Canada had settled on continental unification as a solution
to the ‘deadlocked’ political struggle between Upper and Lower Canada, joined in legislative
union since 1838. The Upper Canadians, led by Toronto newspaper proprietor and reform
politician  George  Brown  had  become  consistently  frustrated  at  the  system  of  equal
representation in the united assembly despite their far greater (and still rapidly expanding)
population. Brown headed up the coalition with conservative John A. Macdonald Brown and
having adopted the policy of confederation to dispense with their failing provincial legislature
they crossed the Atlantic to gain imperial assent in what Creighton termed in a chapter title
an “Appeal to Caesar”.
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Like  Morton’s  therefore,  Creighton’s  work  presents  Confederation  as  a  triumph
against the odds, if not a miracle. A classic example of this can be seen in a passage looking
to illustrate the obstacles that  Canada had to overcome in which Creighton argues that
staunch resistance from the Maritime colonies combined with the ‘problem’ of convincing
Britain  that  union  must  be  adopted,  the  metaphorical  ‘appeal  to  Caesar’.22 Creighton’s
incredulity  at  the  home government’s  ready  acceptance  of  the  union  scheme fitted  one
recurrent  technique  for  lauding  the  Canadian  unionists.  This  was  to  portray  the  British
governing classes as staunchly against empire (or at least hamstrung by those who were),
or alternatively apathetic and even ignorant towards imperial questions. This included the
key members of  the colonial  service.23 This  thesis  will  challenge  that  such conventional
views of imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century are overly simplistic. While a faction (of
whom William Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer was the highest profile) wished to
lessen Britain’s colonial responsibilities, the broad-based approach was to ‘fit’ the colonies
for eventual independence by the gradual cession of self-government and to part with them
only when their people were conducive and their institutions sufficiently developed to allow
them to stand alone. This was not only to prevent again the creation of a vacuum that might
be  commercially  or  militarily  exploited  by  rival  powers,  but  also,  by  the  parting  being
amicable, to give Britain valuable allies in future conflicts.
At  the same time, the cabinet  remained dominated by the giants of  the previous
generation  Russell  and Palmerston,  men who considered  the relinquishment  of  imperial
power detrimental to Britain’s status in the world. Imperial power gave Britain a sense of rank
that Palmerston as Prime Minister was particularly unwilling to allow to be compromised.
When in 1864 British North American security came under intense scrutiny as the Federals
gained the upper hand in the Civil War, Palmerston told Russell “We have those colonies
22
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and cannot abandon them without disgrace and dishonour, ministerial and national, and we
must  do  our  best  to  defend  them  in  co-operation  with  their  inhabitants.”  Palmerston’s
language was revealing as it illustrated his feeling that it was not only patriotic pride that
depended on standing by the empire, it was also a very personal obligation: loss of British
North America could not  be countenanced without  “ministerial”  dishonour.  This  notion of
imperial  rank and duty therefore could be used by Palmerston if  opposed by radicals  or
liberals, and public support could usually be counted upon as one’s ‘position’ was paramount
in the Victorian era. Russell  too warned not  only of this damage that  would be done to
Britain’s  reputation  in  the  world  but  also  a  potential  domino  effect  across  other  British
possessions if the North American provinces fell to the United States: “The loss of any great
portion of our colonies would diminish our importance in the world & the vultures would soon
gather together to despoil us of other parts of our Empire, or to offer insults to us which we
could not bear.”24 Despite assertions in the literature therefore that the home country wished
to cast off the provinces, a consensus in Britain including Palmerston and Russell supported
Confederation  based  on  its  pre-Civil  War  objective  of  conserving  British  North  America
outside of the United States. 
What all this ultimately shows is that there is discrepancy over Britain’s motivations
for endorsing unification. Histories variously argue that the imperial government made the
colonies’ acceptance of the union scheme a proviso for continued military assistance; and/or
that the same imperial support for Confederation was a means to allow Britain to ‘abandon’
or ‘withdraw from’ from the continent. Ged Martin highlighted this anomaly in Britain and the
Origins of Canadian Confederation 1837 – 67  (1995)25  This thesis will  argue that again,
such polarised interpretations are overly simplistic,  and that Confederation was, from the
imperial point of view, essentially a balancing act between the two. The key is that Britain
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regarded union as a measure to make the colonies assume more responsibility for security,
and  threatened  to withhold imperial aid to bring this about. The imperial government fully
intended to continue to guarantee the provinces’ territorial integrity but predominantly with
the support of the Royal Navy; local defence had to be orchestrated by the colonies on the
ground. It was therefore not a simple case of one or the other – that the provinces sign up to
confederation to preserve imperial protection, or refuse it and be abandoned. Confederation
was intended as a means to safeguard British North America’s position in the empire and
certainly its independence from the United States; but through increased self-government
relieve much of the imperial burden of defending it. Both of these objectives had assumed an
intensified significance by the growth of Federal power and diplomatic friction with the North
through the Civil War. 
By contrast, in Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation Ged Martin argued
that historians of British North American unification are overly swayed by the background of
the  US conflict.26 Indeed,  Martin  claimed  that  all  of  the  recurrent  interpretations  of  why
unification  came  about  are  open  to  question.  Martin  argued  against  taking  the
pronouncements of the Fathers of Confederation at face value.27 Martin therefore placed
greater emphasis on political expediency for the leaders of the Canadian coalition. Martin
believed that George Brown’s overriding concern was with achieving electoral justice for the
numerically superior peoples of Upper Canada either through continental union or failing that
simply a Federal reformation of the two Canadas with the new assembly reconstituted on the
basis of ‘representation by population’. John A. Macdonald, Martin contended, needed the
greater confederation to secure his own diminishing political career. 
Refuting Morton and Creighton’s assertions that the Fathers of Confederation faced
crippling opposition in the Atlantic Provinces which led them to launch a noble appeal to the
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mother  country,  Martin  challenged  that  Maritime  opposition  was  not  as  extensive  as
Canadian histories have claimed and in fact it  was a close split  between unionists,  anti-
unionists,  and  those  who  were  undecided  that  allowed  Confederation  to  eventually  be
embraced in the Maritime Provinces. According to Martin this was necessary as the imperial
government possessed little real power with which to impose its wish for unification on self-
governing  colonies  such  as  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick.28 In  this  respect  Martin
contended that the British contribution to achieving union is better described as “context and
support” rather than “pressure and command.”29 The following thesis will  display that the
imperial role was more dynamic, and even proactive, in making Confederation a reality.
Summary
It can be seen that a variety of historiographical factors have influenced academic
consideration of Britain’s role in accomplishing Confederation as a response to the problems
of the American Civil War, such as the changing circumstances of international relations in
with Britain and the United States firm twentieth century allies or the tendency of Canadian
histories to promote the British North America Act as a triumph of Canadian nation-building
and national identity. This has been the case in key studies of Confederation such as W.L
Morton’s The Critical Years and Donald Creighton’s The Road to Confederation. 
At the same time, the home government’s policy towards British North America has
also been overlooked as most of the literature on Britain n the conflict has been concerned
with the diplomatic issues that arose between London and Washington, generally focusing
on the  Trent affair  or  the question  of  offering  mediation  and possible  recognition  to the
Confederacy.  The  majority  of  these  works,  including  influential  texts  such  as  Ephraim
Douglass Adams’s Great Britain and the American Civil War and Howard Jones’s Union in
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Peril:  the Crisis over European Intervention in the Civil  War -  include little on the critical
question of the provinces.  There has been neglect over how the Civil War affected British
policy in relation to the defence of the empire and other British interests, ironic as both the
diplomatic friction with Washington and the postulations on recognising the South (which
were not mutually exclusive) categorically threatened to bring the empire into a state of war
and lead to a US invasion of Canada. 
Part of the reason for these historiographical shortcomings has been a tendency to
restrict the focus of research to sources of the Foreign Service, while the reverse applies to
strategic studies. The latter is a particular issue in that, as colonial security relied in part on
diplomacy and deterrence, purely military data provides an incomplete picture of the nature
of imperial defence policy, a factor in Kenneth Bourne’s Britain and the Balance of Power in
North America,  1815 -  1905.  Scholarly  works on imperial  defence also tend to overlook
British North America,  while  specialist  studies of  Canadian Confederation understate the
military/strategic imperial issues that influenced British policy on union. In this respect all of
these genres of imperial history have at times suffered from being based on research carried
out exclusively on one side of the Atlantic or the other. 
The methodology of this study has been to consult documents of both the Foreign
and Colonial Offices; and the Admiralty and War Offices. In addition to British sources it has
also been based on archival collections in the United States, and crucially,  Canada. The
latter is particularly illuminating in providing first-hand accounts from imperial representatives
in the provinces: the Governor General at Quebec and the lieutenant  governors in Nova
Scotia,  New  Brunswick  and  Prince  Edward  Island,  and  revealing  the  nature  of  their
transaction with the provincial politicians. The chapters that follow will display that the salient
arguments  over  how and  why Confederation  took  place  are  misinterpreted.  Histories  of
Confederation are largely Canada-centric and claim the cause to be a range of domestic
political forces of which security against the Federal menace was just one strand; also that
the Canadian coalition were the chief architects of union and had to petition the imperial
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government  for  its  support.  This  thesis  will  contend  that  Britain  played  a  much  more
important and dynamic role in coming of union and that the American Civil War was indeed
the decisive factor. In spite of the common interpretation in the literature however, it will be
argued that the matter was not as clear-cut as a simple imperial withdrawal as unification
had its  genesis  before  the conflict  as a long term challenge  to Federal  power.  For  the
purpose of comprehending some of the sources it  may be necessary to note that British
people  occasionally  spoke  colloquially  of  ‘Canada’  when  in  fact  referring  to  all  of  the
provinces of British North America, much in the same way that commentators on both sides
of the Atlantic often referred to ‘England’ as opposed to ‘Britain’.
CHAPTER 2
THE ANTEBELLUM ERA
As the issues that led to the Civil  War developed British North America stood, in
many respects, as Britain’s greatest colonial possession.30 The Atlantic Provinces of Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, while smaller than their
illustrious  neighbour,  nevertheless  constituted a vast  land area and were making similar
economic and political  progress. By comparison for example,  India was lucrative but the
recent Mutiny suggested a bout of costly racial, cultural and religious clashes. As well as this
the Indian subcontinent was critically underdeveloped in contrast to the bastions of British
North America: Montreal, Toronto and Quebec. Australia too by the early 1860s was largely
undeveloped,  while  New  Zealand  was  afflicted  by  ongoing  Maori  wars.  Britain’s  other
imperial  possessions  in  the  mid  nineteenth  century  were  mostly  frontier  outposts  and
military/naval bases along trade routes and strategic supply lines. Britain’s greatest imperial
assets  had  been  the  original  Thirteen  Colonies  and  following  their  loss  the  next  most
valuable in terms of national development was the remainder of British North America. 
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The point to this is to illustrate that it is surprising that in the literature it has often
been portrayed that Britain was keen to jettison the North American provinces. It may be
attributed to a prevailing interpretation that the imperial government became careworn by the
problem  of  protecting  British  North  America  from  the  United  States.  Within  influential
diplomatic histories like that of Ephraim Douglass Adams and strategic studies such as that
of Kenneth Bourne it was claimed that Britain came to reconcile itself it American continental
dominance  by  the  1850s.  In  histories  of  Canadian  Confederation  such  as  Creighton’s
important  work,  it  was argued that  a “little-England”  mentality shaped British policy.  The
perception may stem from what was a growing ambivalence in Britain to the responsibilities
of protecting overseas territories due to the reasons touched on in the introduction: it drained
the imperial exchequer of funds for defence and offered rival powers opportunities to attack
Britain in its extremities – Canada being an obvious case in point. 
It is true that the surrender of what became the United States had placed the rest of
the British North American colonies into a unique strategic problem. Whereas normally the
primary security concerns facing Britain in the colonies were internal rebellion or protecting
them from fellow European imperial powers, the provinces also shared a lengthy land border
with  a  rising  continental  power  which:  had made regular  allusions  to  annexation  of  the
provinces; had invaded during the War of Independence and War of 1812; and had aided
rebellion in 1837-38.31 The American acquisition of the strip of land between New Brunswick
and Quebec was always a source of great angst for Britain’s Prime Minister in the era of the
Civil War. Palmerston wrote that “The United States wanted the disputed territory because it
intervenes between New Brunswick & Canada; because it affords a stepping Stone towards
the object which they have long avowed as one of their fixed aims, the Expulsion of British
authority from the Continent of America.”32 Indeed, Maine was described as a “projecting
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incisor tooth” into British North America. Maine’s position, politics and conduct would play a
key role in imperial insecurities over the provinces.
In the antebellum period however, Britain essentially felt assured and even confident
over the empire in North America. All  of  the previous attempts at making Republican in-
roads into the provinces however had failed. Since the War of 1812 the United States had
only maintained a small standing army, their state and territorial militias were considered
derisory in Britain, and the Great Lakes had been, and remained, demilitarised under the
Rush-Bagot  Treaty  of  1817.  One  caveat  must  be  placed  on  Britain’s  relative  sense  of
security: the fear that war with a European power would pin down imperial forces in other
theatres and offer the US the opening it did not otherwise possess. As Bourne wrote, in spite
of  Britain’s  general  feeling  of  security,  “The  one  great  exception,  the  one  great  fear  of
government after government, was one of a coalition of her enemies, and especially one of
Europe and America.”33 The Concert of Europe however had kept the continent essentially
secure for forty years, and when Britain did go to war again in the Crimea, peace was kept
with the United States - even in spite of a tense diplomatic row over the Crampton Affair. By
this time too British statesmen could observe that the internal travails in the United States
preoccupied the Federal Government with its own security concerns. If Canada was truly
considered a ‘hostage’ to United States power, it might legitimately be questioned why the
imperial  government did not request a King’s ransom from the Federal Government and
allow the US to purchase British North America for a vast financial sum. A rising group of
reformers were looking to consolidate the Empire, most notably in the late-1850s Gladstone,
who  in  his  role  as  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  sought  to  economise  Britain’s  imperial
commitments. Britain could after all still keep trading with the provinces just as she now did
with the United States. France had sold Louisiana to the Union and by the end of the decade
Russia would have followed suit with the sale of Alaska.
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The answer to this can be found, not only in the perceived worth attached to them
and their present safekeeping already described, but also in the Victorian-era values of pride
and  prestige  and  resistance  to  the  spread  of  American  democracy.  When  for  instance
Palmerston learned of the relatively  small  concessions made to the United States in the
Maine border settlement of 1842, he was enraged by the loss of honour and prestige which
he believed undermined British influence everywhere, and the prospect that US would be
encouraged that it might yet expel Britain from the continent, this even despite the fact that
the treaty had gained some military advantages for Britain.  Palmerston wrote “This treaty is
an act of weakness & of pusillanimity, which both morally & physically helps them on toward
that end; while at the same time it lowers the position of England in the opinion of all foreign
nations, and is a source of weakness to us in all our dealings with every other Power.”34  It is
too  simplistic  therefore  to  claim,  as  Donald  Creighton  did  for  instance  in  The  Road  to
Confederation,  that an anti-imperialist  sentiment prevailed in the metropolis favouring the
shedding of Britain’s colonial possessions.35 The leading British statesmen of the Civil War-
era,  such  as  Palmerston,  were  mostly  bitterly  opposed  to  wilfully  surrendering  imperial
power. At the time of the Maine border dispute the policy of uniting the North American
provinces  in  order  to  maintain  their  position  outside  of  the  United  States  had  recently
emerged in embryonic form. It persisted right up to and including the Civil War and therefore
Adams and Bourne were wrong in concluding that in the antebellum era Britain despaired of
opposing, and even challenging, Federal hegemony in North America. This chapter will show
that this was the long-term aim of British policy on the continent.
The Canadian Rebellions, 1837-38
34
 Palmerston to Lord Monteagle, 28 October 1842 in Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign 
Policy of Victorian England1830 – 1902, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 258.
35
 Creighton, The Road to Confederation, p. 55.
27
The threat of  Canada joining the United States had become prevalent  during the
uprisings in the then separate provinces of Upper and Lower Canada 1837-38. Disaffected
British North Americans had called for admission to the United States, and their revolt was
assisted by federal expansion groups beneath the border such as the ‘Sons of Liberty’ and
‘Hunters Lodges’.36 A war scare had been ridden at the time of the Canadian Rebellions:
firstly when Colonial  forces had violated US territory and burned an American ship (the
Caroline)  which  had  supporting  the  uprisings,  and  secondly  when  a  British  subject,
Alexander McLeod, alleged to be one of the arsonists, was acquitted in a New York trial
which carried a possible  death sentence.  Palmerston,  at  this  time Foreign Minister,  had
taken the strongest  possible  line  – as he usually  would  with the United States.  On the
suggestion that the US Secretary of State might proclaim the court’s decision to be a state
matter and that the Federal Government could not interfere with it, Palmerston criticised the
American system and made clear that military action would result. The Foreign Secretary
wrote to the British Minister in Washington “I presume if  we tell  him that in the event of
McLeod’s execution we should make war upon the State of New York, he would reply that in
such case we should ipso facto be at war with the rest of the Union ... if that is so, the rest of
the Union must have the means of preventing the State of New York of doing a thing which
would involve the whole Union in war with England.”37 
The more persistent issue in the aftermath of the Canadian unrest, especially given
the  British  aversion  to  Federal  republicanism,  was  the  movement  towards  Federal
annexation. Following suppression of the rebellions Britain’s imperial representative in lower
Canada Lord Durham was instructed to compile a report and make recommendations on the
measures  that  the  imperial  government  should  adopt  in  order  to  subvert  pro-American
feeling. This essentially was to unite the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada under a
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legislative assembly and under one imperial representative - a new ‘Governor General’ of
Canada;  as well  as to devolve greater self-government to the new provincial  legislature.
Combining unification with increased autonomy held several key objectives which became
instructive in terms of how the imperial government would approach the provincial security
right up to and including the Civil War. The purpose of union was to bring the disaffected
French  Canadian  minority  under  the  control  of  the  British  descended  majority,  while
increased self-governance was intended to placate the whole, reconciling its peoples to the
imperial connection. 
While granting Canada relative autonomy was in part designed to keep the province
aligned to Britain, there was an obvious dichotomy at work in that with every concession of
self-government the province was moved a step closer to independence. As alluded to in the
introduction, colonial separation was only endorsed when imperial possessions had been
raised to sufficient strength to safeguard their independent existence. At present the colonies
could not be let go because of the annexationist threat and therefore gradual concession of
autonomy - while through unification enlarging the provinces’ jurisdiction – was intended to
build the provinces’ readiness while they remained under the imperial umbrella. This formed
a crucial part of The Durham Report, the lieutenant governor deeming it essential to maintain
the imperial link, hoping that a larger political entity would cultivate a national feeling based
on Canada’s monarchical links and history, and thus undermine any leanings towards the
United States. Thus Lord Durham was “so far from believing that the increased power and
weight which would be given to these Colonies by union would endanger their connexion
with the Empire,  that  I  look to it  as the only  means of  fostering such a national  feeling
throughout them as would effectively counterbalance whatever tendencies may now exist
towards separation.”38 In giving Canada increased domestic  governance therefore British
policy was to attempt to build its allegiance to the mother country – and its strength - at least
to the extent  that  it  would  not  fall  prey to the United States.  Imperial  policy  was not  to
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obstruct Canadian separation in the long term, but rather to ensure its future position outside
of the US. Commentators in the metropolis were beginning to envisage the development of a
pan-British North American state which might counteract the strength of the United States.
The Morning Post, the journal that would become a mouthpiece of Palmerston in his role as
Prime Minister  in  the 1860’s,  posited this  outcome of  unification  asking,  “Would  not  the
consolidation of a British North American Union be a good check on the growth of United
States superiority?”39
The military balance
Indeed,  following  the warning  of  the Canadian  Rebellions,  throughout  the  1840’s
American efforts to rectify its borders in the northeast, northwest and south, (Maine, Oregon
and  Texas  respectively),  alerted  Britain  to  Federal  expansionism,  with  Palmerston
particularly militant about refusing to give an inch to American claims. In the wake of the
unrest therefore the aim became not merely securing British North America, but over time
the enabling the emergence of a nation strong enough to actually counteract Federal growth.
The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  Lord  Brougham  for  example  wanted  to  “balance  the
colossal empire of the United States” with an “independent, flourishing, and powerful state”
in British North America.40 The under-secretary of the Colonial Office James Stephen too
stated  that  “a  forecasting  Policy  would  appear  to  suggest  that  provision  should  be
deliberately, though of course unavowedly, made for the peaceful and honourable abdication
of a power, which ere long it will be impossible to retain, and for raising up on the North
American Continent a counter poise to the United States.”41  With hindsight, believing that a
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confederation of the provinces could match or rival the continental  dominance of the US
appears wildly  unrealistic,  particularly  when the literature has generally  tended to assert
Federal preponderance by the middle of the century. It is true that in terms of their base
assets the United States was much further along than British North America in industry,
communications and even national consciousness. The relative populations (approximately
30 million as compared to 3 million) too overwhelmingly favoured the US, while immigrants
from the Old World flowed more frequently to American ports than to colonial. The policy
was, no doubt, to an extent abstract thinking, a theoretical solution to the problem of US
regional  influence  in  the  absence  of  a  more  certain  alternative.  However  British
comprehensions must also be put in their antebellum context. The Chancellor’s policy goal
of creating a “balance” against the US colossus and Palmerston’s forthrightness in making
clear  that  war  would  result  from McLeod’s  execution owed to another  critical  factor:  the
relative leverage they believed the military scenario afforded them. 
In this respect it must be considered exactly how the imperial government believed
union would be accomplished.  While a consensus was already beginning to grow that a
general confederation would make the provinces more secure against the United States,
there was a belief that it had to be preceded by important preliminary steps. As with Upper
and Lower Canada post-1838, the Colonial Office favoured the creation of smaller unions,
hoping that one between the Maritime Provinces would follow that of the Canadas. These
regional  unions  could  then  be  assembled  into  a  complete  pan-continental  British  North
American state. At the present time too, without significant improvement in communications
the scope of the ultimate project was believed unworkable due to the expanse of the territory
involved. Given both the practical engineering and logistical issues therefore, as well as the
more political problem of the regionalism and parochialism of the individual provinces, this
was an incremental, step-by-step policy that it was believed must come about over time. The
imperial policy was bound up with the nature of provincial autonomy, in that as British North
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America had essential self-government imperial leaders could not impose union upon the
provinces and recognised it must develop organically. Colonial autonomy too meant that the
home  government  wished  the  provinces  to  accept  the  economic  brunt  of  building  the
continental railway necessary to facilitate union. Thus the need for the provinces to come to
Britain’s terms of acceding to the building blocks of maritime unification and financing the
intercolonial railroad meant that Confederation from the metropolitan point of view had to be
long term project. 
The key is that British statesmen believed that time would allow this, mainly because
they felt no impending military danger from the United States. The final determining factor
behind continental - or indeed world - influence was perceived to be the military means of
defending and projecting  that  influence.  The Royal  Navy was considered to be Britain’s
ultimate arbiter and this made imperial strategists confident that they could force a decision
with the United States, particularly as, militarily at least; the US continued to be regarded in
England as a second-rate power. When at the same time as the Canadian Rebellions local
clashes known as the ‘Aroostook War’ took place over the position of the Maine/British North
America frontier took place, Palmerston made clear the basis for his disgust over what he
saw as British concession in the later settlement.  Palmerston felt assured by the relative
weakness of the US and that therefore the government should stand firm on British claims.
Palmerson wrote that “the states of the Union are in a condition of general bankruptcy, and
that does not give a fancy for maritime war to a nation who live by commerce and who have
made no naval preparations whatever for a fight by sea.”42 The subsequent belief that Britain
could bring its policy to bear in North America allowed imperial statesmen to believe, rightly
or wrongly, that the provinces could be nurtured into a position of regional power. The lack of
militarisation on the continent by the late 1830s suggested that British North America might
enjoy  sufficient  breathing  space to eventually  grow to  rival  the United States.  This  was
deemed  an  essential  goal  as  the  more  pervading  worries  in  terms  of  republican
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expansionism were American conceptions of  Manifest  Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine,
though these were ideological and political tenets that had yet to find full military expression.
Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine
The concept of ‘Manifest Destiny’ held that US Republicanism would eventually embrace the
whole of the land mass from the North Pole to Central America. Again, British opposition was founded
on their ideological wish to limit ‘mobocratic’ Federal democracy, on the pride and prestige attached to
maintaining an imperial presence on the continent, and on the strategic rationale that both of these
aims were militarily attainable. The long-term aim of challenging the United States in North America
therefore also relied on the very practical  necessity  of  preserving the imperial  status-quo.  British
strength was founded on global  trade secured by the Royal  Navy,  and maintaining British North
America  was vital  as  this  colonial  network  provided  the bedrock  of  Britain’s  maritime power.  Sir
William Young stated in a speech printed in The Times in 1838, “our colonial possessions were the
nursery of our commercial marine; our commercial marine was the foundation of our Royal Navy; and
it was on our naval supremacy that the pride and majesty of England depended.”43 As little stall was
afforded to US armed forces but great given to those of Britain, preserving key naval stations like
Halifax and Bermuda was essential  for keeping the military  odds in  Britain’s  favour.  Sir  Edmund
Walker Head, Canada’s Governor General in the antebellum decade, too said it would be disastrous
“to allow the force of these Colonies and the advantages of their military position, their trade and their
shipping to be transferred by any process to the Government of Washington.”44
This  argument  formed part  of  John Arthur  Roebuck’s  manifesto over  how Britain
should maintain the colonies. Roebuck, who had been born in India and raised in Canada,
summed up almost  all  of  the  key points:  the naval  imperative to preserve British  North
America, the fact that imperial forces should even be looking to gain the upper hand on land,
43
 The Times, 19 January 1838.
44
 Chester Martin, Sir Edmund Head’s First Project, (Toronto, 1955), p. 17.
33
and the great democratic danger of the Republican system spreading. Roebuck wrote that
“the extension of the power of the United States to the North Pole I have always considered
an event fatal to the maritime superiority of England. Possessed of the St. Lawrence, the
United States would, in fact, have no frontier to defend. Her offensive and defensive power
would  be  increased  by  that  acquisition  to  an  extent,  that  would  render  her  influence
dangerous to the general liberty of the world.”45 Consequently placing a check on Manifest
Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine was about containing US power and preserving that of
Britain, particularly its vital maritime strength. In positing that the United States would then
“have no frontier to defend” Roebuck’s work was telling in referring to potential offensive
action into the US itself, though Roebuck’s main point seems to have been that if secure by
land, America would be free to build its own naval power. Roebuck’s fear for the “general
liberty of the world” indicated again the common British suspicions of the American system
and its expansionist intent.
Edward Watkin too, who was to help pioneer the intercolonial railway in the provinces
and offer important support to the British North American union, wrote that “the dream of
possessing a country extending from the Pole to the Isthmus of Panama, if  not to Cape
Horn, has been the ambition of the Great Republic – and it is a dangerous ambition for the
rest of the world.”46 These views furthermore pervaded the imperial government. Lord Elgin
became Governor General of Canada in 1847 and it was made clear to Elgin by the Colonial
Minister  that  British  North  America  should  become  a  bulwark  against  United  States
republicanism. The Colonial Secretary was Lord Grey – who would become British Minister
for War in the latter stages of the Civil War – and Grey told the Governor General that “the
more I see and hear of the state of affairs in the United States, the more convinced I am of
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the extreme importance of consolidating in British America a system of government not so
ultra-democratic in principle as that of the great republic.”47
The Maine and Oregon boundary settlements
In the early part of the decade Britain came to negotiate a settlement with the United
States of the Maine boundary question. The Whig administration had been replaced by a
Conservative government under Robert Peel and Palmerston’s place at the Foreign Office
taken over by Lord Aberdeen. As alluded to the reason for the bartering was in various parts
strategic –particularly whose territory would incorporate Rouse’s Point which would be a key
base for any American invasion of Canada, though this region became part of New York, not
Maine - , part commercial in terms of the economic interests of Maine, and part a point of
honour between the two nations which, again, Palmerston was especially determined over.
Aberdeen despatched Lord Ashburton to negotiate terms of the Maine border with American
Secretary of State Daniel Webster, Ashburton being selected precisely as he had both the
American  and  financial  ties  to  ensure  an  amicable  settlement.  The  Webster-Ashburton
Treaty (1842) relinquished much of the British claim – most significantly Rouse’s Point –
though Peel and Aberdeen talked up the retention of the high ground commanding Quebec
and  a  route  for  an  intercolonial  railroad  completely  within  imperial  territory.48 The
concessions should be explained however, not by Kenneth Bourne’s argument that Britain
had begun to acquiesce in US predominance, but by the fact that Peel and Aberdeen were
free-traders  who  gave  commercial  intercourse  precedence  over  relatively  minor  military
considerations or national prestige. Indeed, the surrender of Rouse’s Point can equally be
taken as evidence that the Peel ministry believed the United States to pose no long-term
military  threat  despite  what  local  tactical  advantages  it  might  accrue.  In  opposition
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Palmerston  was  far  more  concerned  with  the  maintenance  of  British  prestige  and
incremental gains made by the United States. Given the feeling of relative security about US
military  capability,  Palmerston  could  not  countenance  what  he  saw  as  a  wilful  and
unnecessary enhancement of  the American position describing “the loss of character,  of
moral  influence,  and  of  military  Security  which  will  result  to  us  from this  needless  and
gratuitous surrender.”49 
Following this however there remained controversy over the position of the Oregon
Country/Columbia District boundary. Peel’s cabinet again refrained from brinksmanship and
accepted a modest settlement, all the disputed territory excepting Vancouver Island being
given up to the US. Again, the relative concessions should be comprehended in diplomatic
and economic terms rather  than Britain acquiescing out  of  concern of  American military
power. Indeed, all the evidence again suggests that the imperial government believed itself
to possess the better of the military balance. At one point in the dispute the British Minister in
Washington Sir Richard Packenham had written to the Foreign Minister that “the fact is the
Americans are much more afraid of a rupture than we are.”50 Aberdeen replied that “our
naval force in the Pacific is ample” and that “we are perfectly determined to cede nothing to
force or menace”.51 Assurance naturally was provided by the Royal Navy; however British
confidence also stemmed tellingly from a sense of assurance on land. This was due to the
diminutive nature of the US army and its anticipated inability, as in the War of Independence
and War of 1812, to seize and to hold meaningful territory in so vast an expanse as British
North America. As much had been reported to the War Office by military surveyor Captain
Boxer,  recruited  to  examine  defence  along  the  St.  Lawrence  River.  Boxer  believed  the
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territorial scale of Canada and lack of Federal forces would make US logistics vulnerable,
and was confident the Royal Navy would exploit resultant gaps. Boxer relayed that:
 the Americans ...  except assisted by money and men from foreign
powers, cannot ... stand a long campaign, and as by withdrawing a large army
... to hold communications with the frontier of Canada they must weaken their
forces on the seaboard materially, all their commercial cities on the Atlantic
would become exposed to the attacks of such of our naval and military forces
as may be directed from England against them and such diversions would of
course not be neglected nor be afforded in doubtful numbers.52 
This reference to ‘attacks of our military forces’ signalled the point that not only did
British  strategists  remain  underwhelmed  by  Federal  capabilities,  but  actually  envisaged
offensive operations on a considerable scale - ”not in doubtful numbers”  - into  the United
States.  This  provides  further evidence against  the notion of  British North America being
considered a ‘hostage’ to the power of the US. It had been supplemented furthermore by the
views  of  the  then imperial  Governor  General  in  Canada,  Baron Metcalfe.  If  the  Oregon
controversy  should  have  become recourse to  war  Metcalfe  was  equally  forthright  about
which nation should be fighting on the front foot, writing to the Colonial Minister that Britain
should “secure a speedy and honourable peace ... by invading the enemy’s territory with a
force so formidable as to overpower resistance, and to compel submission to the moderate
terms which our country would ... be ready to grant.” 53 
The  point  here  is  not  to  argue  that  these  positive  and  aggressive  plans  were
necessarily militarily reasonable or sound, or that some might not have been less sanguine
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about  Britain’s  chances  in  war  on  land,  but  simply  to  illustrate  that  there  existed  a
widespread confidence about Britain and America’s relative military strength. At the same
time this relative sense of security should not be confused with an eagerness to confront the
United States, as Peel’s government’s moderation over the Maine and Oregon boundary
displayed.  When  the  US  moved  to  annexe  Texas  in  the  mid-1840s  British  statesmen
opposed the southern expansion for the reasons laid out, however stopped short of direct
intervention. The plan of uniting British North America was a steady and measured policy to
allow it to check the United States over time, believed feasible as imperial statesmen did not
think the Federal Government could seize the provinces by force. At the same time Britain
did not feel it had much to gain from military confrontation with the US, and in the economic
damage that would be suffered from loss of trade both sides had much to lose.
American ‘mobocracy’
That Britain and the United States could enter into conflict with each other was, to
many,  unfathomable.  They  represented  the  world’s  two  most  developed  democratic
systems,  they  were  descended  from the same ethnic  stock  (something Britain  reflected
proudly  upon  when  acknowledging  American  progress),  and  few  countries  were  more
interconnected  by  trade and  commerce.  Mutual  aggression  therefore  appeared  suicidal.
Lincoln’s predecessor James Buchanan summarised it by saying: “no two nations have ever
existed on the face of the earth which could do each other so much good or so much harm.”
There was a sense of pride in Britain at America’s growth territorially and economically. An
editorial  article  of  The  Times had  said  that  nothing  outside  of  Britain’s  direct  power
“exercises so great and important an influence on our welfare, and on the general progress
of the world, as the character and policy of the American Government.” A year later: “we
have so little desire to check or impede the growth of the United States of America ...  we are
satisfied  the  rapid  and  successful  growth  of  that  country  is  of  essential  advantage  to
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ourselves, as Englishmen, and to the general interests of mankind.”54 Sharing as they did so
many political and economic values American progress in theory served to benefit Britain. In
broad terms the British press could - and when it suited did - sell the American success story
as a great achievement for, and display of, the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’ and therefore essentially
an English success by proxy. Standing up for the United States in Britain were the radicals
led by Richard Cobden, John Bright and William Forster. They were pro-American, pro-free-
trade  reformists of the ‘Manchester School’ and would vehemently champion the cause of
the Union during the Civil War. They were three however of what was but a tiny presence of
Federal supporters in parliament, while in government the fraction was smaller still.
In  general  therefore  British  feelings  regarding  American  Republicanism  were  far
more nuanced, particularly within the ruling classes. Colouring London’s attitude towards the
US was the belief that US democracy was dangerously unrestrained. The political strife that
would lead to the Civil War came to be seen in Britain as the natural outcome of this corrupt
system – and to provide a warning over how the new unified British North American state
should be constituted in terms of a federal or legislative structure. Palmerston especially saw
the conflict as resulting from the over-empowerment of the people and the states. Strongly
imbued with this prejudice against US institutions, Britain’s leader in the Civil War’s political
career in particular was marked by a desire to check the power and progress of the United
States. Palmerston was born in 1784 - the year the treaty granting independence to the
United States was ratified - and held his first political post before the War of 1812 broke out.
It was known that Palmerston had, as a young child, passed through France in the turbulent
year of 1792, the experience impressing upon him the danger and chaos that could readily
accompany  power  in  the  hands  of  the  masses.  The  experience  of  the  second  Anglo-
American conflict, as well as the struggle against the revolutionary, republican and imperial
France had a marked influence on Palmerston, a political  colleague stating that he “was
54
 The Times. 22 June, 1854; 25 October, 1855.
39
launched into public life when the feeling of the whole country was bitter against them as
rebellious colonists, and no man quite gets rid of his early impressions.”55 
Palmerston therefore was especially critical of the extent of popular democracy in the
United States. It can be argued that this association of the French ideological threat with the
American  played  into  the  military  concern  of  a  repetition  of  the  War  of  1812  whereby
hostilities would arise in the North America at time of war in Europe and vice versa. This was
put  forward  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington  who  could  certainly  draw  on  experience  of  the
problem, and who summarised why the British system was so much more virtuous than the
republican. Wellington wrote “we must expect that a war with the United States will not be
with that Power alone. Unfortunately the Democratic Party throughout the world is inimical to
this country. The reason is that our system is essentially conservative: that the freedom of
the  subject  is  founded  upon  law  and  order;  which  provides  at  the  same  time  for  the
conservation of person, property, privileges, honour and character; and the institutions of the
country.”56 Therefore while Britain was reticent to clash with the United States head on –
unless forced into it on a strict point of honour – a large cross-section of statesmen certainly
felt that it was in the imperial interest to attempt to halt US growth as much as possible.
The Mexican War
American  annexation  of  Texas  led  to  the  Mexican  War  in  1846-48  and  with  it
renewed  scrutiny  over  republican  expansion,  American  military  strength  and  the  geo-
strategic balance. Imperial appraisals of the military situation however remained influenced
by the perceived modesty of US forces. When the United States first invaded the British
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Minister in Washington talked up the defenders’ chances, Packenham writing to Aberdeen
that “the Americans greatly underrate the difficulty and expense of a war with Mexico”.57
Nonetheless  American  conquests  in  the  Mexican  War  -  which  included  California,  New
Mexico,  and  Texas  -  made  continental  expansionism  a  military  fact.  British  statesmen
however were not greatly perturbed by this American progress, particularly as the internal
friction in the United States had begun to be perceived and could only be exacerbated by
multiplying its territory. Post 1849 the United States persisted with its small pre-war army of
15,000 men and The Times for example published that “we have far more available troops
than the Americans” and “are more accustomed to military movements and operations.”58
The Federal expansion nonetheless only increased the imperial  drive to establish a non-
republican counterweight in North America.
Kenneth  Bourne  therefore  overstated  imperial  pessimism  at  least  to  an  extent59
Crucially it was a time when Britain’s two major statesmen of the Civil War-era had also held
the  leading  roles,  though  in  reverse.  Russell  was  Prime  Minister  and  Palmerston  had
returned as Foreign Secretary.  Though the US had effectively  redefined its  limits  north,
south,  east  and west  with the Mexican cessions and relative gains made by the border
settlements, the imperial government – and particularly Palmerston and Russell - continued
to back imperial arms to keep British North America secure as a long-term continental rival.
Bourne’s allusion to the potential significance of the United States breaking apart from within
was important, though rather than representing the last British hope for checking American
continental dominance, in fact this internal friction in the US formed part of the general lack
of concern over Federal strength that maintained imperial hopes for the provinces to form an
eventual counterweight. 
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Britain’s continued confidence about checking Federal power following the Mexican
War was already in part due to the increasingly evident internal rift in the US which came to
temporarily forestall further American expansion to the north. Indeed, British statesmen were
even already considering how in the event of a breakup of the Union the balance of power
on the continent might be altered. This scenario according to Grey would allow Britain to
wield “as much power by offensive & defensive alliances as under its Colonial system.”60
This allusion to “offensive” alliances reemphasises the point that British cabinet ministers
were still relatively secure about American power on land and believed that scope remained
for opposing it.
The aversion to American Republicanism was an important factor in the wake of the
Mexican  conflict,  particularly  in  the  context  of  a  wider  reaction  against  democratic
movements which played out  with the Revolutions  of  1848 in Europe.  Both Russell  and
Palmerston were imbued with the wish to maintain an imperial barrier to the United States.
Indeed, far from anti-imperialist as Creighton suggested, Russell even took exception when
Elgin  posited  the  end-game of  confederation  might  be his  own administrative  power  as
Governor  General  assumed  by  a  provincial  politician,  with  Britain  maintaining  a  token
imperial representative and military force. The Governor General wrote to Grey that “the time
may come when it may be expedient to allow the Colonists to elect their own Governors ... ,
England withdrawing all her forces except 2000 men at Quebec & being herself represented
in  the Colony  by  an Agent  –  something  like  a  Resident  in  India.” 61 These suggestions
obviously represented what came to be the quintessential imperial goals of the unification
scheme,  to  concede  further  self-governance  to  the  provincial  assembly  and  restrict  the
British  military  commitment.  When  the  contents  of  this  letter  were  relayed  to  Russell
however, it  revealed the Prime Minister’s aversion to any appearance of abandoning the
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colonies and the importance placed on not dropping the British guard over defence. Russell
wrote  an  uncharacteristically  passionate  note  to  the  Colonial  Secretary  damning  Elgin’s
suggestion and concluding “anything would be better than an elective Governor & an English
Garrison of 2000 men. Better blow up Quebec & all our fortifications in Canada!”  62 In case of
doubt, the Prime Minister made explicit to Grey that his primary concern was preventing the
further expansion of the American federal system, writing that “the pressing danger is that of
annexation to the United States to which I could never give my consent.”63
Elgin  certainly  could  not  be  accused  of  antipathy  towards  imperial  security.  He
foresaw  potentially  disastrous  consequences  if  the  US  was  empowered  by  turning  her
armies north without an adequate British response, writing to the Colonial Minister “let the
Yankees get possession of British North America with the prestige of superior generalship –
who can say how soon they may dispute with you the empire of India and of the seas?” 64
Grey was more accommodating of the approach to gear the provinces for independence, but
reemphasised the point that prior to this, Britain had to maintain and develop them until they
were able to shield themselves from US republicanism.  The Colonial  Secretary wrote to
Elgin that “as the effect of the institutions of the United States becomes more and more
developed, the more dangerous I think them to the peace of the world, and I do think it of the
utmost  consequence that  we should  retain  (the provinces)  long enough to raise them a
constitution in which they might maintain their own independence instead of being absorbed
into the Union.”65 Grey in this context referred to “independence” as the ongoing granting of
autonomy that would take place within the structure of the British Empire and carried out with
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the established intention of rendering them strong enough politically and commercially to
keep them outside of the US. 
Grey’s use of the phrase “absorbed into the Union” however was also significant as,
in  spite of  the sense of  assurance about  the lack of  military threat,  US institutional  and
economic development raised a concurrent worry that the provinces would inexorably enter
into the United States commercial slipstream. As a result in the early to mid-1850s British
statesmen felt the threat of annexation by force secondary to the more subversive economic
danger.  Following  the Mexican  War  Roebuck  appealed  again  to  the establishment  of  a
unified  British  North  American  nation  to  counteract  the  growing  “empire”  of  the  United
States. The colonial theorist echoed the thoughts of Durham, Russell and Grey and called
for a “new confederation ... which would prove a counterpoise to the gigantic empire and
influence of the United States (whose) mighty wings seem as if about to be unfolded, and
then to overshadow the whole of that vast continent, of which already she has acquired but
too large a portion.”66
The Reciprocity Treaty
This  formation  of  an economically  viable  British  North  America  to  discourage  its
people  from wishing  to  join  the United  States  therefore  fuelled  imperial  ambitions  for  a
greater  continental  nation  to  be formed out  of  the  provinces.  While  a  vague  but  broad
consensus already existed that a general confederation of British North America would make
the provinces more secure against the United States, there was a belief  that it would be
preceded by important preliminary steps. As with Upper and Lower Canada post 1838, the
Colonial Office favoured the creation of smaller unions, for instance of the Atlantic Provinces,
that could then be assembled into a complete pan-continental British North American state.
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Moreover at the present time the scope of the project was believed unworkable considering
the incredible expanse of the territory, without significant improvement in communications. 
To this  end both  the establishment  of  a sustainable  commercial  system and the
communications  and  linkage  to  support  union  would  be  aided  by  the  construction  of  a
transcontinental railroad. The Canadian legislature already favoured an ‘intercolonial’ railway
joining  Canada  to  New Brunswick  in  order  to  improve trade opportunities  and  compete
commercially  with  the northerly  American states.  The Maritime Provinces  however  were
interested  in  a  rival  project  flamboyantly  entitled  the  “European  and  North  American
Railway”,  proposed  to  link  Halifax  to  Maine.  This  transferred  the  focal  point  of  trade
opportunities to those between the Atlantic Provinces and the United States and therefore,
wishing to prevent provincial dependency on the US, the imperial government preferred the
scheme connecting the Maritime colonies to Canada. British statesmen endorsed this project
as the valuable foundation for union, not only in the physical logistical sense, but also by
forging ties and relationships  in  encouraging  the colonies  to work together.  Without  the
railway Grey told Russell in 1849 “there was an absence of any sufficient common interests
to  form  the  ground  work  of  the  union,  &  there  also  were  physical  obstacles  to  their
communication with each other which must render it practically very difficult if not impossible
for any description of central authority to work.”67 
In  facilitating  economic  and  political  co-operation  with  a  view  to  provincial  union
therefore  the  intercolonial  lent  itself  to  securing  British  North  America’s  existence
independent of the United States, an aim that that would also be assisted by the railway’s
potential use for defence. The commercial benefit was also bound up with the military in that
imperial trade with the pacific colonies relied on American logistics and therefore depended
on peace. Watkin asked the metropolis to “try for one moment to realize China opened to
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British  commerce:  Japan  also  opened:  the  new  gold  fields  in  our  own  territory  on  the
extreme west  and  California,  also  within  reach:  India,  our  Australian  Colonies  –  all  our
eastern Empire in fact, material and moral, dependent (as it present it too much is) upon an
overland communication,  through a foreign state.”68 This  issue had again yet  to assume
great urgency while Britain felt confident in their military capability.
In the late 1840s to early 1850s the fear surrounding the economic threat intensified
when, following the repeal of the Corn Laws and loss of exclusive trade privileges with the
mother country, pro-annexationist sentiment grew again in the provinces. Stewardship of the
Colonial Office had been taken over by the Earl of Clarendon and in part to appease and
reconcile the local populations once more Britain negotiated the Reciprocity Treaty with the
United States in  1854,  the first  time a foreign trade agreement had been negotiated on
behalf of colonial possessions. The treaty exchanged fishing rights for US seaman off the
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland coasts for duty free entry of the provinces’ goods into the
American market. Either or both parties would be entitled to serve notice of their intention to
terminate the arrangement after ten years, with the period of notice being one year. Although
reciprocity  was  primarily  intended  to  address  the  commercial  issue  and  the  imperial
government remained sanguine about the strategic situation, there was a military rationale in
that  local  clashes  over  the  fisheries  had  threatened  more  than  once  to  escalate  into
hostilities with the US. Clarendon’s statement on the treaty therefore, though to an extent
designed for effect, summed up the diplomatic and economic value when describing “this
great work, which ... more than any other event of recent times, will contribute to remove all
differences between two countries whose similarity of language and affinity of race, whose
enterprise  and  industry,  ought  to  unite  them  in  the  bonds  of  cordial  friendship,  and  to
perpetuate feelings of mutual confidence and good-will.”69
68
 Watkin, Canada and the States, p. 14.
69
 Hansard, CLXXXV, 27 June 1854, col. 995.
46
In  spite  of  this,  annexationists  in  the  United  States  held  an  alternative  view  of
reciprocity that, far from reducing the economic motive of the provinces to desire entry into
the Union, in establishing a unique commercial relationship the treaty laid groundwork for
their incorporation into the Union in the future. Both their sense of military assurance and the
internal troubles in the US allowed British statesmen to at present dismiss this, especially as
the treaty itself served as a proxy for the developing conflict between north and south. The
south predominantly opposed annexation of British North America as the provinces, entering
the Union  as they would  as  non-slave states,  would  tip  the  already  perilously  teetering
balance in favour of the free north. The Kansas-Nebraska Act had been signed only the
month before and led to the sectional violence known as “Bleeding Kansas” over whether or
not the territory would admit slavery. The south therefore preferred to take the British view
that the treaty strengthened the colonies’ separate identity and would place a check on what
they - like many British statesmen - had come to describe as northern ‘imperialism’. On the
British  side  commentators  had  predicted  that  the  Union  could  not  survive  the  vast
acquisitions made following the Mexican War. Bleeding Kansas now showed the conflict
attendant with establishing new states, and it seemed impossible that of all the divergent
interests in the Union could hold together if the British North American provinces were added
to this mix. This restriction was summed up in The Times, it being stated that “the Southern
States would resolutely oppose any such accession of strength to their northern antagonists
as must  result  from the junction of  the Canadian provinces” and if  not,  “the weight  thus
thrown upon the northern extremity of the Union would precipitate the catastrophe so long
foreboded, and snap asunder the mighty fabric at its centre.”70
British and southern views also met on reciprocity in that it at least helped delay a
growing  clamour  in  the  United  States  for  the  erection  of  trade  barriers.  These  calls
predominantly  came  from  the  north  sustained  as  it  was  on  a  more  industrialised,
manufacturing  economy  while  the  south  relied  on  foreign,  particularly  British,  trade.  A
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prospective  tariff  was therefore a further  source of  the imperial  antagonism towards the
United States – and of the tension within it - and gave yet another motivation for keeping the
provinces outside of the Union. This was because whether the US imposed a protective tariff
or not, as long as British North America was maintained great quantities of trade could be
smuggled into the US via the ‘back door’ of the colonies. This was very important to Russell
in the same way that it was felt important to preserve the ports and harbours of the provinces
in order to maintain the Royal Navy and restrict American power. Keeping possession of
British North America’s coastline safeguarded Britain’s export trade and held back one of its
main economic rivals. The Prime Minister issued a warning to Cobden that the “imposition of
a duty of 30 to 40 per cent on British manufactured goods from the Mississippi to the St.
Lawrence would be a great blow to Manchester & Leeds.” 71
The Crimean War
The Reciprocity  Treaty had been  signed  in  the in  the  midst  of  a  steady military
reduction in British North America and the month after Britain had entered the Crimean War.
Gladstone was now in his first spell at the Treasury and advocated the scaling down of the
imperial garrisoning commitment. Britain had not been involved in a major conflict for almost
four decades and its reliance on maintaining peace through these years primarily through
diplomatic compromise and the deterrence provided by the Royal Navy, left it short of troops
on the ground. The imperial troop withdrawals from North America had to be accelerated in
order to reinforce the East which aroused the perennial  concern that preoccupation with
Europe  would  be  met  with  opportunism  by  the  United  States.  Palmerston  was  Home
Secretary under Lord Aberdeen’s premiership when the war broke out, and remained as
intent on challenging the US - particularly in its attempts to spread its influence in Central
America - as dealing with Russia.  However the steady military reduction in North America
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meant that in the event of a United States attack, though the imperial government would
supply  what  regulars it  could,  appeal  was necessary to local  forces to make up for  the
shortfall. Palmerston wrote to the Governor General that “there was a necessity for a clear
understanding ... that ... should an invasion of Canada by foreign Powers occur, the most
valuable aid to reinforcements supplied from this country would be afforded by an organized
militia, such as her great population might now supply.”72 The Canadian legislature passed a
militia law in 1855 to create a volunteer force of 5000 men to replace the regulars which
displayed some action. Imperial attempts to unburden British regulars from local defence in
the provinces would become an ongoing concern and reach their zenith in the Civil War the
sheer scale of the American build-up was impossible for home forces to match.
The fear of invasion appeared like it might be realised however when the need for
manpower resulted in the Crampton Affair, illegal recruiting activity by the British Minister in
Washington Sir John Crampton which led to a potential breaking off of diplomatic relations.
English observers perceived in President Franklin Pierce’s belligerent stance the common
opportunism of pandering to Anglophobic feeling with Presidential elections a year away.
The Foreign Minister wrote that “the President, to give himself a chance on the Democratic
ticket, was obliged to perform an act of vigour, which being interpreted always means some
insult  to  England.”  The  affair  thus  provoked  more  opprobrium  over  the  nature  of  the
republican  system  and  enhanced  the  negative  opinion  in  Britain  that  US  democracy
corrupted its foreign policy,  if  possible,  even more than its domestic.  One article in  The
Times considered that “so long as the Government is really ... acting for what it believes the
interests of its subjects, so long as it really has a foreign policy, however wrongheaded and
perverse, it is entitled to respect and consideration, but when its foreign policy is no policy at
all, but a mere trick played off for the purpose of a coming election, we cannot but feel that
there is some grave defect in the theory or working of institutions which thus permits the
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most precious interests of nations to be trifled with and blustered away.”73 British sea power
was sufficiently strong to send further ships to the Atlantic stations and this allowed the
paper to quip “perhaps instead of reinforcing our West Indian squadron, we ought to station
half-a-dozen ships at each of the ports menaced by Mr Pierce’s electioneering tactics.”74
To colonial reformer J.R. Godley the American threat posed an even greater problem
than the Russian menace and led again to the suggestion of consolidating British North
America. Godley effectively summarized the growing British view that the provinces’ should,
through unification, be fitted for a strong independence as a means to counterbalance the
power of the United States and prevent annexation. Godley wrote to Charles Adderley - the
man who as under-secretary for the colonies would be responsible for drafting the British
North America Act in 1867 - that
the  Statesman  must  be  blind  who  does  not  see  that  the  great  peril  which
overshadows the future of the civilized world lies in the vast power and progress
of  the  United  States,  coupled  as  their  gigantic  material  resources  are  with
unbounded energy and inordinate ambition.  To raise up to this over-weening
power  a  rival  on  its  own continent,  would  be  a  work  far  more valuable  and
important to England than the curbing of the power of Russia. Such a rival as
British  America  would  be to the United States,  necessarily  inferior  in  power,
would for its own sake be a faithful ally to England, for on England’s friendship
and  support  her  existence  would  depend.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  British
American States remain disunited,  they must  be annexed one by one to the
mammoth republic.75
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Filibustering in Central America
Though British involvement in the Crimea and the Crampton affair did not result in an
American attack, there was increased American filibustering in Central America, which led to
some dangerous excesses such the bombardment and sacking of the British protectorate at
Greytown, modern-day Nicaragua. The United States also stepped up efforts to enforce the
Monroe Doctrine in Cuba and Aberdeen’s government faced pressure, not only from without
over slow the progress in Russia, but also from within as Palmerston displayed his intent to
challenge  the  US  by  petitioning  the  Foreign  Office  to  take  a  firm  stand  against  US
encroachments.  Clarendon  was  given  to  be  forthright  due  to  the  concord  with  France.
Referring  to  British  and  French  opposition  to  American  designs  on  Cuba,  the  Foreign
Minister  had  stated  “on  the  question  of  policy  there  is  no  part  of  the  world  in  either
hemisphere with regard to which we are not entirely in accord.” The Foreign Minister agreed
with Palmerston that deterrence was the best policy response to the US, particularly due to
the  volatility  of  the  American  ‘mob’.  Remaining  steadfast  about  the  Empire’s  strength,
Clarendon also spoke of the effect to be had by displaying that Britain could project its power
in North America at the same time that it was engaged in a struggle on the other side of the
world. He wrote to the British ambassador in France that 
Nothing can be worse than the doings of the United States and they
think to make political capital against us in the belief that our hands are full
but we mean to dispel that delusion and in order to prevent another attack on
Greytown or Ruatan ...  a 90 gun screw sails shortly to reinforce the West
Indian  station,  another  powerful  frigate  will  follow  in  a  fortnight  and  if
necessary some of the Baltic screws when the winter sets in... these bullies
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must be shown that we are not afraid of them or they will be hustled into war
with us by some of the mob to whose passions they pander.76 
Tension with the United States also owed to American resentment at the damage
done to neutral trade by the Russian war and particularly the British blockade, leading to
rumours that the US would turn to privateers. This only made Palmerston more belligerent;
however  and  the  reasons  for  his  forcefulness  were  extremely  significant.  Firstly,  like
Clarendon, while at war with Russia Britain was allied with France; secondly, the Canadian
legislature had passed some measure towards taking responsibility for defence; and thirdly,
confidence remained high in the Royal Navy. Palmerston wrote to Clarendon that “when we
have taken Sevastopol ... as we shall do with the Lancaster Guns our naval force will be to a
great  degree let  free.  We have France so bound up with us,  we have our N. American
provinces now united and loyal.” Sea power remained Britain’s trump card, and the Home
Secretary therefore suggested to the cabinet that if the United States elected to issue letters
of  marque Britain should unleash its power and reduce the American eastern seaboard.
Palemerston wrote “the U.S. have no navy of which we need be afraid, & they might be told
that if they were to resort to privateering, we should ... retaliate by burning all their sea coast
Towns.”77
Despite Palmerston and Clarendon’s hawkishness, the mounting opposition to military
adventure, particularly from Gladstone, Roebuck and Derby, put paid to any use of force
against the US. It had been made clear that the British public and parliament would not
countenance war over the foreign enlistment crisis, let alone American filibustering in Central
America. From 1854 to 1857 successive British Governments faced severe criticism as a
result of deficiencies shown first in the Crimea, then on in the Indian Mutiny.  The Times
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especially placed a microscope on the mishandling of the Russian War.78  This was highly
influential  as a result  of  both wider literacy and the revolution in printing and distribution
technology, which by the mid-nineteenth century allowed newspapers to engage society to a
greater extent than ever before. William Howard Russell, who would go on to send influential
reports back from the Civil War, helped pioneer front-line war reporting and the Crimean War
was also among the first conflicts to be captured by photograph. Casualties were extremely
high and as in the Civil War the majority succumbed to disease. 
The assault on Sebastopol, the rapid reduction of which Palmerston had considered
would free the Royal Navy for possible enterprises in the west, turned into a frustrating and
protracted siege and the Allies’ troubles turned a large section of public opinion against the
government,  and against  military operations in general.  There was strong criticism about
cutbacks  which  were held  to have deprived the army of  vital  men and equipment.  The
backlash against  the Peelite  government  led to the Whigs  taking office and Palmerston
succeeding Aberdeen as Prime Minister. The faith in the Royal Navy, the growing sectional
problems in  the US,  and the belief  that  Crampton’s  treatment  was a stunt  for  domestic
political  gain,  had  meant  that,  on  balance,  British  assurance  over  provincial  security
remained intact; however with the military problems experienced in Russia and then in the
Indian subcontinent, the imperial troop reduction in North America, and then crucially the
regression of the Canadian efforts on defence this began to change.  
The northwest and colonial militias 
The pressure on Britain’s armed forces in the late 1850s increased the importance
placed on the colonies taking on greater responsibility for local security – a goal that self-
government,  unification,  and ultimately independence were all  intended to work towards.
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Following the financial disadvantage bought on by repeal of the Corn Laws Canada’s local
legislature had argued that it was unjust for the province to be asked to finance defence,
however  the new economic  arrangement  under  reciprocity  impacted British views of  the
extent to which the colonies should contribute.  Describing this, Grey wrote to Elgin; 
Canada  now  has  self-government;  which  ought  to  carry  with  it
corresponding responsibilities;  Her rapid progress in wealth and population
makes it only due to the people of (Britain) that they should be relieved from
the charge imposed on them for the protection of a colony so well able to do
much towards protecting itself. In this I am only reverting to the former colonial
policy of this country ... Her Majesty's Government would have thought it right
at  an  earlier  period  to  revert  to  this  policy  in  Canada  but  for  commercial
difficulties thrown in her way by British legislation. That has passed away.79
Despite this wish however, in Canada the Militia Act of 1855 soon became moribund
and  the  local  forces  in  the  provinces  generally  were  in  a  poor  state.  In  Canada  the
geography and economy of  British  North America made the militia  legislation  difficult  to
maintain. For communities reliant on an agrarian economy the months selected for training
clashed with the hunting, fishing and tree-felling seasons from which men could ill be spared,
and as a result absenteeism was endemic. Those volunteers that did participate usually had
to make vast journeys even to reach training grounds and hence were in little physical shape
for drilling. The exercises themselves were lacklustre and there were often no uniforms and
insufficient arms for companies to drill,  in some cases none. The Lieutenant Governor in
Nova Scotia the Earl of Mulgrave had similar problems with the lack of professionalism in his
local militia, as well as the advanced age of its commanders. Mulgrave wrote to the Colonial
Minister that “there is no ground work to start with and officers are generally speaking totally
ignorant of their duties and most of them are unfit for the service in consequence of their
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age.”80 On paper the New Brunswick Lieutenant Governor Arthur Gordon could call out 48
regiments of New Brunswick militia amounting to just over 40,000 men, however there were
only  200 rifles available to equip them. The little artillery  possessed by the Nova Scotia
militia  was  obsolescent  smooth-bore,  low-calibre  models  Due to  the imperative  to scale
down  the  British  commitment  the  protection  afforded  by  imperial  troops  was  steadily
decreasing.
The colonial forces were also becoming a more pressing issue in the late 1850’s as
concerns  were  growing  over  the  less  developed  parts  of  British  North  America.  British
Columbia’s  gold  rush  and  the  influx  of  American  immigration  revived  the  fear  of  US
annexation in the North West. Sir Edward Bulmer Lytton became Colonial Secretary in the
Lord Derby’s administration of 1858-59, and immediately displayed a more bullish attitude
towards the necessity of securing the future of Britain’s North American possessions. Lytton
hoped that permanent settlement in British Columbia would be a catalyst for a continent-
wide  line  of  imperial  provinces  joined  by  a  Pacific  railway  and  telegraph.  There  was
discussion in parliament of the establishment of a new colony in the centre of British North
America which could form a ‘counterforce’ to the United States and connect the easternmost
provinces to the pacific. This further encouraged a political reorganisation of British North
America as did security problems with the territory of the Hudson Bay Company. Skirmishes
with indigenous peoples had led the Company proprietor to request British military forces to
guard the Red River frontier.  Wellington in his final  political  role had argued against  the
deployment of troops to this post which could only be relieved during a small window each
year and via a precarious route, stating that it offered an enemy an “easy prestige victory” by
attacking them, however in 1857 the War Office had despatched a hundred men from the
Royal Canadian Rifles to protect against a threat from the Metis tribe.81 
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The Hudson Bay Company’s contract was nearing expiry and a Parliamentary Select
Committee  formed  to  determine  the  future  of  its  land.  As  Britain’s  willingness  to  bear
responsibility for the security of this vast tract of land was declining, the committee’s report
decreed that the company’s rule should cease and that settlement and union to Canada
presented a more suitable option. The results were also instructive as the British reluctance
to supply troops together with the annexationist threat led the Canadian Governor General
Sir Edmund Head to again mute unification with the other North American colonies as a
preventative  measure.  Head  acknowledged  the  region’s  remoteness,  and  was  therefore
working with the Colonial Minister’s railway scheme and telegraph in mind, writing to Lytton:
“it  is  evident  that  from  the  distance  and  natural  impediments,  the  real  and  active
management of local affairs at the Red River or on the Saskatchewan, must be exercised on
the spot;  but  the notion  of  union,  and of  interests  common with  Canada and the North
American colonies would have a strong tendency to prevent any leaning towards the United
States, and would ensure Her Majesty’s Government the support of these colonies against
any effort in this direction.”82 In the previous years to the 1860’s, as after, the consistent
approach of British colonial policy had been ‘divide and rule’. New South Wales had been
divided into two colonies, and the struggles in New Zealand had led to the establishment of
two semi autonomous provinces. British Columbia had been set up as a colony distinct from
Vancouver Island. Confederation was therefore a marked departure for British policy, itself
an  indicator  of  the  unique  determination  to  create  a  bulwark  against  the  United
States. .Rather than a doctrine of ‘divide and rule’ in British North America the policy came to
be  ‘unite  and  empower’  as  increased  national  power  would  it  was  hoped  increase  the
responsibility  for  defence.  This  was  all  the  more  prevalent  at  a  time  when  the  home
government faced pressure to limit the expenditure on imperial defence, this becoming the
quintessential goal of Gladstone in his role as Chancellor of the Exchequer that he would
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hold through the era of the Civil War. Even in his tenure as Colonial Secretary in the mid
1840s Gladstone had pressed for awarding self-government to New Zealand at the earliest
possible date.83
Given that security in the empire rested primarily  on the strength of  Britain’s sea
power  there  was  great  reticence  to  maintain  ground  forces  in  the  colonies  at  British
taxpayers’  expense,  particularly  due  the  perception  they  were  largely  fulfilling  token
stewarding roles that should be carried out by local forces. Gladstone wrote that there was
something unsatisfactory about “standing armies in the colonies for purposes partly of dignity
and display, partly of police, partly of enriching the local community by the expenditure of the
Imperial Funds.”84 Due to the basic local advantages of the US – which would become an
increasingly important factor through the 1860s - British North American defence relied on
the  Royal  Navy’s  ability  to  exert  pressure  on  American  decision-makers  by  blockade,
commerce raiding,  naval bombardment or perhaps even coastal  assault.  Gladstone as a
result was pushing towards a minimum of imperial soldiery in the provinces and in the main
British  naval  protection  which  is  “not  liable  to  be  employed  at  the  will  of  the  colonial
administrators for the repression of disturbances which their own misgovernment may have
provoked, nor for anything approaching to the general purpose of police.”85
Security in Europe and North America
The need to impart more responsibility onto the provinces was made more significant
by  the  breakdown  of  the  British-French  alliance  after  the  Crimean  War.  The  seemingly
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boundless ambition of Napoleon III - expanding the French Navy and warring in Italy - made
addressing the power of Britain’s continental rival the immediate priority. The drive to reduce
Britain’s  imperial  commitments  therefore  owed  much  to  an  increasing  foreboding  about
demands  being  placed  on  military  resources  in  the  dependencies  when  more  urgently
required to ward off threats in the most critical theatre to Britain’s survival, Europe. Attention
was diverted to the invasion threat and developing arms race with France. Fear of the ‘bolt
from the blue’, a rapid thrust across the Channel by an attacking French fleet, encouraged
means to relieve British forces from defence duties across the Empire.86 The great fear was
that the Royal Navy would be diverted away to suppress another uprising in India or perhaps
the West Indies, or defend a base in the Mediterranean or protect commerce in the Pacific.
The recent experience of the sepoy rebellion provided a warning of the strain Britain could
suffer from security in distant possessions. If British sea power was pinned down elsewhere,
a powerful  French squadron might  feel  emboldened to make a quick thrust  through the
English Channel. Making colonies offer more towards their defence was one such way of
keeping  more  of  the  fleet  safely  in  home  waters. To  this  end  the  establishment  of  a
permanent ‘Channel Squadron’ in 1858 also at least freed up an offensive British fleet to
attack the vital ports of France or whatever opponent they faced. 
Palmerston entered the role he would hold throughout the Civil War at the head of
government when Derby’s administration fell  in 1859 and during a defence debate made
explicit  that  the  threat  was  across  the  channel.  Describing  it  in  his  parliamentary  diary
Trelawney called it  “remarkable that Palmerston threw off all  diplomatic reserve & plainly
indicated where danger lies – viz, in France.”87 The Prime Minister sought to fortify Dover
and Portland, and establish a second inland arsenal to ease the burden on Woolwich. These
works were designed not so much to deter a French invasion of southern England but, like
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the  imperative  to  make  the  provinces  do  more  towards  colonial  defence,  a  means  of
relieving the Royal Navy from having to bear the brunt of meeting such threats in the English
Channel. They therefore essentially represented the same strategic necessity, a realisation
in  Britain  of  the  danger  of  an  overextension  of  the  Royal  Navy.  On  their  presentation
however  some of  the problems that  would  plague the configuration  of  effective imperial
defence  during  the  Civil  War  came  to  the  fore.  It  was  suggested  that  the  erection  of
fortifications  by  a  nation  that  had ostensibly  based  its  security  on diplomacy  and  naval
deterrence was apt to arouse suspicion in, if not seriously provoke, potential enemies into
greater hostility. Furthermore the advances in particularly rifled gunnery produced doubt that
the works could represent a long-term benefit. Combined too with the imperative to reduce
military expenditure the measures met with stiff opposition in parliament.
When the Prime Minister was accused in the House of Lords that his measures and
language would only alienate the French he displayed the belief he would cling to throughout
the Civil  War: that the surest form of security lay in diplomatic and military resolve. The
Prime Minister  argued that  “the only  foundation for  friendship  between equals  is  perfect
frankness; and, so far from the fair statement of what we intend to do for our own defence
being the ground for bad relations between us and France, I say that not only the statement
made to night, but the works which are to follow that statement, are the only foundation for
real and substantial friendship with France.” Palmerston however was unable to get all the
funding required for the defences, partly due to the fact that technological advances were
becoming so swift that by the time of completion the forts would likely become practically
obsolete. Trelawny asked “and, when the work shall be completed – if ever – will not new
discoveries in artillery require fresh outlay?” 88 
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 Gladstone conversely was driven to reduce Britain’s imperial and defence budget
and therefore sought to consolidate security through diplomacy rather than the increasingly
expensive method of military deterrence. The Chancellor was consequently looking for other
forms of accord with France and dispatched Cobden to Paris to negotiate the Free Trade
agreement deeming it crucial to forge some economic amity between the nations. Gladstone
briefed  Cobden  over  the  mission,  describing  "...the  great  aim  -  the  moral  and  political
significance  of  the  act,  and  its  probable  and  desired  fruit  in  binding  the  two  countries
together by interest and affection. Neither you nor I attach for the moment any superlative
value to this Treaty for the sake of the extension of British trade ... What I look to is the social
good,  the  benefit  to  the  relations  of  the  two  countries,  and  the  effect  on  the peace  of
Europe".89
The Prince of Wales’s North American Tour
The effect of the insecurity over France necessarily played directly on the minds of
British diplomats with regard to how they assessed the imperial position in North America.
Towards the very end of the antebellum decade a local dispute in the Vancouver Island
territory  concerning farming land when a British citizen’s  pig was killed  by an American
neighbour caused a diplomatic controversy over the position of the Oregon-Columbia District
boundary. Reporting his efforts to reach compromise back to Russell,  Foreign Minister in
Palmerston’s administration, the new British Minister in Washington Lord Lyons referred to
the problem of American use of anti-British feeling for political capital writing “I have said all I
have been able to think of  to enforce the fairness and good sense of our proposal,  but
electioneering considerations outweigh all other in this country, elections go on without a
pause from years end to years end, and violent language against England is always popular
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with the rabble who alone take part  in them.”90 This issue would shortly assume greater
significance with the election that sparked the secession crisis. During the 1860 presidential
campaign which brought Lincoln to power, Lyons wrote to Russell that “whichever party is in
power in this country, we must, I am afraid, by always prepared for a declaration of war by
the United States, if we are involved in serious difficulties in Europe.”91
Diplomacy  did  smooth  over  the  crisis,  important  as  it  signalled  a  moment  when,
despite  the  insecurity  with  France,  most  British-American  issues  had  been  resolved.
Incumbent president James Buchanan, effectively left helpless by the deteriorating relations
between North and South, was hoping his presidential legacy would at least benefit from
having  settled  the  contentious  matters  in  foreign  relations,  particularly  with  Britain.
Recounting his last meeting with the Buchanan, Lyons wrote “he began by repeating an
observation he often makes to me, that it has been his great ambition to be able to say at
the end of his Administration that he left no question with Great Britain unsettled: that for the
first time since the Revolution ‘the docket was clear.”92 The reception given to the Prince of
Wales  during his  North  American  tour  the following  year  was seen as  evidence  of  this
rapprochement.  Amongst  other  symbolic  acts  Prince Edward  shook  hands  with  the last
American survivor of the Battle of Bunker Hill.93 One of the most notable impressions was
that formed by the new British Colonial Minister the Duke of Newcastle who accompanied
the Prince. Of the ovation from the American people Newcastle wrote: “there could be but
two causes  for  such a  demonstration:  personal  love of  the  Queen,  which  amongst  this
people  is  a  passion,  and  rapidly  growing  affection  for  England,  which  I  am  thoroughly
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convinced this visit will speedily ripen into a firm and (if properly watched and fostered) an
enduring attachment ... I think I am not too sanguine in saying now that we shall leave the
United States on the 20th a faster friend to our country than they have been since their
separation.”94 
On the eve of the Civil War therefore the imperial government had resumed its sense
of ease over North American security, an assurance that had, in general, been maintained
since  the  War  of  1812.  This  was  not  only  due  to  the  improvement  in  Anglo-American
relations, but also because of a corresponding good feeling from the provinces towards the
mother country. The visit of the Prince of Wales, as well as the recent French war scare, had
ignited  a  patriotism which encouraged the formation of  new volunteer  militia  companies
making the home government more optimistic about local defence. The Colonial  Minister
suggested to Palmerston that at the start of the next session of parliament they should seize
the opportunity to consolidate this good feeling in British North America so as to propagate
the  improvement  of  provincial  forces.  Newcastle  wrote  to  the  Prime  Minister  that  “the
Colonies have rarely been mentioned in a Queen’s Speech, unless when they have incurred
a censure for some rebellious indication ...  You will  probably allude in the speech to our
defences and the raising of volunteers. If so, this would give you an opportunity of saying
that the same spirit  has been evinced by all  the Colonies, and that the Queen is deeply
gratified by the proofs of loyalty which they have evinced.”95 This indication of colonial action
on defence was a fundamental part of the British policy on self-government and in order to
enhance  this  relationship  the  plan  remained  in  place  for  eventual  consolidation  of  the
provinces  into  one  state,  following  the  carrying  out  of  preliminary  Atlantic  union  and
construction of the intercolonial railroad. This was made clear by the Colonial Minister after
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the North American tour. Newcastle wrote that union was “the object to be aimed at (though)
other minor measures must precede it”.
Summary
The metropolitan goal of seeing British North America become united had emerged
and persisted in the antebellum era, chiefly as a means to enhance imperial security. There
were two main strands to this: one, to keep the provinces from falling to the United States;
two,  to enlarge the responsibility  of  the colonial  governance with a view to relieving the
mother country of some of the burden for defence. The determination to maintain British
North America outside of the United States owed much to the imperial prejudice against US
republicanism,  which  imperial  statesmen  believed  to  be  a  threat  not  only  to  English
democracy, but, somewhat hyperbolically, to world peace. The possibility of the provinces
being subsumed by the union had been a prevalent  issue at  various times through the
century. The fear of annexation had arisen at the time of the Canadian Rebellions and linked
to a general concern of the United States adopting a malevolent interpretation of Manifest
Destiny or  the Monroe Doctrine,  or  even simply a natural  drift  in the American orbit  via
increasing economic and commercial ties. In the mid-to late 1850’s this economic prospect
attracted more attention from imperial  thinkers than a direct  military threat,  even despite
American victory over Mexico. As with the union and increased autonomy put in place for
Upper and Lower Canada at the end of the 1830s which was implemented partly to increase
its sense of ‘national’ status in 1838 and affiliation with the empire, general confederation of
British North America came to favoured to replicate this model on a larger scale. Unification
was favoured as it was posited that belonging to a ‘greater’ country would be a disincentive
to the colonial peoples to join the United States. 
Furthermore, as Britain wished to maintain its empire in North America in order to
‘counterbalance’ the insidious influence of the US, it was hoped that, over time, this united
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entity  would  grow  to  sufficient  strength  to  even  challenge  Federal  hegemony  on  the
continent. The nature of self government and the undesirability of once again alienating the
colonial people however meant that the provinces themselves had to be equal and willing
participants  in  the  process.  This  long-term  aim  was  considered  feasible  as  imperial
statesmen refuted that the US could storm British North America by force, a conviction that
was held right up until the Civil War. For this reason Eprhraim Douglass Adams and Kenneth
Bourne were wrong to conclude that Britain had given up on opposing republican dominance
in the region prior to the Civil  War. Of the US gains after the Mexican War for example
Kenneth Bourne wrote that “This new round of American expansionism the British viewed
with unabated alarm.”96 This chapter had argued that Bourne overstated the extent of British
concern over Federal growth prior to 1861. Indeed, it was the very assurance the imperial
government felt about the military balance that allowed them to favour a long term project
like Confederation. 
The only (though important) real dangers to this appraisal appeared to be factors
external to North America, though ironically they were partly alleviated by factors internal.
Firstly the economic danger of the provinces themselves turning to the United States was
increased by the home policy of repealing the Corn Laws. Secondly the fear that Britain
would become embroiled in Europe, or with a European power, always carried with it the
suspician that the United States would exploit the distraction to make a land-grab on the
provinces and in the mid-1850s Britain fought the Crimean War. Signing the Reciprocity
Treaty helped assuage the first danger, while both were mitigated by the internal tensions in
the United States in that southern resistance to free-state expansionism served to help keep
northern economic and military ‘imperialism’ in check. 
The antebellum decade however did serve notice of the aims of provincial unification
to a degree. The reformist policy of reducing colonial military commitments, driven partly by
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pressure from radicals and Gladstone’s push for economy – and intensified by the demands
made on imperial forces by the war with Russia – led to greater calls for the provinces to
take up some of the burden for defence themselves. As the concept of union was to imbue
provincial sentiment with an enhanced sense of nationhood, so too this increased pride and
responsibility  became linked to the colonies  taking on a  greater  share of  the burden of
orchestrating local defence. Francis Hincks, a Canadian politician who helped to negotiate
the  Reciprocity  Treaty  appreciated  exactly  in  1853  that  this  imperial  rationale  behind
unification was to “devise some plan by which the burden of defence may be thrown upon
the Colonies, and they imagine that this can only be effected by a large combination.” 
By the outbreak of the Civil War however these aims had not assumed paramount
urgency. British statesmen still felt relatively assured by the power balance in North America
and therefore the long term projects felt necessary to accomplish continental union; primarily
an intercolonial  railway and Maritime Union to forge better  economic and cultural  bonds
between  the  provinces,  were  considered  attainable  over  time.  Watkin  unwittingly
summarised this and the American allure to be overridden when he described the Dominion
of Canada in his later biography. Of confederation Watkin wrote “certainly, in 1861, this great
idea seemed like a mere dream of an uncertain future. Blocked by wide stretches of half-
explored  country:  dependent  upon  approaches  through  United  States’  territory:  each
Province enforcing its separate, and differing, tariffs, the one against the others ... it was not
a matter of surprise to find a growing gravitation towards the United States, based, alike, on
augmenting trade and augmenting prejudices.”97 It was the onset of the secession crisis in
1860-61 that started to elicit a diplomatic and strategic environment in which the steady and
methodical completion of these pre—requisite measures appeared to be compromised. 
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CHAPTER 3
THE SECESSION CRISIS, 1860-61
66
The same Republican election victory that  caused seven States to secede in the
autumn/winter of 1860-1861 also to a large degree initiated the British sense of crisis over
imperial  defence  throughout  the  Civil  War.  Like  those  disaffected  in  the  South,  original
misgivings in Britain stemmed from the character of the next Federal Government under the
likely stewardship of Republican politician William H. Seward. Seward lost out as Republican
nominee mainly as he would carry greater baggage than the lesser known Lincoln into the
sectionalist  presidential  contest.  Following  the  Republican  victory  however  Seward  was
entrusted  with  what  was  considered  the  next  most  prestigious  position  in  the  Federal
cabinet, Secretary of State, and moreover the role that would bring him into most contact
and possible friction with Britain. British worries were exacerbated by the assumption - also
prevalent in America - that the inexperienced Lincoln would be little more than a figurehead
leader, leaving the more famous name in the party, Seward, effectively commanding both
major roles. Seward himself believed the true power would be in his hands, going so far as
to compare his position and President Abraham Lincoln’s to that of a Prime Minister and
monarchical head of state respectively. He told the Russian minister in Washington Eduard
de  Stoeckl  that  a  monarch,  like  the  President,  was  in  place  through  an  “accident  of
circumstances,  hereditary  in  this  case,  and in  truth  the  actual  direction  of  public  affairs
belongs  to  the  leader  of  the  ruling  party,  here  as  in  any  hereditary  principality.”98 The
expectation of Seward ‘s pre-eminence was most alarming as the concern centred on one of
the empire’s most vulnerable territories, British North America, fear being sustained by the
knowledge that expansion to the north had long formed part of Seward’s political agenda. In
campaigning for nomination as the party’s presidential candidate two years before, Seward
had included in his manifesto annexation of the British Northwest, stating that Rupert’s Land
would make a “great” state for the Union.99 While exploitation of Anglophobic sentiment and
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pledging  the  cession  of  British  North  America  were  customary  electioneering  tactics
however, British concern over Seward’s policies owed as much to private pronouncements
as to public.
Britain’s  Colonial  Secretary  having accompanied the Prince on his  recent  American tour,
Newcastle’s dealings with Seward on the trip left him with an impression that the New Yorker may
catastrophically  misjudge  Britain’s  patience,  particularly  regarding  agitation  towards  the  North
American provinces. Indeed, the nickname acquired in the South ‘irrepressible conflict Seward’ (for
inflammatory comments deemed to prophesy war between slavery and anti-slavery America) could
also have been applicable to a perception that grew in England. At one reception Newcastle had been
told by Seward that he would “make use of insults to England to secure his own position in the States”
and “was confident (England) should never go to war with the States – (she) dared not and could not
afford it.” Demonising the old enemy Great Britain would prove to be a concerted policy of Seward’s to
build public support in the US and was for the most part recognised by the Palmerston’s cabinet as
the bluster it  was. However the Colonial Secretary’s response revealed the importance placed by
imperial government in maintaining its sense of pride and status amongst the nations of the earth.
Newcastle wrote “I told him there was no fear of war except from a policy as he indicated, and that if
he  carried  it  out  and  touched  our  honour,  he  would  ...  find  he  had  embroiled  his  country  in  a
disastrous conflict at the moment when he fancied he was bullying all before him.”100 
Even though the Secretary of State’s words and actions might only be designed for home
consumption, from early on paranoia existed in the imperial cabinet that Seward would underestimate
Britain’s willingness to stand up for its honour and the countries would spiral into hostilities. When on
one occasion Seward specifically claimed that Britain would not go to war over Canada the Colonial
Secretary’s response was no less than a direct reference to naval bombardment of the eastern United
States. Newcastle told the Secretary of State “Do not remain under such an error. There is no people
under Heaven from whom we should endure so much as from yours; to whom we should make such
concessions ... but once touch us in our honour and you will soon find the bricks of New York and
Boston falling about your heads.” The Colonial Minister’s comments indicated the salience of honour
in British dealings as well as the continued feeling of security surrounding the use of naval power.
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After the conversations with Seward Newcastle told Watkin that “I do not think they believe we should
ever fight them; but we certainly should if the provocation were strong.”101
From March 1861, even before the outbreak of actual hostilities between the states,
serious fears arose of a British - American war. The first source of apprehension was the
‘foreign war panacea’, a rumoured policy of Seward’s for staving off disunion by engaging in
a general American war against a third party. The Secretary of State’s initial pretext for this
was retaliation against British opposition to the new Federal tariff, enacted in the final days of
the previous administration. As alluded to in the previous chapter, the agrarian economy of
the South  together  with  its  rising  antagonism towards  the ‘materialistic’  and commercial
character of the North, had previously secured enough opposition to prevent protectionist
legislation  passing  through  Congress.  The  secession  crisis  changed  this,  the  exit  of
Southern senators from Washington enabling the passage of the Morrill Tariff on March 2,
immediately  altering  economic  relations  between Britain  and  the  North.  The  Republican
administration took office on March 4 and from Lyons’s first meeting with Seward the British
minister exhibited concern that any issue could be conflated to a cassus-belli, the new import
duties providing the first flashpoint. Lyons was told that if Europe protested the new tariff
nothing would give Seward more pleasure for in a quarrel “South Carolina and the seceding
States would soon join in.”  The British Minister  also received a report  from Stoeckl  that
Seward had outlined a scheme resembling the foreign war panacea. The Secretary of State
had said  that,  “If  the Lord would  only  give  the United States an excuse for  a war  with
England, France or Spain ... that would be the best means for establishing internal peace.”102
This new imperial security concern, fuelled by the economic effects of the secession crisis,
appeared to be given substance by Seward’s reputation for preaching Federal expansionism
and his earlier comments to the Duke of Newcastle.
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Imperial political, economic, cultural and strategic benefits from separation
The North’s new economic policy was therefore among the first of many instances in
which the political fall-out of Southern secession hampered British-American relations and
this  inevitably  helped engender  sympathy and support  in  England for  the  rebellion.  The
Confederate Constitution came into being on March 11, and while mostly identical to that of
the  United  States,  the  new  document  expressly  prohibited  the  southern  congress  from
enacting any protective duties or tariffs. The Times printed that “so long as the Washington
Congress  adheres  and even adds new restrictions  to a protective policy  they give their
enemies the best excuse for hostility,  and cut themselves off from the sympathy of their
friends.”103 The Times was not only often a signifier of government opinion, but with its high
level of readership the text most consumed in the United States in order to gauge popular
British  feeling.  From  this  an  ongoing  dialogue  of  recriminations  between  the  principal
Northern and British newspapers began, lasting throughout the Civil War and helping create
a general climate of insecurity over Anglo-American relations during it. Charles Dickens, who
had acquainted  himself  strongly  with  the American  people  and institutions  for  his  travel
writings on the United States declared that “The Times, by playing fast and loose with the
American question, has very seriously compromised this country.”104 Federal protectionism
remained a major issue throughout the Civil  War, particularly when it eventually came to
terminate the Reciprocity Treaty in 1864. 
Even in general however,  diplomacy with the United States was difficult  from the
outset due to London’s lack of support for the Federal cause. Britain took great pride in the
work it had done to arrest the African slave trade and its great hope was for bondage to
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cease in the United States. Lincoln’s deliberate denial that the war had anything to do with
slavery, while effective in keeping the border states out of the Confederacy, meant that he
relinquished a potential source of sympathy from abroad. This made life more difficult for
those who did wish to advance the cause of the Union. Another contemporary luminary for
example,  Charles Darwin, wrote “some few, and I am one of them, even wish to God, that
the North would proclaim a crusade against slavery.”105 Except for the famous pro-Union
sympathies of John Bright, Richard Cobden and William Forster – whose sentiments are so
well  known partly  because  they went  against  the tide – Federal  support  was practically
absent  from parliament and certainly  from Palmerston’s cabinet,  increasing the sense of
bitterness towards England amongst many Northerners. With the slavery question therefore
not affording the Union moral high-ground in England,  British statesmen reverted to their
natural political sympathies and ideals. The British ruling classes were inclined to favour the
more aristocratic and free-trade leaning South over what they considered the mob-ridden,
protective, and territorially aggrandising North. 
Quiet trumpeting in Britain for the Confederacy however also had much to do with the
security  of  British  North  America.  The  problems  that  the  imperial  government  had
encountered in terms of bringing the provinces to organize local defence, together with the
fiscal threat of the provinces becoming subservient to the US, meant that great advantages
were perceived in Confederate independence. Lord Robert Cecil  alluded to the economic
threat of the new Federal policy, as well as the more weighty danger of the US becoming an
ocean power, when he came to advance the case for recognising the South. Cecil argued
that “the Northern States of America never could be our sure friends ... not merely because
the  newspapers  wrote  at  each  other,  or  that  there  were  prejudices  on  both  sides,  but
because we were rivals, rivals politically and rivals commercially. We aspired to the same
position.  We both  aspired  to  the government  of  the  seas.”  Separation  would  mean the
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dismemberment of a trade rival while strategically it would potentially give Britain a valuable
ally in a conflict over Canada forcing the US to divert resources to its southern flank. 
Politically  too,  the  British  wish to limit  Federal  republicanism due to  the pent  up
prejudices that had festered through the antebellum period induced the imperial government
to favour separation. Russell characterised the conflict as a liberation movement resisting a
government fighting for “empire.” The Times made a similar argument, commenting that “the
real motives of the belligerents, as the truth transpires; appear to be exactly such motives as
have caused wars in all times and countries. They are essentially selfish motives – that is to
say, they are based upon speculations of national power, territorial aggrandizement, political
advantage,  and commercial  gain.”106 Parallels were frequently drawn that if  the rebels of
1776 were justified in declaring independence then so too were those of 1860. Moreover
both  historical  precedent  and  recently  established  policy  favoured  the  recognition  of
breakaway governments and nationalist  movements.   Consequently  the breach between
Washington and London widened due to irreconcilable opinions about southern secession.
While the Republican Administration wished to preserve the Federal Union – considering this
essential to the future of freedom and democratic ideals - and believed it could do so by
force, the British government in general held the opposite views. The English ruling classes
did not see restoration of the Union as desirable, nor did they hold that such an end could be
achieved  by  war.  The  British  Government  believed  southerners  to  be  in  earnest  and
therefore dismissed the possibility  of  putting down a rebellion on the scale of 8,000,000
people across 300,000 square miles of territory. The North on the other hand denied that this
necessity existed, claiming that a coterie of extremists had seized control in the South and
that with a small number of victories the latent unionist sentiment there would reassert itself.
Conviction in the Foreign Office in part  resulted from the despatches of  their  consuls  in
Southern towns who conveyed the determination that prevailed there. Russell wrote “I do not
now see how the United States can be cobbled together again by any compromise. ...  I
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cannot see any mode for reconciling such parties as these. The best thing now would be that
the right to secede should be acknowledged.”107
Lincoln’s tactic moreover of waiting for the Confederacy to act as aggressors before
mobilising Federal power was seen as military and political suicide. Despite Seward’s wish
to give the South the concession of evacuating Fort Sumter (the surrender of which had
been demanded by Confederacy) the President exercised his own authority and allowed the
ultimatum to expire. Following the eventual firing on the fort The Times printed “To allow full
scope to a revolution until it is fully organised, and then to oppose it, seems to be nothing
short  of  madness”.  This  damning  verdict  of  the  North’s  chances  was  prefixed  with  the
opinion  “Surely  the  time  for  coercion  is  past  and  the  only course  now  open  to  the
Government of Washington is to accept secession as a fait accompli.”108 English sympathy
for the Confederacy therefore was predicated not only on the political, economic, cultural
and strategic self-interest associated with southern independence but also on the simple
pragmatism that independence could not be prevented by the North. This meant that British
policy would ultimately be directed to recognition of the South. 
The pressure to reduce colonial military expenditure 
The diplomatic friction that had begun to develop with the Union over these differing
impressions  of  Southern  secession  occurred  against  a  significant  context  of  increasing
pressure  on  the  imperial  government  to  reduce  military  expenditure.  Just  as  the  new
Republican administration was taking office in  March 1861 the House of  Commons was
mounting a fierce assault  on the expense accrued in protecting colonial possessions. As
described  in  the  previous  chapter,  despite  the  growing  conviction  that  self-governing
colonies should materially contribute to providing for their military security, the local militias
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in British North America were in a state of degeneration. This led to Parliament appointing a
Select Committee to report on how a portion of the burden of imperial  security might be
transferred to the colonies themselves. The Parliamentary Select Committee’s official remit
was “to inquire and report whether any and what alterations may be advantageously adopted
in regard to the Defence of the British Dependencies, and the proportions of cost of such
Defence as now defrayed from Imperial and Colonial funds respectively.” The motion for its
creation was moved by a Conservative, Arthur Mills, whose voice held considerable gravitas
as it was he who had had written and published what was considered the definitive treatise
of the maladministration that had led to, and the costs that had resulted from, the Indian
Mutiny. Mills described the current imperial  drain for Britain as “a burden ...  involving an
expenditure of £4,000,000 sterling – and the withdrawal of 100,000 soldiers from the service
of the mother country to the outlying provinces of our empire.”109 
As part of its inquiries the Select Committee questioned the Colonial Minister and
honed in on the security of British North America. Newcastle was asked whether “a federal
union of the North American Provinces would tend to facilitate the arrangements for  the
more efficient and economical defence of those provinces.”110 The Colonial  Minister, who
was  also  influenced  by  the  belligerent  warnings  given  by  Seward,  surveying  the  tense
climate wrote on March 1 that union “is what must eventually be bought about and may be
hastened by events arising out of the condition of the rest of the Continent.”111 As argued,
the  Colonial  Office  had  considered  eventual  union  the  logical  outcome  of  both  the
construction of a trans-continental railroad and the smaller union of the Maritime Provinces,
to then merge with Upper and Lower Canada. The Colonial Secretary’s principal reservation
was that it  preferred legislative union to federal - the secession crisis now presenting an
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ominous example of the fragility of a federal system - particularly when its primary rationale
was in centralising the responsibility for its security. Newcastle therefore was reluctant to
advocate a “federal” structure; however due to the scheme’s synonymy with the building of
the continental railway the Colonial Minister endorsed the merger in general. Newcastle told
the commissioners that “any plan which threw the Government of all these countries into a
united power would facilitate arrangements for the construction of railways.” The secession
crisis had rapidly impressed the security issue on the mind of Colonial  Secretary and an
early consolidation of the colonies into a vast single federation it was hoped might accelerate
the railway scheme, felt  as it  was imperative for defence. This was revealing because it
indicated that having previously held the conviction that a sequence must be followed of
construction of a railroad, then maritime unification, and later a merger of that federation to
the Canadas, Newcastle contemplated a departure from their expected timetable because of
the political upheaval in the United States. That the Colonial Minister was influenced by the
tactical  value of  the railway was verified by Watkin who relayed that the Newcastle  had
stated  “this  work  was  not  a  mere  local  work,  but  satisfied  military  and  other  Imperial
conditions.”112 The Colonial Minister furthermore apparently believed that creating the railway
would as good as make confederation a guarantee. According to Watkin in 1861 he and the
Newcaslte both felt that “the union of all the provinces and territories into ‘one great British
America’ was ‘the necessary, the logical result’ of completing the Intercolonial Railway.”113 
The recourse to unification also continued to link to the doctrine that greater self-
government  went  hand  in  hand  with  responsibility  for  defence.  Costly  work  was  still
incomplete after many years on fortifications in British North America. The drive for economy
was  now  making  military  thinking  veer  away  from  works  which,  by  requiring  continual
maintenance and manning by soldiers, only appeared to accentuate the burden - especially
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when the progression of weapons technology threatened rapidly to make them obsolete.
This problem of the draining of imperial troops intensified the home government’s preference
for relying on the Royal Navy. As a result the Parliamentary Select Committee reported “that
the  multiplication  of  fortified  places,  and  the  erection  of  fortifications  in  distant  colonial
possessions ... on a scale requiring for their defence a far greater number of men than could
be spared for them in the event of war, involve a useless expenditure, and fail to provide an
efficient protection for places the defence of which mainly depends on superiority at sea.”114
Cost-sapping fixed defence schemes within provinces therefore were to be eschewed in
favour  of  augmenting Britain’s  naval  strength  for  colonial  security.  The advent  of  steam
powered warships had revised the strategic picture in increasing Britain’s ability to project
maritime strength at times of crisis across the empire, but also in making the British Isles
more accessible to hostile fleets. England therefore had practically “ceased to be an island”.
This shifting the emphasis to home defence, the resolution was also unanimously adopted
that  it  was  “desirable  to  concentrate  the  troops  required  for  the  defence  of  the  United
Kingdom as much as possible and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing against
foreign aggression in the distant dependencies of the Empire.”115
The growing threat as the Civil War escalates on land and sea
The dearth of local forces in British North America - tolerable during the antebellum
period  as  the imperial  cutbacks  took  place  -  assumed a  more critical  aspect  when  the
political crisis in the US subsequently escalated to armed conflict both on land and at sea.
On land the danger was a basic, inevitable by-product of British North America’s geographic
position with a nation arming itself across the frontier. Planned aggression notwithstanding,
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the Federal mobilisation carried inherent dangers of border incidents and flashpoints that
could escalate to war. Very early on the State Governors of New York and Ohio attempted to
procure arms from the Governor General of Canada Sir Edmund Walker Head, a request
which was refused. A statute forbade the removal of arms from the provinces and amid
deteriorating relations with the Union Britain could not afford the North the double advantage
of increasing its military preparedness while simultaneously decreasing its own.116 Head had
already written to Lyons of an early instance of Federal deserters being pursued across the
frontier into Canada, stating that if such occurrences persisted a military presence would be
required in the West of the province. Following the scaling down of imperial troops over the
previous decade however, there were now just over 4000 British regulars across all of the
North American possessions - barely half the number stationed there at the mid-point of the
century. From this very early stage,  particularly  given the diplomatic  differences with the
Union and the reduction of forces in the provinces, imperial leaders exhibited paranoia about
the new Northern army turning on British North America when the issue with the South was
settled.  Indeed on April  24,  less than two weeks after  the bombardment  of  Sumter and
Lincoln’s  call  for 75,000 volunteers,  Head was communicating his fears over their  future
employment to the British Secretary of War George Cornewall Lewis. The Governor General
wrote that “it would be not a pleasant thing to have 100,000 or 200,000 men kicking their
heels with arms in their hands on our frontier and all the habits acquired in a southern civil
war.”117 
This prospect that British North America would become a battleground sooner rather
than later became more marked when the respective leaders announced their intention to
adopt  naval  war  measures,  Lincoln  to  blockade  the  rebel  coast,  Confederate  leader
Jefferson  Davis  to  issue  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal.  The  imposition  of  the  Federal
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blockade dealt a further blow to British trade following as it did the Northern tariff, and was
especially agitating to British statesmen as they mostly did not believe in the cause of the
war  with  the  South.  The  measure  interrupted  the  cotton  trade  essential  to  the  working
populations  of  predominantly  northern  England,  however  Lyons  was  warned  by  the
Secretary of State at the very start:  “if  one of your ships comes out of a Southern Port,
without the Papers required by the laws of the United States, and is seized by one of our
Cruisers and carried into New York and confiscated, we shall not make any compensation.”
Lyons, fearing the consequences of the loss of British commerce, responded that “the most
simple, if not the only way, would be to recognise the Southern Confederacy.” This threat to
acknowledge Southern independence played directly into the South’s ‘King Cotton Policy’ - a
theory that the starvation of the textile mills would compel the European powers to act in
their favour - , even more so when Seward responded to the British Minister’s comment with
his own threat of military retaliation. Indeed, shortly after at a reception given by Lyons, the
Secretary of State let vent at this prospect and shouted “such recognition will mean war! The
whole  world  will  be  engulfed  and  revolution  will  be  the  harvest.”118 This  warning  that
recognising the South would bring a military response, relayed to the Foreign Office, was
highly influential throughout the Civil War in leading Britain to hold back from recognition,
particularly  given the shortfall  of  local  forces in  the provinces.  Leaning  toward Southern
success therefore, but now wary of provoking the North, Britain resolved to let the conflict
run its course. The outgoing American Minister in London George M. Dallas was therefore
told by Russell on April 27 that he “refuses to pledge himself.”119 Cautious of the danger to
British shipping however and still suspicious that Seward would ignite a diplomatic quarrel,
that same day the Foreign Minister directed the North American squadron to be reinforced. 
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In other ways too the imperial government’s response to the blockade was influenced
by its own strategic interests. Early in the year Russell had had to ward off questions over
the abolishment  of  blockades,  and had been sure to state Britain’s  vital  interest  in  their
continuation.  Especially  considering  the  vulnerability  of  Canada  where  Britain  could  not
match the US on land it was necessary to safeguard the resort to blockade. This would in
the event of war represent Britain’s main offensive weapon against  the US. The Foreign
Minister summed up the danger to Britain thus, that “there being two Powers, one of which
has a very strong army and a weak navy, the other having an army inferior in numbers, but a
superior navy, that the Power which has the superior navy should forego all the advantage to
be derived from that source, and allow the contest to be decided by military force alone.”
This led to the first debate in parliament on the significance of the Civil War. The Declaration
of Paris, signed by Britain in 1856, held that blockades ‘to be binding must be effective’. It
was therefore asked of the cabinet whether they would accept that of the North if it did not
meet these criteria. Indeed throughout the war supporters of the Confederacy would petition
the government to break the blockade, citing the evidence of blockade runners and weak
enforcement. This was a critical issue however as it held direct implications for the continued
viability or otherwise of the Royal Navy as the main source of British power. As a policy
tolerant of a loose screening place less onus on British blockades to be watertight in the
future, Britain had a vested interest in its maintenance. This was important because if for
instance Britain did have to go to war with the United States, even the world’s largest navy,
the British, could not man every single part of the thousands of miles of American coastline.
The  United  States  had  dissented  Britain’s  blockade  when  the  Royal  Navy  had  been
stretched during the war with Russia,  and it  was pointed out  by the cabinet  that  “many
questions of nicety had come ... during the Crimean War; and ... this country, now that it was
in the situation of a neutral, would have no reason to insist upon any other rules than those
which  it  had acted upon  as  a  belligerent.”  Russell  argued  that  “if  this  proposition  were
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accepted, the whole of the power would be gone which has hitherto rendered Great Britain
so formidable at sea.”120
The diplomatic damage from the Declaration of Neutrality and Belligerent Rights
Breaking the Federal blockade too would have represented an act of war against the
Union,  and this also influenced the imperial  government’s consistent reluctance to do so
through the Civil War. Wary of the shortfall in local defence in the provinces and Seward’s
threats  imperial  statesmen  determined  that  England  should  follow  a  non-interventionist
policy.  Becoming  embroiled  in  the  conflict  equally  was considered  bad  policy  as  British
statesmen believed the North would realise separation was inevitable and therefore costly
intervention would be unnecessary. Palmerston had written to Russell early in the secession
crisis that “nothing could be more inadvisable than for us to interfere in the dispute, if  it
should break out, between any of the states of the Union, and the federal government.”121
Shortly after Lincoln and Davis’s announcements therefore the Foreign Minister issued the
Declaration  of  Neutrality,  warning British citizens that  they would forgo the right  to legal
protection if  they participated in the conflict. This policy had a direct bearing on avoiding
conflict in North America for if British sailors attempted to run the blockade or enlisted as
privateers in  the Confederate navy,  the risk of  being tried in  Federal  courts  could  force
Britain to make official protests and possibly war. Russell said famously in the first House of
Lords debate on the Civil War “we have not been involved in any way in that contest by any
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The declaration prohibited the enlistment by British subjects in the armed forces of either
party, as well as the fitting out of vessels equipped for war by British contractors. When the
new US Ambassador  Charles  Francis  Adams eventually  arrived  in  London  the  Foreign
Minister told him the declaration was “to explain to British subjects their liabilities in case
they should engage in the war”123 Having informed the Secretary of State that Britain would
take no precipitate action, it was construed by Seward as a shift by Russell from refusing to
“pledge himself”  on a policy as he had stated to Dallas,  to now setting out  a deliberate
‘neutral’ one. 
This definitive statement by the Foreign Minister, influenced by the strategic interests
of  averting  war  with  the  North  and  enabling  the  South  to  prove  it  could  maintain  its
sovereignty, in fact caused extensive diplomatic damage. This is because Seward accused
the  Foreign  Secretary  of  duplicity  whereas  to  Russell  the  neutrality  proclamation  was
consistent  with his previous stance by not  favouring either side. Russell  argued that  the
declaration “implied no recognition, nor allowed any other than an intermediate position on
the part  of the Southern States” however to the North ‘neutrality’ was highly offensive in
validating the Confederacy’s struggle, especially when this was combined with the awarding
of  belligerent  status shortly  after.  Intended to help safeguard imperial  security therefore,
ironically this measure served to further endanger it.
Given that the Northern blockade was a military measure implicitly denoting a state of
actual war, British leaders questioned the entitlement of the Federal government to regard
Confederate privateers not  as combatants but  as pirates.  Leader  of  the opposition  Lord
Derby raised this with the cabinet, stating: ‘‘the Northern States, on the one hand, cannot be
entitled to claim the rights of  belligerents for themselves,  and, on the other,  to treat the
Southern States, not as belligerents, but as rebels.”124 Unable to prescribe one military resort
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as  lawful  and  the  other  unlawful  therefore,  the  imperial  government  acknowledged  the
belligerent rights of the South. Again the rationale was largely strategic as unless Davis was
entitled to issue letters of marque, any refusal to pursue Southern privateers as criminals
could lead to a diplomatic break with the North. As an invocation of the law of nations the
declaration  of  belligerent  rights  bound  the  Confederacy  to  the  rules  of  warfare  and
safeguarded Britain from the need to take action against Southern privateers. Once more
however  the  strategic  benefits  of  apparently  legitimising  the Confederate  war  effort  and
allowing the South greater military scope to achieve its independence for these very same
reasons  inflicted  corresponding  harm  on  Anglo-American  relations.  The  awarding  of
belligerent status ultimately proved even more divisive to than the Declaration of Neutrality.
The threat to British neutrality from activity in the provinces
The Declaration of  Neutrality was issued to all  subjects of the British Crown and
therefore equally, if not more, applicable in the provinces where the geographical proximity
to the US made involvement more practical and therefore carried greater risk of violation.
This was the case over a British steamer on Lake Ontario, the ‘Peerless’, rumoured to have
been purchased by the Confederacy and which Seward brought to imperial attention. The
Secretary of State’s petition however was made directly to the Canadian Governor General
rather than through the proper channel, the British legation in Washington. Head was asked
by  Seward  to  “take  all  possible  steps  to  stop  this  piratical  cruiser  at  the  canals  or
elsewhere”125 while Lyons reminded Seward that communications should be made through
him and  not  directly  to  Canada.  These  exchanges  further  fuelled  the  imperial  cabinet’s
concern that the Secretary of State would start a war with Britain, either as an intentional
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‘panacea’ to the Union’s crisis or from mistakenly overestimating how much ‘bluster’ England
would tolerate. The Prime Minister wrote to Russell  that  “these communications are very
unpleasant. It is not at all unlikely that either from foolish and uncalculating arrogance and
self-sufficiency or from political calculation Mr. Seward may bring on a quarrel with us.”126
Lyons too was beginning  to  concur  with  Newcastle’s  analysis  and wrote  to the Foreign
Secretary  that Seward was under the false impression “that England will never go to war
with the United States” and thus “could be safely played with without any risk.”
Through  British  North  America  therefore  the  diplomatic  tension,  as  well  as  the
question  of  imperial  military  readiness,  came into  sharper  focus.  This  concern  over  the
Secretary of State’s recklessness reinforced Britain’s favoured policy of achieving security
through firm diplomacy and deterrence. The intention ran along the same lines adopted by
the Colonial Minister when he had warned Seward that any attempts on Canada would be
met with a military response: namely to prevent Seward taking such a ‘liberty’ that honour
would leave no alternative but use of force. Russell told Lyons that he must impress upon
the US that Britain’s “forbearance sprung from a consciousness of strength, and not from the
timidity of weakness.”127 This was also a policy very natural to Palmerston. Therefore when
Lyons himself was pressured by Seward to seize the vessel he vehemently responded that if
the ship’s papers were in order they had possessed no legal right to do so. Seward told the
British  minister  that  unless  the  Canadian  authorities  acted  he  himself  would  order  the
Peerless  to  be  apprehended  to  which  Lyons  protested  “unequivocally  and  without
reservation.”128 Head,  declaring  himself  fearful  of  the  repercussions  of  US seizure  or  of
damage caused to the canals, told the ambassador that he was delighted that such a “clear
and emphatic” rebuke had been made to Seward.
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An even weightier issue compromising imperial security early in the conflict was the
risk to British neutrality caused by covert Federal activities in the provinces. Seward had
despatched a political ally in former Congressman George Ashmun to Canada ostensibly to
act as a counter agent to subvert pro-Confederate feeling. Ashmun was to meet with the
Governor General (with whom he was acquainted) on the pretence of non-political business
but  was instructed by Seward to “impart  ...  correct  information on the subject  ...  of  the
motives and prospects of citizens in some of the Southern States who are avowedly disloyal
to the Union.”129 Details of this mission were exposed by the New York Herald and provoked
further consternation in both the Foreign and Colonial  Offices. Russell  wrote to Lyons to
instruct him to “not conceal from Mr Seward the unfavourable impression” produced. The
British minister did so and reiterated to Seward that official communications should be made
only through himself and not directly to Canada.130 To this the Secretary of State somewhat
disingenuously replied that “no agents were employed for any objects affecting the relations
between Canada and the United States.”131 Head’s direct superior the Colonial  Secretary
however was deeply concerned about British neutrality being compromised and informed the
Governor General to “continue quietly to discourage all Missions whether from the United
States or from the Southern Confederacy.”132 
Newcastle,  with  as  much  reason  as  any  for  feeling  apprehension  following  the
Secretary of State’s remarks to him, wrote that Seward’s “idea I have no doubt, is to prepare
the minds of the mob for war with England, if the result of the quarrel with the Southern
States should render an inroad into Canada a measure of political advantage” giving further
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credence  to  the  notion  of  the  US organising  for  an attack  on British  North  America  as
compensation for the loss of the South. 133  Friction was also caused by notification that the
Secretary of State had positioned additional American consuls in smaller Canadian town in
order to counteract pro-Southern feeling. The Foreign Office became even more wary of a
perfidious Northern influence in the provinces, perhaps with the intention of politicising them
into the Federal orbit. Lyons forwarded a request from Russell to the State Department “that
the Government of the United States will  abstain from multiplying its Consular  Offices in
Canada without actual necessity.”134
Security in North America and maintaining relations with France
Even the Secretary of State’s effort to reach terms with the European Powers on the
Declaration of Paris was interpreted as a nefarious tactic to arrest the Confederate war effort
and/or to draw Britain into the conflict. Seward wished to sign up to the fourth article which
stated that  “privateering is everywhere abolished.”  Russell  wrote that  a European nation
entering the agreement  “would be bound to treat the privateers of the so-called Confederate
States as pirates”, thereby making the declaration of neutrality untenable and forcing Britain
to renounce Southern belligerency. In order to prevent Britain becoming involved therefore
the imperial government requested that the preface be added: “in affixing his signature to the
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thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the
internal differences now prevailing in the United States.”135 That forcing Britain to withdraw
the South’s belligerent  rights was Seward’s aim had been conveyed by the Secretary of
State to the French Ambassador in Washington Henri Merciér. Merciér passed this on to
Lyons who wrote “Seward will be furious when he finds that his adherence to the Declaration
of  Paris  will  not  stop  the  Southern  privateering.”  When  questioned  by  Adams  Russell
responded  “Her  Majesty’s  Government  decline  to  bind  themselves  ...  to  a  Convention
which ... might be construed as an engagement to interfere in the unhappy dissensions now
prevailing in the United States.” Already alert to the possible initiation of Seward’s ‘foreign
war policy’, Russell feared that if Britain entered into the agreement with the US but then
refused to arrest Confederate sailors as pirates, Seward had further ground for a diplomatic
break with London.  The Foreign Minister  suggested this to Palmerston writing that “it  all
looks as if a trap had been prepared.”136 In an attempt to contain Seward’s ‘bullying’ tactics
therefore and to guard against conflict, Russell also requested that the agreement only be
entered  into  if  signed  simultaneously  by  the  US  minister  in  Paris  and  the  French
government.
The proximity of British North America moreover carried a dual danger and for this
reason entering into accord with France served a corresponding dual purpose. This was
because  not  only  would  war  in  North  America  place  extreme  demands  on  imperial
resources, but the fear existed that European rivals would seize upon any North American
distraction  to  make gains  on the continent.  Chief  amongst  these was France given  the
suspicion of  Napoleon,  the recent  war scare,  and the nations’  historic rivalry.  As Anglo-
American relations encountered difficulties therefore the Foreign Office sought to counteract
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both the tension with Seward and the danger of European conflict by maintaining a united
front with France on American policy. Using a metaphor that would become famous in the
Civil War, Russell told the British ambassador in Paris Robert Cowley “I am not disposed to
walk  alone  in  the  hornet’s  nest  at  Washington.”137 Equally  the  Foreign  Office  had  felt
compelled  to  act  due  to  the  knowledge  that  one  of  Seward’s  tactics  was  to  split  the
European powers against each other. This had been substantiated by a statement given by
the American minister to Russia Cassius Marcellus Clay as he passed through Paris. Clay
had told French reporters “although England might not improbably decide to mingle the red
crosses of the Union Jack with the piratical black flag of the Confederate States of America,
France would  certainly  unite her  Tricolour  with the Stars and Stripes;  nor would France
forget what power it was that had checked her advance at every turn, had hedged in all the
fields of her glory and had confined an earlier Napoleon on St Helena.”138
In  fact,  with  the  French  manufacturing  industry  suffering  even  more  from  the
blockade  than  Britain’s,  Louis  Napoleon’s  government  would  come  to  be  even  more
forthright about recognising the South and would later attempt to exploit America’s troubles
by  intervening  in  Mexico.  With  Britain  and  France  both  anticipating  Confederate
independence, it was determined that they must proceed in unison until the North had come
to  accept  separation.  Russell  told  the  American  Minister  in  London  that  “there  existed
between this government and that of France which would lead both to take the same course
as to recognition, whatever that course may be.” This statement however, refusing to rule
out recognition and compromsing the plan to isolate the European powers, only increased
Seward’s  belligerency.  Lyons  wrote  to  Russell  that  Seward  was  ‘‘arrogant  and  reckless
towards foreign powers.”139 Sensitive to the prospect of European recognition and therefore
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perceiving  hostility  in  anything  that  afforded  the  Southern  authorities  the  image  of  a
legitimate  government,  various  dialogues  taking  place  between  British  and  Confederate
representatives  increased  the  diplomatic  tension  with  the  North  still  further.  In  some
instances however, for example when it was necessary to represent British expatriates in the
seceded states, it was impossible for Palmerston’s government to give no credence to the
Confederate authorities at all. Generally British Consulate offices in the South liaised with
the  legation  in  Washington  and  less  frequently  directly  with  the  Foreign  Office  directly.
Following secession however - as the Confederate government regarded the British minister
in Washington as ambassador to a “foreign country” and therefore “unqualified”  to guide
consular  matters  in  Confederate  territory  -  consuls  in  the  South  were  advised  to
communicate exclusively to the Foreign Office.140 Frustrated following complaints by Seward,
Lyons  wrote  to  Russell  that  “Britain  really  had  no  choice  but  to  converse  with  the
Confederate Government for there was no other body which could provide for the safety and
security of British subjects and British property now residing in the states in rebellion.”141 
The Secretary of State requested the recall of the British consul in Charleston Robert
Bunch following the discovery that negotiations had been carried out with the Confederate
government over the Declaration of Paris, and of correspondence in a British mail bag which
included a letter stating that Bunch had communicated “that the first step to recognition was
taken.” Russell perceived it  as a means to show Federal displeasure at European policy
towards the South, writing that ‘‘Mr Bunch has merely been selected as a safer object of
attack than the British or French Government.”142 Russell’s refusal to order the consul home
led to Seward revoking the exequatur which the Foreign Minister took as evidence of the
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British  and French view that  the South must  become independent.  Russell  called  it  “an
admission which goes further than any acknowledgment with regard to those States which
her Majesty’s government have hitherto made.” Russell himself held an audience with two
Confederate  emissaries  in  London  who  had  journeyed  over  to  advance  the  case  for
recognition.   The  Foreign  Office  justified  this  according  to  the  policy  that  meeting
representatives  of  independence  movements  in  an  ‘unofficial’  capacity  was  standard
practice.  As  with  every  other  indication  that  Britain  was  venturing  towards  an
acknowledgement  of  Southern  independence,  this  enraged  Seward  and  Adams.  The
Secretary of  State attributed Britain’s  sympathy for  the Confederacy to selfish economic
motives.  Despite  Russell’s  arguing  that  meeting  the Confederate  envoys  in  an  informal
capacity was routine policy, it was followed by the most alarming indication yet that there
would be an eruption in British North America.
Execution of the Foreign War Panacea
On May 17 the Secretary of State wrote “Great Britain is in danger of sympathising so
much with the South, for the sake of peace and cotton, as to drive as to make war against
her, as the ally of the traitors ... I am trying to get a bold remonstrance through the Cabinet
before it is too late.”143 Lyons sensed that Seward was planning to initiate the foreign war
policy. He had rightly ascertained that having been overruled in his policy of withdrawing
from Sumter the Secretary of State was attempting to impose his own will  over Lincoln.
Seward had delivered his infamous memorandum “Some Thoughts for the Consideration of
the President”. This document suggested the US “seek explanations from Great Britain and
Russia,  and send agents into Canada,  Mexico and Central  America to rouse a vigorous
continental spirit  of independence.”144 This further raised the spectre of the United States
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attempting to agitate the provinces into discontent. While not knowing the precise details of
the  Secretary  of  State’s  scheme,  Lyons  suspected  that  the  neutrality  and  belligerency
proclamations would be used as pretext for an attack on British North America. Lyons wrote
to Russell on May 20 “Seward, having lost strength by the failure of his peace policy, is
seeking to recover influence by leading a foreign war party; no one in the Cabinet is strong
enough to combat  him.”145 In  this  last  supposition  at  least  Lyons was mistaken,  Lincoln
dismissing the memorandum and making pacifying amendments to the Secretary of State’s
aggressively  drafted despatch  to  Adams,  leaving  Seward  no  choice  but  to  defer  to  the
President.
This  incident  nonetheless  enhanced  the pressure  on  the imperial  government  to
secure the provinces, especially when British statesmen received further reports of Federal
attempts to destabilize British North America. Lyons was informed by a British Consul of a
plot  involving  the  Secretary  of  State’s  son  Frederick  Seward,  who  had  been  overheard
discussing  an  operation  to  promote  annexation  in  Canada  and  New  Brunswick.  Secret
Service funds were to be used to purchase a number of British North American newspapers
and spread agitation for admission into the Union. While the report’s veracity is doubtful it is
significant  that Lyons clearly believed Seward capable of such machinations.  The British
Minister  took it  seriously  enough to write to Russell  that  that  there was “only  too much
reason to believe that Mr. Seward would see with pleasure disturbances in Canada.”146 Even
more alarmingly, on June 4 the same Consul informed Lyons of a planned invasion of the
province from Buffalo by the 69th Irish Reserve Division.  This was the first  of  numerous
occasions both throughout the Civil  War, and especially after it,  where security concerns
over  British  North  America  would  centre  on  the  threat  posed  by  the  American  Irish
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population,  in part motivated by advancing the cause of Irish Home Rule. The Canadian
Press also erroneously reported that Buffalo’s Fort Porter was being garrisoned by Federal
forces as a prelude to attack on the province.
As the Civil  War progressed therefore,  security fears increasingly  emanated from
other sources than the proceedings of the Department of State. Ominous reports had also
begun to circulate from the expanding United States army. The Union Commander in Chief
Winfield Scott was widely held to advocate the conquest of British America and loved to
recount his experiences as a young Brigadier General in the War of 1812. Lyons also heard
that  the  words  of  Yankee  Doodle  were  being  changed  in  Union  army  sing-songs  to:
“Secession first he would put down/ wholly and forever/ and afterwards from Britain’s crown/
he Canada would sever.”147 In the Senate Chamber too Congressmen were speaking of a
short  war with the South followed by a northerly expansion of New England.  Belligerent
sentiments were also coming from the newspapers. In Seward’s riding the New York press
were calling for a three-year armistice between North and South during which time their
forces should unite to sweep through British and Russian America and Latin and Central
America. 
Manifold suggestions of danger to the provinces were perceived therefore among
political circles in Washington DC, the military hierarchy, and the Northern Press. That even
Lyons was affected by this  general  atmosphere of  uncertainty  can be seen in  a  cipher
telegram he sent to Russell on June 6 which stated that “no new event has occurred but a
sudden declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain appears to me by no
means impossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to invasion.”148 Lyons’s feared
the San Juan Island dispute could be conflated into an excuse for attacking the provinces,
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be intentionally goading the British troops. Lyons urged Russell that the affair needed to be
settled as soon as possible and it was decided the matter should go to arbitration. Lyons
also ciphered to Britain’s Naval Commander in the North Atlantic Admiral Milne that in the
event of imminent hostilities he would be alerted with the signal “could you forward a letter
for me to Antigua.” Milne in turn told his officers “Be on your guard and prepared. States may
declare war suddenly.”149
The complexities of reinforcing British North America
This tense climate served to further entrench the British policy of standing firm and
resolute in its diplomacy with the Union, and also encouraged a new effort towards military
readiness on land. Even if the worries of Lyons and Milne about a sudden attack by the US
did  not  materialise,  the  foreboding  about  ‘compensation’  at  the  war’s  end  remained.
Therefore partly  at  the behest  of  the British Commander in  North America Sir  Frederick
Williams,  3000  imperial  reinforcements  were  deployed  to  the  continent  in  early  June.
Williams believed these necessary to counter expected Federal filibustering attempts at the
end of the conflict which pleased Palmerston, particularly given his enduring resentment of
American filibustering in Central America. The Prime Minister moreover, intent on his policy
of  deterrence through intimidation,  insisted they be sent  out  on the Great  Eastern,  “the
largest and fastest vessel which this country had ever possessed”, ensuring the deployment
was accompanied by huge fanfare. Russell  believed that appeasement was dangerous -
particularly given the apparent unpredictability of the Secretary of State - and that the best
approach was a show of strength and confidence. Lyons concurred, writing to the Foreign
Minister that they must “disabuse both government and people of the delusion that they can
carry their points with us by bluster and violence, and that we are more afraid of a war than
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they are.”150 Russell therefore instructed the British Minister to convey to the Department of
State that the troops were justified to provide routine security with a neighbour in the process
of mobilisation across the frontier and  also necessary due to the discomfort felt from the
covert operations in Canada and the Peerless controversy.
Following the reinforcement however many of the unique and complex problems the
imperial government would come to face over the security of the provinces during the Civil
War came to the fore. The opposition attacked the deployment in parliament, arguing that
the bombastic  means of  transportation would portray a sense of  panic  or  perhaps even
provoke US aggression. Derby argued that far from protecting British neutrality or projecting
confidence, these troops “despatched in hot haste in a very ostentatious manner ... would
bespeak alarm in placing a corps of observation, and even of defiance, on the frontier.”151
Newcastle, like Williams, prophesied that the moment of greatest danger would be the Civil
War’s end with the North seeking compensation and/or revenge in an attack on British North
America. The Colonial Minister however was more cautious than Palmerston or Russell and
like  Derby  worried  about  the  impact  of  negative  reactions  to  the  mode  of  deployment.
Therefore while  it  was imperative for  British North America  to be supplied  with  imperial
troops, this and the military organisation of the provinces should be carried out discreetly so
as not to provoke further backlash either at home or in the United States. Newcastle wrote
“in whatever aspect ...  we regard this war, it is obviously necessary to increase our force in
Canada, and assume quietly an attitude of preparation.”152 
Newcastle however was presiding over a ministry facing huge pressure to reduce its
military  commitment  to  the  colonies  and  for  this  reason  alone  the  reinforcement  was
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unpopular among radicals and reformists. Given the resolution in March to pass the burden
of defence onto self-governing colonies, any imperial action in the provinces was liable to be
accused of  being a retrograde step – particularly  an act  as demonstrative as the Prime
Minister’s.   Palmerston’s  use  of  the  Great  Eastern  was  accused  of  being  so  bold  and
assertive  that  it  would  only  cause  complacency  and  inaction  amongst  the  local  people
towards defence. Benjamin Disraeli, next to Derby the leading voice of the conservatives,
claimed that “taking this early opportunity of letting the people of Canada know that we are
prepared to assume the monopoly of  defending them, is rather calculated to damp their
ardour and make them feel that it is not their business to protect their hearths and homes.”
Disraeli accepted that precautions against border incidents were necessary but questioned
that the mother country should supply them arguing that “I can conceive that there may be
violations  of  our  frontier  and  acts  of  outrage  committed  by  subjects  of  the  American
Government. But are there no inhabitants in Canada—are there not a numerous and gallant
people there, accustomed to military discipline?’”153
Indeed,  far  from displaying  a  “monopoly”  on defence,  the  harsh truth was that  -
considering the desperate state of the provincial militias and the rapidly increasing Union
army – the nature of the reinforcement was predicated more on bluff than on viable security.
The Times printed that even with the supplementary troops there would be on average less
than two soldiers per mile of British North American frontier and that to override this shortfall
the Canadians should be able to provide 50,000 men for defence, which at this time was
completely impracticable. Intended to dupe the US about the strength the British Empire
could bring to bear in Canada, the reinforcements threatened rather to dupe the provincial
peoples that the imperial government could protect them while provoking the Federals to
respond in kind. The policy was therefore heavily criticised in the leading newspapers as
being counterproductive.  The Times continued that the British arrivals would only increase
provincial  dependency on the mother  country  and argued that  the men would  be better
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stationed in Europe or New Zealand. Following up on the belief that local security should be
provided for by local populations and that the imperial contribution should rest on sea power
and  use  of  blockade  one  editorial  declared  that  “he who  attacks  Canada  declares  war
against England, and will call down on himself all the might of England, ... but in the matter
of her own fields and cities the duty of Canada is to defend herself.”154 The War Office had
planned  to  send  a  further  three  regiments  at  the  end  of  the  summer,  however  it  was
dissuaded from doing so, in part due to negative reactions from the public and press. 
In attempting to impress on the colonial peoples that they should become responsible
for  security however,  the critical  dispute emerged that  would hamper defence measures
throughout  the  Civil  War.  This  was  that  British  North  Americans  conceived  that,  not
possessing a diplomatic voice of their own, conflict with the Union would result from Britain’s
failed foreign policy, and therefore be Britain’s issue to deal with. Head wrote to the Colonial
Minister that the people of his province believed there were no “causes of difference with the
government of the United States arising out of the affairs or interests of Canada .... a line of
weakness through which an enemy might wound England ... in a war caused by interests in
no degree of a local ... character.”155 This left the imperial government stalled in relation to
security  on the ground.  The colonial  militias  were weak and the local  legislatures  were
evidently apathetic to their improvement.
However if provincial defence was riddled with difficulty on land, it was equally if not
more problematic on the Great Lakes. The findings of the Select Committee in March that
the proper imperial contribution to colonial security should rest on British superiority at sea
produced a critical anomaly when it came to the inland waterways of the North American
continent. The Rush-Bagot Agreement signed following the War of 1812 limited the number
of heavy vessels that either side could maintain to two on Lake Ontario and one on Lakes
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Huron and Erie. While no armed warships were permitted however the capacity of the United
States to deploy a force on the lakes if necessary was far greater than that of Britain. The
American  mercantile  marine  was  numerically  superior  to  that  of  Canada  and  therefore
dangerous  if  converted  to  war  vessels.  Lake  Michigan  was  completely  within  American
territory and possessed navigable communication with the border lakes. Like the Federal
railroad network therefore it gave the US a decided advantage in deploying resources swiftly
in case of necessity. As The Times put it: “those who were well acquainted with that frontier
entertained the opinion that its proper protection would be gunboats on the lakes, not men
scattered in small numbers and at distant points on the land.”156
The First Battle of Bull Run and British conceptions of the Civil War
Even  despite  the  tension  with  the  Department  of  State  these  problems  of  local
defence in the provinces still had not assumed critical urgency. With Southern organisation
and mobilisation gathering pace the United States remained in a much more precarious
position than British North America, and imperial assurance appeared to be solidified when
the Civil War’s first major clash of arms took place. The resounding Southern victory was
taken to confirm British preconceptions of  both the weakness of  US federalism and the
certainty of Southern independence. As British people - like American - had anticipated one
decisive  battle,  Manassas  further  entrenched  the  view  in  England  that  Southern
independence  was  guaranteed.  Palmerston  scoffed  that  Bull  Run  should  be  termed
“Yankees Run”.157 The British and the British North American press featured damning and
provocative verdicts on the shortcomings of the Northern Army, a Nova Scotia journal for
example lauding monarchical qualities over republican by claiming parallels with England’s
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Civil War, stating that the South possessed “the haughty, high-born spirit of the Cavaliers’
and the North was the ‘exponent of Puritanism”. Indeed even within the Federal Army itself
there was perceived an inferiority of Yankee republican soldiery to the cultural and historic
stock of the British descended troops. It was reported that those with British ancestry were
the only Union soldiers to emerge with any credit, a provincial journalist claiming that “the
Irish and Scotch regiments fought more in accordance with the monarchical principles taught
at Agincourt or Fontenay than with the democratic principles of ninety-day regiments.”158 The
battle therefore reinforced the low opinion in England of the ‘mobocratic’ Federal military.
This  condescending  appraisal  of  Lincoln’s  volunteer  army  formed  essentially  the  same
argument that Colonel Jervois would make when reporting on Canadian security later in the
Civil War. Further embedding as it did British sympathies for the South; the battle moreover
intensified the ill-feeling between the American and British newspapers and between the
Foreign Office and Department of State.
As he had in the Crimea, William Howard Russell was acting as war correspondent
for The Times and amid the dark atmosphere in the North following Bull Run, reported back
more evidence of hostility and danger towards Britain and the North American provinces.
Shortly  after  Manassas  Russell  had  been  entertained  by  Seward  and  described  the
Secretary of State reading out a despatch that had been drafted for Adams. Russell wrote
that “the tone of the paper was hostile ... there was an undercurrent of menace through it,
and ... it contained insinuations that Great Britain would interfere to split up the Republic, if
she could.” Here too the persistent risk of the ‘foreign war policy’ was alluded to. Seward told
the journalist that he “was pleased at the prospect of the dangers which threatened it” and
that “If any European Power provokes a war, we shall not shrink from it.” Confirming British
perceptions  of  the  volunteer  army however  the correspondent  was  himself  content  that
Federal troops were in no shape for a contest with Britain, stating “I could not but admire the
confidence ...  of the statesman who sat in his modest little room within the sound of the
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evening’s guns, in a capital menaced by their forces who spoke so fearlessly of war with a
power which could have blotted out the paper blockade of the Southern forts and coasts in a
few hours, and, in conjunction with the Southern armies, have repeated the occupation and
destruction of the capital.”159 Nonetheless following the conversation with Seward Russell
came to the conclusion that  the North would keep its armies ready post-war for a likely
invasion of the provinces. The reporter therefore suggested that keeping the North at bay
may require an alliance between British and Confederate forces.160
Canada  was  holding  its  provincial  election  at  this  time  and  with  armed  conflict
breaking out on the continent as well as the general feeling of insecurity with the US, the
incumbent conservative government argued the need for stability as their platform for re-
election.  The opening battle  of  the war also influenced their  policy in pledging that  they
would  now  start  the  work  on  the  intercolonial  railway.  Bull  Run  had  added  an  extra
imperative to the scheme by dramatically  proving the importance of  railroads in  modern
warfare.  The  rapid  Confederate  reinforcement  by  train  with  Johnston’s  force  from West
Virginia was as crucial to Confederate victory as Jackson’s stand on Henry House Hill. As
stated, allusions had already been made to the advantages US forces would enjoy from its
railway system in an invasion of British North America both in attacking the land border and
supplying the Great Lakes. This issue was later made clear in critical defence report by J.L.A
Simmons, who wrote “unfortunately the frontier of the United States is unpleasantly near to
the road from Quebec to Halifax; and although no railroads have as yet been made leading
from the interior of the United States to the frontier, they have been completed to a point
within  sixty  miles  from  it,  from  which  there  are  common  roads  leading  to  it;  and  the
population of New Brunswick, which only numbers 250,000 souls, is not sufficient to prevent
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an inroad upon the line of communication from Quebec to Halifax, and to keep it  open.”
Because of its association with imperial defence therefore, the intercolonial railway scheme
became central to the political agenda and the rival “European and North America Railway”
plan for connecting Halifax to Maine was - under the tension now felt with the Union - edged
out  completely.161 The  conservatives’  re-election  campaign  was  successful  and  it  was
agreed that a delegation would sail to Britain in the autumn to discuss the terms of a loan to
finance the project.
Federal militarisation and the General Defence Circular
Even  though  the  imperial  government  continued  to  believe  Confederate
independence was a fait accompli, the biggest factor in Britain shying away from recognition
remained  the  unwelcome  prospect  of  military  retaliation  by  the  Union.  This  had  been
reiterated by the Secretary of State who told Lyons that “the United States would resist to the
last  gasp any attempt  of  the European Powers  to interfere in  the contest.”162 Like  W.H.
Russell, the British Minister now acknowledged therefore that recognition would necessitate
a military pact with the Confederacy. Lyons described Merciér’s plan for intervention as futile
without “a defensive (if not also an offensive) Alliance with the South.”163 Seward’s sensitivity
to  the  risk  of  foreign  intervention  was  heightened  moreover  by  a  European  venture  in
Mexico. The Franco-British alliance had extended to a joint coalition with Spain to settle the
foreign debts question, it having been agreed that the mission was solely to extract Mexican
debts and no party was to seek territorial or imperial gain. 
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This mission was a double-edged sword however in that it offered the prospect of
further solidifying the unity of purpose between the European powers, or conversely putting
a new strain upon it. Queen Victoria warned Palmerston of being “made a cat’s paw for the
mysterious and selfish purposes and plans of the Emperor”, advice the Prime Minister did
not  especially  require  given  his  own suspicions  and  prejudices  against  France.  Indeed,
minor insecurities were already beginning to develop in the Anglo-French accord and these
would  grow  and  multiply  later  in  the  Civil  War.  While  Britain  continued  to  hold  back
fromintervention,  France,  experiencing  greater  hardship  from  the  cotton  embargo,  was
threatening  to  recognise  the  South.  When broached  by  Merciér  about  the  possibility  of
recognition  unless  southern  ports  were  opened  Seward  suddenly  turned  his  hard-line
approach on the French ambassador. The Secretary of State aggressively stated that the
best way for the European powers to ensure resumption of the cotton supply would be to
desist from encouraging the Confederate war effort i.e. by rescinding the South’s belligerent
status and withdrawing their proclamations of neutrality. In attempting to maintain a friendly
tone to the US Mercir had made comments which were relayed to the Foreign Office and
that sounded a further note of caution about both the maritime threat of the United States
and of France exploiting this challenge to British power. The French Ambassador had told
Seward that it had always been the aim of French policy that the United States should be
great and strong, and in particular that they should be a considerable naval power.”164
This  insinuation  that  France  desired  a  “great  and  strong”  rival  to  Britain  carried
greater impact  as the imperial  government was now struck by,  not  only  the progressing
mobilisation brought about by the Civil War, but a more general and deliberate militarisation
of  Northern  society.  Indeed,  Lyons  perceived  the  development  of  a  military-industrial
complex which was accelerating Federal power and prosperity at the expense of Britain. He
wrote to Russell that these advantages “are held to be happy results of the war and of the
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new Tariff, and to afford great encouragement in persevering to maintain both. Nor does the
satisfaction seem to be diminished by the idea that in this way Europe will  be the great
sufferers by the American troubles.” 165 Wary of this apparent developing militarism and with
the Northern army in the process of being rehabilitated post-Bull Run by new commander
General George McClellan, increased concern was again felt over imperial security. 
Believing  as  they  did  in  Southern  separation,  the  breach  between  the  imperial
government  and  Washington  also  only  widened  when,  following  the reverse  in  Virginia,
Federal prosecution of the war subsequently intensified. The suspension of habeas corpus
led to a number of British subjects being imprisoned, forcing Lyons to make regular protests
to Seward.  As Britain perceived this to contradict  so starkly the North’s  claim to be the
defender  of  political  liberty  sympathy  only  increased  for  the  Confederacy.  The  Foreign
Minister, who had for so long claimed the US to be corrupt through its excessive democracy,
now attacked it for its tyranny, writing sardonically “Her Majesty’s Government did not before
understand that the President was invested by the Constitution with powers so despotic and
so arbitrary.”166 The impression prevailed in Britain that the war was not a moral crusade for
democracy or freedom, but a reactionary stand driven by territory and power. Following one
of several Russell speeches accusing the North of fighting for ‘empire’  The Times printed
“this  way  of  stating  the  case  seems  to  be  thoroughly  correct.”167 Seward  tackled  this
accusation with an extremely strong rebuff - which on this occasion he had printed for public
consumption -  in  turn further  alienating  Britain.  Other draconian Northern policies  had a
similar political and diplomatic impact. British statesmen were mortified by rumours of Union
plans to sink rock-laden vessels  in Southern harbours. As with the blockade,  by striking
Britain’s own commercial interests this potential crippling of trade particularly infuriated the
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imperial  government.  Certain that Confederate independence was inevitable,  the Foreign
Office read into it confirmation of their view that the cause was hopeless. Russell described it
as “barbarous” and declared “I must remark ... that this cruel plan could only be adopted in
utter despair of the restoration of the Union, the professed object of the war; for it  never
could be the wish of the United States to destroy cities from which their own country was to
derive a portion of its riches and prosperity.”168
All of these tensions seemed to culminate in the autumn of 1861 with a “General
Defence Circular  issued by the Department of  State which was interpreted in  Britain  as
prelude to war over British North America, The Times seeing in it the realisation of the long
threatened third party war policy. William Howard Russell concluded “he is determined to
resort  to  his  favourite  panacea  of  making  the  severed  States  reunited  by  a  war  with
England.”169 Lyons wrote to the Foreign Office that “Mr Seward appears to have deemed it
advisable to get up a little excitement about the European Powers again.” The cumulative
effect of the defence circular, Seward’s belligerent stance over the cotton supply and the
publication of his hostile note over the arrest of British subjects deeply concerned Lyons. He
wrote to Russell  that “Mr Seward’s language to M. Merciér indicates a sudden and very
unfortunate return, on the part of this government, to an inconsiderate and unconciliatory
policy towards the Powers of Europe.”170 Anxiety was also felt in the cabinet. In a special
colonial  office  meeting attended by  Newcastle,  under-secretary Rogers  and the recently
returned Head it was speculated that this was a Seward ploy to have himself dismissed from
the cabinet by going too far in his hostility to Britain and then assume the presidency in 1864
on a wave of Anglophobia.171
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The Republican victory in the Presidential election of 1860 had bought into power a
Secretary of State that not only was a cause of the political crisis with the South but also of
diplomatic tensions with Britain. Seward was notorious in England for Anglophobic bluster,
expansionist politics, and more unsettlingly for a ‘foreign war policy’ that he might use to
theoretically  assuage  the  Civil  War.  Already  in  the  early  months  there  had  been  much
discomfort over irregular operations conducted at the behest of the Secretary of State in
Canada and rumours of plans to initiate unrest against the imperial government. Federal
belligerence  towards  Britain  was in  part  a  response to  the comprehension  that  imperial
statesmen wished for separation. Ephraim Adams argued that four major things made the
Union  believe  that  Britain  would  recognise  the  Confederacy:  the  Foreign  Secretary’s
noncommittal statement to Dallas; the Declaration of Neutrality; the tight accord with France;
and Russell meeting the Southern Commissioners. To this might be added the affording of
belligerent rights to the South and the lack of even tacit support for the North either in Britain
or in the provinces. This stemmed from the same general motivation that drove the wish for
British North American union.  Confederation was favoured as a British policy in order to
secure the North American provinces from Federal encroachment and eventually challenge
the  position  of  the  United  States.  The  secession  crisis  itself  now  suggested  a  revised
balance of power to this end through the fragmentation of the Union and a sovereign South.
The  Foreign  Office’s  neutrality  and  belligerents  rights  declarations  were  themselves
strategically  motivated  in  being  intended  to  allow  the  conflict  to  play  itself  out  with  the
expected  result  of  Confederate  independence.  Paradoxically  however,  while  intended  to
keep Britain  away from conflict  in  North America,  by validating  the Southern cause and
enraging the North, these proclamations appeared to bring the British Empire closer to the
brink. 
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The fear of an all out American attack, either at the conclusion of the Civil War, or in
order to extricate itself from it, was made worse by the fact that this was a time at which the
imperial  government  was  being  driven  to  reduce military  expenditure,  particularly  in  the
colonies. The imperial government however had come to realise that it faced a dilemma in
needing to reinforce British North America, but not wishing to face a backlash either from
public opinion or from the States, it being feared this precaution might provoke an attack by
the Federals. Britain’s overriding goal - and under these pressures now more than ever -
was for the provinces themselves to take the lead in providing for local defence. The people
of  Canada  however  apparently  did  not  think  security  to  be  their  concern  as  they  were
innocently and inadvertently made targets solely by their connection with Britain. This issue
too linked inexorably to the goal of uniting the British North American provinces, seen as it
was a means to enhance the sense of national status of the statesmen and people and
devolve greater responsibility to the provinces themselves. 
In the interim it remained politically if not ideologically imperative to British leaders to
prevent the US overrunning British North America and this issue had been exacerbated by
the  present  situation.  The  American  republican  system  was  anathema  to  the  British
government, it being considered a dangerous varying mix of unrestrained democracy and at
times despotic tyranny. This had become especially the case during the Civil War with the
Union claiming to be defending the freedom and democracy of the people, but yet having
curtailed individual liberties and the due process of law. This was the difficult position the
imperial government found itself in after a year of the conflict. All of these factors however,
Seward  potentially  bringing  on  a  war  with  Britain,  the  security  of  the  provinces,  the
independence of the South, and the allegiance of France, entered a more critical phase with
the onset  of  the  Trent crisis shortly thereafter.  Of  Seward Brian Holden Reid wrote that
“British statesmen were inclined to view the American secretary of state ...  as a man of
words rather than action, full of bluster and empty threats.”172 The following chapter will show
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that, despite a modicum of reassurance of the Department of State’s intentions following the
peaceful resolution to the Trent affair, fear persisted and at times resumed very strongly that
Seward would misjudge the threats he could mete out and plunge the nations into war - a
point Holden Reid acknowledged later on – and that this uncertainty had a signal effect on
increasing the imperial wish to achieve union.173
. 
CHAPTER 4
THE TRENT CRISIS, 1861-2
In December 1861 the  security of Canada assumed an unparalleled urgency, not
only due to the  Trent Crisis but also just the cumulative effect of the rising apprehension
over the past year. Coming off of the back of the general defence circular the  Trent affair
intensified the British cabinet’s paranoia of the policies and intentions of the Department of
State. Many suspected the seizure to be a deliberate Seward ploy to initiate his foreign war
panacea. Russell’s secretary at the Foreign Office for example labelled it a  “premeditated
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scheme to force us into collision.”174 With this the British Minister in Paris Earl Cowley was in
agreement, stating “I wish I could divest myself of the idea that the North and South will not
shake  hands  over  a  war  with  us.”175 Equally  the  British  prejudice  against  America’s
‘mobocratic’ system determined the enhanced sense of insecurity. Russell wrote to Lyons
that “such an insult to our flag can only be atoned by the restoration of the men who were
seized, and with Mr Seward at the helm of the United States, and the mob and the Press
manning  the  vessel,  it  is  too  probable  that  this  atonement  may  be  refused.”176 Even
regardless of Seward’s culpability therefore, English conceptions of the uncontrollability of
US democracy made the imperial government believe that hostilities would be unavoidable.
The Prime Minister issued a warning to Lewis about a vengeful press and public dictating US
policy.  Palmerston told  the War Secretary  that  “The masses will  make it  impossible  for
Lincoln  and  Seward  to  grant  our  demands  and  we  must  therefore  look  to  war  as  the
probable  result.”177 Lyons  had  transmitted  reports  to  the  Foreign  Office  about  the
belligerency  in  the  Northern  press  that  Russell  claimed  was  “manning”  US  policy.
Philadelphia’s Sunday Transcript for example stated “If (Britain) is not as cowardly as she is
treacherous – she will meet the American people on land and on the sea, not only to lower
the red banner of St George ... but to consolidate Canada with the union.”178 The intensity of
feeling  was  conveyed  to  the  English  newspapers  too.  When  W  H  Russell  interviewed
Seward in mid-December and raised the possibility of war the correspondent was told, “We
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will wrap the whole world in flames! No power so remote that she will not feel the fire of our
battle and be burned by our conflagration.”179
The Foreign Minister’s conviction that the Secretary of State and the baying masses
were the great danger gave him cause for concern that French support on apprehending
privateers would be forthcoming. Russell wrote to Cowley, “if we are forced to go to war with
Seward I hope the (French Government) will keep strictly to its oath ... for privateers which I
fear will swarm. I have still a hope of a favourable termination. It is the New York harbours
against the press and the mob.”180 It is revealing that the Foreign Secretary referred to “war
with Seward’” rather than the ‘North’ or ‘United States’. The Trent crisis however unleashed
the dormant fears, not only over the security of British North America, but facing conflict with
European rivals too. The Foreign Minister’s notes to Cowley were mainly preoccupied with
French policy on Europe as opposed to the United States. They also made clear that the
Secretary  of  State’s  intentions  and  the  preservation  of  honour  were  Russell’s  primary
concerns though he remained relatively confident in the abilities of the Royal Navy. Russell
told Cowley that “I think now the American Govt under the inspiration of Seward will refuse
us redress. The prospect is melancholy, but it is an obligation of honour which we cannot
escape. It is very foolish of the North, for if they had a chance of prevailing it is now – and
with our fleet at sea they cannot blockade ... the South.”181 Predicting the Union’s response
to the affair Russell wrote “I think they will try to hook in France, and if that is, as I hope,
impossible, to get Russia to support them.”182 In keeping with Russell’s wishes France was
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indeed unlikely to give overt military support to the Union as its immediate concern was with
reopening the cotton supply. 
For  this  reason  however  the  British  Minister  for  War  George  Cornewall  Lewis
believed that a British-American conflict was in the French interest. Lewis wrote that “it is
quite certain that the French Govt wish for war between England and America. The blockade
of the South would be raised, and they would get all the cotton which they want.”183 More
than this however, particularly given Merciér’s recent comments to Seward, the belief existed
that France saw the crisis as a strategic opportunity and desired conflict  to further build
Federal naval power at the expense of Britain.184 The Trent incident therefore threatened not
only  conflict  with the Northern states but  enhanced concerns about  Napoleon assuming
greater command in Europe while Britain was pinned down in the Americas. The Queen
expressed “profound distrust in the conduct & purposes of our neighbour.” Palmerston too
feared that France was seeking free reign for its forces on the continent. The Prime Minister
wrote to Russell “it seems clear from all this the Emperor intends to war on a great scale
next Spring, and will therefore make no real reduction in his army or navy ... He will attack
Austria with the help of Italy in Venetia, in Dalmatia, and in Hungary. He will attack Prussia
on the Rhine, and get up an insurrection against the 3 Powers in Poland, and if  we are
engaged in a war on the other side of the Atlantic, as seems likely, he will think himself free
from our interference.”185 
Untrusting  of  French  policy  therefore  the  Trent  crisis  was  the  most  compelling
circumstance yet encouraging alliance with the Confederacy,  a strategy that had already
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been mooted in the major newspapers and even by the British minister in Washington.  It
offered strongest  prospect  yet  of  redressing the strategic  imbalance on the continent  by
helping the Confederacy achieve independence.  One of the chief Northern supporters in
Britain,  radical  John  Bright  recognised  this  and  wrote  to  his  acquaintance  US Senator
Charles  Sumner  “if  you  are  resolved  to  succeed  against  the  South,  have  no  war  with
England; make every concession that can be made; don’t even hesitate to tell the world that
you will even concede what two years ago no Power would have asked of you, rather than
give another nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your country.”186 Indeed, as
support and sympathy for the Confederacy was widespread in Britain, the affair gave a fillip
to supporters of the South. This applied to British arms too, many in the Royal Navy buoyant
at the prospect of a British-Confederate alliance. Milne wrote “The ships’ companies are in a
high state of excitement for war, they are certainly all for the South. I hear the Lower Decks
today are decorated with the Confederate colours.”187 The prospect of joining forces with the
South  however  merely  increased  the spectre  of  the  North  attempting  to  strip  Britain  of
Canada.
Indeed, in congress  speculations about a British-Southern pact were not universal
unwelcomed  due  to  the  opportunities  this  would  offer  in  a  war  with  Britain. When  the
President’s message was addressed to senators in early December it was posited that the
Union would be better not waiting for the Civil War to terminate before attacking British North
America. Congressman Alexander Stevens for instance argued that fighting Britain and the
South at the same time actually played into Northern hands strategically - a statement Lyons
relayed to Russell - which read: “we should be better able to meet England ... with the rebel
States  in  alliance  with  her  than  if  they  were  still  loyal.  They  have  a  vastly  extended
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defenceless  frontier  easily  accessible  by  a  maritime  enemy.  If  we  were  relieved  from
protecting them, we could use all our forces in other quarters.” It was subsequently made
clear precisely where those ‘other quarters’ were; Stevens stated that “we should ... rectify
our Eastern and Northern boundaries; and our banner would wave over freemen ... from the
Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic Ocean, and from the Bay of St. Lawrence to Puget Sound.” The
Senate Chaplain too made veiled references to later military actions “upon a broader scale
with a vaster force.”188 
While  Stevens’  arguments  may  have  been  ambitious,  these  statements  held
significant weight in the Foreign Office. Indeed, taking place as it did around a week after the
seizure, Lincoln’s annual message to Congress was anxiously anticipated by the imperial
government for word of the Federal Government’s perspective on the crisis. While slightly
reassured by the fact that the President made no explicit  reference to the incident, other
aspects  of  the  speech  contained  inferences  of  menace  towards  Britain.  In  refuting  the
practicality of Confederate independence Lincoln stated that there was no “natural boundary”
between the northern and southern states.  This  was interpreted by some however  as a
subtle reference to the fact that there also was no ‘natural’  barrier between the US and
British North America, it being a frontier incorporating lakes and rivers with some parts of the
US lying north of the Provinces and vice versa. Lyons informed Russell moreover that the
general  feeling  in  Washington  suggested  hostility  writing  “the  language  used  by  the
President ... in speaking of foreign Powers has caused no small degree of disquietude here.
It is held to indicate suspicion and irritation on the part of this government.”
Still  more alarming for imperial security in the present climate was a reference by
Lincoln to militarising the Union shores on the lakes. Lyons wrote to Russell that “I have
reason to believe that no little alarm will be excited in Canada by the recommendation which
the President addressed to Congress to erect fortifications and make depots of arms and
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ammunition at well-selected points along the great lakes and rivers.”189 As a result concern
grew about the Union going a step further and placing armed vessels on the waterways,
currently  prohibited  under  the  Rush-Bagot  agreement.  With  its  commercial  marine  and
communications advantage the US had a much stronger start point for bringing a force to
bear on the lakes. Conversely the imperial government, proceeding with its policy of cut-
backs,  did  not  even  maintain  the  ships  allowed  by  the  terms  of  the  1817  treaty.  The
American vessels disarmed under the treaty had been covered and could now be put back
into use, while the British ships had been left to rust and were now unsalvageable. 
The defence of British North America
When word reached the provinces from London, making some attempt to secure the
Great Lakes (a key weakness in Britain’s defence policy) was among the chief concerns.
The Canadian legislature requested to know what Britain’s strategy would be should war
come and was told that the key positions to secure were Quebec, Montreal and Halifax; the
imperial  seat  of  government,  key communications hub along the St Lawrence River and
primary  British  naval  base  in  the  region  respectively.  Protecting  Quebec  and  Montreal
however depended largely on commanding both the St Lawrence and the Great Lakes. This
in turn rested on the safe-keeping of the Beauharnois, Cornwall and Welland canals and
concentration  of  troops  would  therefore  be  required  for  their  protection.  Indeed,  if  the
Welland canal were to appear in danger of falling into American hands it would have to be
destroyed as it  was the key conduit  between Lake Ontario and Lake Huron.190 The first
instruction that reached Canada from London was the Colonial Minister informing Monck that
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11,000 extra reinforcements. These were sent out in December and were deployed for the
defence of the vital imperial positions.
Indeed, in keeping with the resolution made earlier in the year, the British contribution
would primarily be confined to the efforts of the Royal Navy, imperial troops only performing
a supporting role on land. Lyons had warned Milne early on that war was imminent and he
should be prepared and late in the year he offered fresh advice not to scatter his forces. The
American Navy by this time could boast roughly 260 vessels, a force six times larger than
Milne’s squadron. While numerically inferior however, to Milne’s advantage was the fact that
his squadron was steam powered as oppose to the largely sail ships of the US. Whereas too
the US navy was largely ad hoc the regular  British fleet was more strongly imbued with
experience  and  professionalism.191 The  Navy’s  strategy  was  to  immediately  break  the
Federal blockade off Florida, Virginia and the Carolinas, then impose its own on the North.
The strides of the Federal Navy however, together with the unsuitability of the imperial fleet
for action on the rivers and lakes, spawned fears over brown water defence and even that of
Halifax, the paramount naval station to defend. The Duke of Somerset had declared himself
too preoccupied with the naval arms race with France to seriously consider to lacunae of the
North American continent, particularly when the powers were at peace and military thinkers
had felt secure about war with the US. There were two ironclads in service but they were not
fitted for coastal use, making the Royal Navy vulnerable to the US Monitor. This gave similar
worries over the defence of the Great Lakes and the St Lawrence, as well as the St John
River.192 
Security on land now too started to become an urgent concern as under this strategy
and due to the imperial  cutbacks of  the antebellum decade,  the general  defence of  the
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provinces would be left to the colonial militias, forces that were in a state of degeneration.
New Brunswick for example had only 50 companies of volunteers, poorly equipped with old
flintlock  muskets  and possessing  next  to  no ammunition.  Still  more alarmingly  an 1860
change to the law left the Lieutenant Governor Arthur Gordon unable to call up the trained
and drilled militia remaining dormant from the Act of 1854, and Gordon was even doubtful
that the colonial assembly would agree to meet early to effect a change. On December 23,
Gordon wrote to Colonial Secretary asking him to pave the way for solving the matter writing
“my hands may be materially strengthened by a dispatch from your grace pointing out the
inconvenience of the existing act and the necessity for its reconsideration.”193 In Canada at
least Monck gained the assent of his local legislature to arm the militia and form the men in
artillery and engineer companies, however these men too were chronically short of arms,
there not being enough weapons to equip the sedentary force. 
The  Governor  General  was  nonetheless  concerned  to  maintain  calm  within  the
provinces.  Monck therefore did not  wish more rifles to be transported from Halifax,  and
requested Williams to prepare “as quietly as possible, not on the account of the Americans
but lest an alarm and panic should be excited amongst our people.” Monck in Quebec and
Lyons  in  Washington  had  urged  “vigilance  and  quiet”  among  British  subjects  in  North
America prior to instructions being received from London. Concern would especially be felt
over the New Brunswick/US border and Lieutenant  Governor of Nova Scotia the Earl  of
Mulgrave was reminded to send messages to Monck by personal messenger through the
provinces rather than the usual winter route through Maine. Williams was also asked not to
use the telegraph for secret correspondence. 194 Indeed, the position of Maine, lying on New
Brunswick’s western border, gave it enormous importance in the present climate. This factor
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now contributing to the sense of insecurity over British North America linked to the want of
viable communications believed essential to form the groundwork of provincial union.  Both
the  canal  and  railway  networks  were  located  close  to  the  American  frontier  and  were
especially vulnerable with no natural defences existing between the two. Gordon complained
to the Colonial Minister that there was no inland telegraph line to communicate with Canada
and “consequently all messages for that province have to be transmitted by what is called
the American line, along the valley of the St. John. This line would in the event of war be
manifestly insecure, and being, moreover, not ... under the control of the Government, is
hardly to be depended upon for secrecy.” 195
As with the militia however – and also the imperial government was soon to find the
fortifications - it  was a struggle to make the local legislatures contribute to improving the
communications.  Gordon  had  attempted  to  impress  on  New  Brunswick  parliament  the
importance of keeping the roads open lest military necessity require it, informing Newcastle
that  “I  have  taken  every  opportunity  of  impressing  upon  the  members  of  the  executive
government the importance of keeping the highways carefully free from all obstructions”. It
appeared however that the provincial  legislature was masking the weakness of the road
networks in order to avoid contributing to repairs, much to the frustration of the Lieutenant
Governor. Gordon told the Colonial Secretary that “owing to a natural unwillingness on the
part of the executive government to expend the public  money without urgent necessity I
have found a disposition on their part to elicit more favourable accounts of the state of the
roads than are I fear borne out by the facts.”




All of these logistical shortcomings emphasised the lack of a trans-colonial railway
and added to the argument for its creation. Ironically, the British North American delegation
was in  London when the  Trent affair  broke,  having arrived to  negotiate  the loan  for  its
construction.  Speaking of the seizure Canadian representative Joseph Howe, who would
become a critical opponent of the Confederation movement, stated “this mortal blow, aimed
at our national honour gives of course importance to our mission.” Howe graphically warned
what would be the Canadian fate if the Federals invaded, telling the imperial government
that “our cities would be captured, our fields laid to waste, our bridges blown up, our railways
destroyed”, while women “would become prey to a soldiery drawn from the refuse of society
in the old world and the new.”196 Gladstone however, whose prerogative it was to confer the
loan  remained  dedicated  to  economising  on  the  imperial  commitment  and  therefore  on
making Canada accept the duty of defence. Regarding the money, the Chancellor privately
spoke  of  the  objectionable  features  of  these  “helps  to  other  people  who  might  help
themselves.”197 Gladstone did  therefore  impose the condition  that  the  loan  came with  a
‘sinking fund’ making repayments due yearly beginning in the current financial year. Under
the current strain the home government rather preferred to turn the focus around and ask
what  assistance  they  could  expect  to  receive  from Canada  which  led  to  tense  counter
accusations of imperial neglect. At the War Office for instance Lewis met the party to ask
them what they had to suggest and was told by one delegate, “why, to fight it out of course;
we in Canada will have to bear the first brunt. But we cannot fight with jack-knives; and there
are no arms in the country. You have failed to keep any arms at all.”198 
The logistical problem of deploying forces in early winter added to the argument for
the  railway.  Only  one  troop  ship  reached  Canada  before  the  St  Lawrence  froze  over
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meaning that the rest had to land at Halifax, Saint John and St Andrews and the men be
marched overland.199 Some, including the 62nd Infantry Regiment, were disembarked at St
Andrew and from there had to be transported by sleighs to Canada via Woodstock. From
there it appeared the threat emanating from Maine was fairly benign. One of this regiment’s
lieutenant-colonels observed that in Houlton, Maine, extremely close to Woodstock across
the frontier there could be seen only a few dozen volunteer militia “whom I saw marching in
the  town  without  arms,  to  the  inspiring  air  of  Yankee  Doodle  playing  on  a  small  fife
accompanied by a big drum.” Despite this the imperial government’s predominant security
concerns  were  with  the  most  north-easterly  of  the  American  states.  Gordon  and  Major
General Charles Hastings Doyle – who would become the next Lieutenant Governor of Nova
Scotia  -  discussed  defence  of  the  lower  provinces  and  concluded  that  Saint  John  and
Woodstock were practically indefensible. Doyle’s priority was the northern end of the river at
Woodstock, which he told Gordon would be “difficult if not impossible to defend.” It would
likely form the first objective of an invasion as once in possession of the town, the Federals
would possess the ability to descend the river and commence “laying under contribution the
richest and most important counties of the province.” 200 The danger was that Woodstock
was situated less than ten miles from the United States border and was reachable from
several routes directly connected to a great military road through Maine. It was therefore
contemplated adopting the same strategy as in the War of 1812 and occupying the eastern
portion of  the state. The benevolence of the locals  on that  occasion made some British
commanders  optimistic  it  may  pay  dividends  again.  Milne  even  believed  that  with  its
economic interests essentially  similar  to those of  British North America it  might consider
Britain a natural ally and therefore went so far as  to posit that  if Maine was spared attack
“that state might be inclined to change masters.”201 The Colonial Minister too endorsed the
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scheme,  telling  Watkin  “by  the  way,  I  have  heard  that  the  State  of  Maine  wants  to  be
annexed to our territory.”202
Doyle favoured pre-emptive strikes on American ports and coastal towns but due to
these political considerations it was rejected by Milne.203 Gordon’s spies however had also
been despatched into Northern towns and reports suggested an incredibly hostile reception
would await British forces in the state. Information reached the Lieutenant-Governor that the
United States had four regiments in the state, one of cavalry, one of artillery and two infantry,
and that hostility  towards the empire was abundant.  Gordon’s informants described “that
spirit prevailing among all classes in Maine as extremely hostile to Great Britain.” This was
transmitted to the Colonial Office, as well as specific statements on the Anglophobic feeling
among  powerful  figures  both  in  public  sphere  and  the  press.  The  Lieutenant  Governor
relayed to Newcastle that “the most influential inhabitants ... (at which places a kindly spirit
toward Great Britain was supposed to prevail) ... have come forward ... to join in addresses
to and subscriptions for  the editors of  those newspapers  which have most  distinguished
themselves by virulent abuse of England and H.M Government.”204
The  Trent   Crisis and losing the provinces 
The Federal Army in general concerned the imperial government. As on water, the
US land force that Britain would now have to deal with had altered drastically from that which
existed even eight months before. In the annual statement to Congress the War Department
had set forth its strength, which Lyons relayed to the Foreign Office. The British Minister told
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Russell that “the Secretary of War gravely announces in his report that the United States
have raised a greater force than was ever gathered by the First Napoleon; that they have
already an army of 600,000 men; that should any emergency demand it, “the Government
could promptly put into the field an army of over 3,000,000.’” Initially Britain had placed the
satisfaction  of  pride  as  paramount  in  spite  of  the  manifest  evils  of  war  with  the  US.
Clarendon for example wrote, “I have a horror of war and of all wars one with the United
States because none would be so prejudicial to our interests ... but peace like other good
things may be bought too dearly and it can never be worth the price of national honour.”205 In
the emergency cabinet meeting called when news of the Trent broke Palmerston famously
walked in and smashed his fist on the table saying “You may stand for this but I’ll be damned
if  I  will”  and  wanted  to  “read  a  lesson  to  the  United  States  which  will  not  soon  be
forgotten.”206 At first the Duke of Argyll described it to Gladstone as a “wretched piece of
American folly ... I am all against submitting to any clean breach of International Law, such
as I can hardly doubt that this has been.”207 11 days later however the same author wrote to
the Chancellor that “War with America is such a calamity that we must do all we can to avoid
it.  It  involves  not  only  ourselves,  but  all  our  North  American  colonies.”208 Gladstone,
continually reluctant to release funds for imperial defence, from the start urged the diplomats
to forsake strong demands that would make it impossible to avoid conflict. Gladstone replied
to Argyll that “it is a very sad and heart-sickening business, and I sincerely trust with you that
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war may be averted.”209 The Chancellor was anxious that Britain’s critical note to Seward
should not be so peremptory that the United States would be denied a “graceful exit.” 
Like Gladstone, Russell maintained that Mason and Slidell must be released but was
checked in his ardour due to the problems of Canadian defence. The realisation had quickly
dawned that,  despite the pride at stake, the growth of the Federal army even in the year
since  on  the  onset  of  the  secession  crisis  had  changed  the  strategic  outlook  in  North
America.  Russell  wrote  to  Palmerston:  “I  do  not  think  the  country  would  approve  an
immediate declaration of war. But I think we must abide by our demand for the restoration of
the prisoners ... Lyons gives a sad account of Canada. Your foresight of last year is amply
justified.”210 The Foreign Minister too was becoming about war with the US. On hearing that
McClellan  thought  the  “seizure  was  quite  unjustifiable”,  Russell  wrote  “I  wish  McClellan
would be made dictator”, ironically something the General himself had joked about in view of
his popularity in the North. 211 Russell  reflected favourably on discussions with Adams in
which the ambassador offered assurances should Britain’s tone be moderate. The Foreign
Secretary  wrote  that  “Adams language  ...  was entirely  in  favour  of  yielding  to  us  if  our
demands are not  too peremptory...If  our demands are refused,  we must,  of  course,  call
parliament  together.  The  sixth  of  February  will  do.  In  any  other  case  we  must  decide
according to circumstances.”212 
That the Foreign Secretary was converted to Gladstone’s approach of allowing the
US a ‘graceful exit’ is evident from this note. Russell was prepared to wait seven weeks until
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the scheduled start of the next session of parliament to take action in the hope that cooler
heads would have prevailed by that time on both sides of the Atlantic. This is what took
place  with  each party  accepting  the strategic  danger  of  an Anglo-American war.  Prince
Albert’s  softening  of  Russell’s  letter  to  require  merely  an explanation  and not  an abject
apology kept the British demands from being too arbitrary to avert a conflict. Britain stood to
lose its North American provinces, the United States the South, Lincoln thus stating “one war
at a time”. Indeed, despite his early confidence in British naval power meting a lesson, even
Palmerston’s  resolve was tempered by the prospect  of a reverse in Canada.  The Prime
Minister wrote to the War Secretary on December 2 that he did not think the “loss of our
North American Provinces a light matter, or one which would not seriously affect the position
of  England  among  the  nations  of  the  world.”213 The  Times made  the  same  argument,
declaring “We can sweep the Federal  fleet from the seas,  we can blockade the Atlantic
cities, but we cannot garrison and hold 350,000 square miles of country.”214
The need for future deterrence
In regards to the Department of State, Seward’s siding with the doves led British
statesmen to somewhat revise their impressions. Russell told Gladstone “I do not believe
that Seward has any animosity towards this country. It is all buncom.”215 Lyons had begun to
believe that Seward had realised the inadvisability of antagonising foreign powers and wrote
to the Foreign Secretary that “you will perhaps be surprised to find Mr Seward on the side of
peace...ten months of office have dispelled many of his illusions... he no longer believes ...
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the United States could crush the rebellion with one hand, and chastise Europe with the
other.”216 Nonetheless for the present the consistent paranoia of mob-rule in the North kept
British statesmen concerned, particularly given the negative feeling stirred up by the crisis.
From the start of the Civil War the imperial government had worried the Federal Army would
turn northward at  its close,  particularly  as – Britain expecting Confederate victory -  they
would have lost  the South. Following the  Trent affair  British statesmen would fear a US
attack  purely  as  retribution  for  the  humiliation  of  having  to  surrender  the  envoys  and
therefore from this time trepidation existed for imperial security in North America regardless
of the outcome of the Civil War. 
With this comprehension the key impression the crisis gave was that the provinces
must  be  better  able  to  meet  a  Federal  invasion  when  the  expected  vengeance  was
attempted. The Colonial Minister wrote “even if peace be for the present preserved I fear we
cannot count upon its safe continuance for any length of time in the present temper of the
American people, and it is of great importance that our North American possessions should
not  again  allow  themselves  to  be  caught  in  a  state  of  utter  unpreparedness.”217 Lyons
continued  to  believe  military  readiness  was  Britain’s  only  option  in  Canada,  urging  that
imperial  forces  must  be prepared to  give  a  “warm reception”  should  the Federal  attack
materialize. 218  The War Secretary wrote “I do not believe that the Americans will cherish the
Trent affair  in  their  hearts,  &  will  watch  the  moment  of  our  weakness  in  order  to  be
avenged.”219 Thus even though Seward’s concessions had – at least temporarily – given the
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imperial government some reassurance over the Department of State, the residual British
prejudice of the American ‘mob’ continued to fuel concern. The lesson was drawn that the
US should not be allowed to perceive Britain’s “weakness”, the  Trent affair in this respect
reinforcing the imperial  government’s view that  a deterrence policy  represented the best
strategy for staving off attack in North America. Lyons, better placed than anyone to observe
the effects  of  British foreign policy,  wrote that  “diplomacy would  have done little  toward
settling the Trent question, had not the military preparations come in aid of it” and that “the
preparation for war ... has prevented war.”220 
For this reason great satisfaction was taken that despite the extreme difficulty of the
weather  the  imperial  reinforcements  had  been  deployed  efficiently.  Gordon  informed
Newcastle that “it cannot be otherwise than most satisfactory to H.M Government to learn
that an undertaking so difficult as the movement in this climate of a large body of troops and
guns  over  a  long  line  in  the  depth  of  winter  has  been  attended  with  such  complete
success.”221 During the march from Saint John to Canada there were four fatalities, two from
pneumonia and two from the effects of “excessive drinking”, given the circumstances a low
rate of loss. Only one case of serious frostbite occurred by which one soldier of the 16th
Regiment lost both hands. As a result the very difficulty of deploying the troops at such an
inhospitable time of  year was transformed into a virtue by Palmerston in order to refute
accusations made by the opposition that the government had been remiss in not sending the
extra troops the previous summer. It was also furthermore presented as evidence that the
government’s  defence policy  of  firm deterrence had proven successful  in  the affair.  The
Prime Minister told parliament:
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I  believe  it  was  rather  fortunate  that  we  did  not  send  that  number  then,
because I think those who have watched the progress of late events must
have seen that the energy and rapidity with which a very large force was
despatched to Canada in the middle of winter, in spite of all the difficulties
that  naturally  opposed  themselves  to  such a  proceeding  -  that  display  of
promptitude, of vigour and power, on the part of this country, I am convinced
tended very greatly  to the peaceful  and satisfactory solution of  the recent
difficulties between this country and the United States.222
This was also important in that it was hoped this would influence the other key strand
of  imperial  defence policy  – the aim for  the provinces to take on the onus for  defence
themselves. The Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick was confident that Britain’s evident
commitment would have a galvanising effect on the colonies. Gordon wrote that “the people
of this province will learn with the liveliest satisfaction that in case of need H.M Government
will neglect no exertions to provide for their protection and defence and Your Grace may rely
with confidence on the loyal and gallant spirit which will serve every man in New Brunswick
to  repel  hostile  aggression.”223 The  Foreign  Minister  harboured  a  belief  that  Canadian
resolve would have a signal effect on deterring the US from future aggression. Russell wrote
“the unanimity shewn here, the vigorous dispatch of troops & ships – the loyal determination
of Canada may save us a contest for a long while to come.”224
Desertion and the State of Maine
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Though the imperial  government  was pleased  with  the deployment  however,  the
increased military presence in North America now caused additional problems for the British
authorities to deal with. The desertion of Federal soldiers into the provinces having been a
concern since early on in the conflict; this now begun to cause problems in the opposite
direction. On February 5 Gordon wrote to Newcastle that “I regret to have to report to Your
Grace that desertions have taken place in several corps ... since their arrival in this province
and  chiefly  while  in  the  line  of  march  between  Woodstock  and  the  Canadian  frontier.”
Desertion  had  been  a  continual  problem  for  imperial  forces  in  North  America  but  was
exacerbated now by the increased British presence and  the Federal need for manpower.
Extended enlistment, stern disciple, low pay and boredom made men restless and made
tempting the allure of opportunity and prosperity in the US and the chances for promotion
were much higher in the burgeoning Federal army. The problem was summed up by Sir
James Ferguson who stated “if temptation at any time was held out to British soldiers to be
unfaithful to their colours, how much more danger was there when every trained soldier was
worth his weight almost in gold in the United States.”225 This could occur either entirely of
their  volition or  through the efforts of  illegal  Union recruiting,  known in the provinces as
‘crimping’. Numerous such cases were reported in London, Canada West and the base for
imperial troops, Halifax. Gordon informed the Colonial Minister “I have reason to believe that
many  subjects  of  the  U.S  are  constantly  engaged  in  seducing  H.M  soldiers  from  their
allegiance and conveying them across the frontier.” Of equal concern were efforts to induce
soldiers from the New Brunswick militia companies to defect to the North and bring with
them their  British Army issued Enfield rifles.  Not  only  did it  threaten to weaken imperial
forces while simultaneously strengthening the feared invader: but it was a source of further
diplomatic antagonism and tension with the state of Maine, lying as it did so close to St John
across the New Brunswick border. One regiment was redeployed from Fredericton to Nova
Scotia due to the persistent problem of desertion to Maine. To guard against desertion Doyle
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set up outposts and patrols, a measure which was very successful, only one (failed) attempt
occurring  thereafter. There  were  serious  issues  in  the  navy  too.   Following  nineteen
instances of desertion on the St George Milne implemented the ‘Aldanah plan’. This was the
stationing  of a  stop  and  search  ship  near  the  port  of  Halifax  to  arrest  “systematic
desertion.”226 The vessel used was H.M.S Pyramus which intercepted merchant vessels in
the harbour believed to contain Royal Navy seamen.
Relations  with  the  adjoining  American  states  also  appeared  in  jeopardy  due  to
questions over the Reciprocity  Treaty.  Northern newspapers and the New York press in
particular were questioning the benefits to American commerce under the agreement. The
terms of the treaty were due to expire in 1864 at which point either or both parties were
entitled to give a year’s notice of their intention to terminate the arrangement. In February
Lyons met with Lincoln and Seward to discuss reciprocity and was told by the President: “In
this and in all matters we desire to be good friends with you if we can.”227 The British minister
was still however concerned enough to follow this with a written enquiry to the Secretary of
State  who  responded  by  presenting  a  letter  he  had  written  to  the  Governor  of  Maine
summing up the will  for the agreement not to be interfered with. This exchange however
bought back many of the doubts about the Secretary of State. Seward informed Lyons of
instructions given to the Governor of Maine permitting the passage of British troops and
officers’ baggage currently on vessels of the Montreal Steamship Company off the coast,
through  the  state  to  New Brunswick.  It  caught  Lyons  unawares  for  there  had  been  no
designs to transmit men or equipment via this route. It appeared a propaganda exercise by
Seward to obtain a high moral perch or to embarrass British arms, or even an attempt to
gage public opinion on imperial forces with a view to launching hostile action. The imperial
government did not require the offer and Lyons did not wish to have British troops passing
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over US territory at the present juncture. If there was hostility from the locals a flashpoint
might arise that could spiral to war - while conversely if the soldiers were received without
bad feeling it was feared they may desert, or that if war came they would be less battle-
hardened out of gratitude to the North. The request for officer’s baggage to be forwarded
was  also  superfluous  because  the  Reciprocity  Treaty  already  contained  a  mechanism
allowing for such transmission. 
Most irksome to Lyons was the final paragraph of Seward’s letter which alluded to
the importance of states’ rights and consequently iterated the elevation of domestic harmony
over foreign. Seward wrote “the Federal Government is fully sensible that ... it owes to each
of the states the most exact respect for her rights and interests. The State of Maine has
been so eminently loyal and patriotic in the present emergency that the President would not
feel  himself  at  liberty  to  wound  any  sensibility  that  she  may  feel  upon  the  subject.  If,
therefore, you shall advise me that the directions in question are likely to have that effect,
they will be cheerfully modified.”228 It was agreed between Williams, Monck and Lyons that
the company should indeed deposit the baggage at Portland for transportation, Lyons feeling
that not utilising the Reciprocity Treaty in the current climate would give a further impression
of enmity towards the United States. Monck however advised that no military personnel were
to get involved in the arrangements as he believed that, following the Trent affair the state of
Maine was “rancorous (with) animosity and ill-will.” The Governor General also admonished
the shipping company, erroneously believing they had initiated the situation by making an
unsanctioned request to a foreign government, accusing it of causing “inconvenience, at a
very anxious moment.”229
In  other  ways mistrust  of  the neighbouring  state continued to cause the imperial
government anxiety over imperial security however. On February 7 Maine’s state legislature
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requested an appropriation for defence from the Federal Government which fuelled further
speculation  in  Britain  of  war  with  the  US.230 Following  this  on  February  19  The  Times
published reports of an imminent invasion of the provinces, based on this and also Lincoln’s
“General War Order Number One.” This called for a ‘general’ advance by all Union forces
and was likely interpreted as a directive sending the Federal armies into Canada, when in
fact it  was an attempt to prompt Union commanders (McClellan in particular)  into action
against  the Confederacy using Washington’s  Birthday as motivation.  Given the affiliation
between Palmerston and the paper the report may have been treated with serious concern
in the government.
The Great Lakes and Burgoynne’s report into Canadian defence
Other of the northerly Federal States now also caused discomfort over the safety of
the provinces. In February a House of Representatives Select Committee reported on the
necessity  of  establishing  depots  on  the  Great  Lakes  and  widening  of  the  Illinois  and
Michigan Ship Canal. It was claimed that the Rideau Canal gave Britain an advantage on
Lake Ontario as it was out of range of Federal guns, quoting The Times that the canal could
be used to “pour into the lakes such a fleet of gunboats and other craft as will give us the
complete and immediate command”.231 Equally concerning given the British weakness on
the lakes, it  was argued that because Michigan was not a “boundary lake” and thus not
specifically referred to in the preamble to the Rush-Bagot agreement that the US was within
its  rights to deploy limitless  warships  upon it.  Petitions were also made in Congress by
several of the Northern-most states for appropriations for works which had been neglected
on their fortifications. Lyons raised these issues with Seward who responded that it  was
230
 Winks, p. 117.
231
 The Times, 14 January 1862.
127
unlikely it would be acted on as congress would be unlikely to vote the money for what was
merely the lake states seeking federal grants for state purposes. 
Nonetheless this allusion to militarising the lakes was more concerning as this same
month the imperial government despatched Colonel Burgyonne to inspect the defences of
the provinces and the waterways represented one of the key problems. Burgyonne wrote
that “The naval power on the Lakes is one of the greatest difficulties with which we shall
have to contend.”  The colonel summed up that while beginning at a state of parity, the
domestic  advantages  of  the  Union’s  manpower  and  logistics,  together  with  its  greater
commercial marine would allow it to overwhelm Canadian efforts. Burgyonne wrote
the naval power on the Lakes is one of the greatest difficulties with
which  we  shall  have  to  contend.  By  Treaty,  neither  Power  is  to  maintain
armed vessels on these Lakes, and therefore it would appear that we should,
in  case  of  war,  start  on  an  equality  with  the  enemy.  But  this  equality  is
completely destroyed by the superior means in the hands of the United States
for creating such a force. Their great populations, their much larger proportion
of  mercantile  naval  resources,  including steamers on the Lakes,  and their
great means of transport of resources from the interior, including leading naval
ports,  would be extremely in their favour in such a contest ...  In the upper
waters, the States would possess a peculiar advantage, in having one fine
district Lake (Michigan) entirely within their own territory, possessing at the
same time a navigable communication with the others, while we have but a
very partial similar resource on Lake Huron.
Burgyonne’s  reference to the Federals’  “great  means of  transport  of  resources from the
interior” was an allusion to the more extensive railway system of the northern United States,
as well as the superior canal network to supply and support their naval force. On this point
the  colonel  also  expounded  upon  the  American  threat  to  circumvent  the  Rush-Bagot
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agreement by arming Lake Michigan as it  was not technically  a border lake. Burgyonne
wrote “it has even been rumoured that the States had an intention of evading the above-
mentioned Treaty by a subterfuge, and establishing during peace an armed naval force on
Lake Michigan, on the plea of its not being a joint occupation, but one exclusively their own.”
Most worryingly Burgyonne described the way in which imperial vessels on the lakes would
find the experience completely alien – in paradoxical ways - to that of the Royal Navy on the
open seas. Whereas British naval superiority could at least be disrupted on the ocean by
rogue tactics such as privateering,  as the weaker  party  on the North American lacunae
imperial forces could not similarly fight and flee as the self-contained nature of the lakes
rendered naval engagements therein of an entirely different nature to that in open waters.
Burgyonne wrote “there is one peculiarity in a naval warfare on these Lakes, - that while, on
the ocean, a very inferior naval force may find means of annoying his enemy by stealing out
and roving over the seas, on these Lakes that which maintains a general superiority will
effectually in these confined waters, preclude the other from any such injurious action.”
The need to take action on the lakes was one of “four leading elements” Burgyonne
considered  vital  to  the  defence  of  the  province,  the  other  three  being  fortifications,  the
organised  militia,  and  the  railway  and  canal  communications.  None  of  the  other  three
assumed the urgency of the Great Lakes however, primarily because the Colonel saw no
obvious solution and therefore turned back again to long-term consideration of British North
America’s future. In Britain’s favour was the strain the Civil War was putting on the United
States economically and politically. Burgyonne believed the increased taxation to finance the
war, the damage done to trade, and the loss of personal freedoms was likely to encourage
emigration  to  Canada  over  the  US.  The  arguments  therefore  tended  to  consider  the
provinces’ growth over time and leave security to be decided on a more ad hoc basis. Thus
on  the  construction  of  a  railway,  Burgyonne’s  principal  concern  was  its  financial
sustainability, particularly given the long-term desirability of promoting emigration to British
North America over the United States. Burgyonne wrote “it has been urgently pressed, that it
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would be desirable to construct a line of railway ...  to which the Imperial Government is
required to contribute, as a most advantageous military communication. There cannot be a
doubt that such a line would be very valuable, but hardly so much so ... as to justify the large
outlay, unless there were a great showing of its utility and probable compensating returns
from it for its social and commercial interests.” 
The fortifications and militia elements were important in that they related directly to
the question of responsibility for local defence, which was still such a cause of frustration in
Britain and dispute in the provinces. Burgyonne therefore knew that it was futile to prepare
simply a strict appraisal of the troops necessary to repel American invasion as the question
“has many social  and political  considerations mixed up with it  particularly as regards the
measures  that  are  to  be  taken up  by  the  mother  country  and  the colony  respectively.”
Indeed, it  was idle to proceed with theories of defence until  the division of expense and
labour  had  been  ascertained  between  the  imperial  and  the provincial  governments,  the
Colonel writing “it will  be needless to decide upon the establishment and maintenance of
certain standing forces,  fortifications  and other  military  means that  Great  Britain will  not
undertake, and that the colony cannot afford.” The central argument in the mother country
was  squarely  made  here  that  being  afforded  the  benefits  of  self-government  should
correspond to taking on the burden of defence. Thus the report stated:
An argument has for years been plausibly maintained, has very recently been
advocated strongly, and will probably be discussed before long in Parliament;
which is, that colonies like Canada, which have free and independent control
of their revenues and affairs, and have had the military lands and reserves
handed over to them (in Canada, for instance, to an amount of considerable
value), and are absolutely flourishing in a great degree, ought not to remain a
burden on the resources of Great Britain for their protection.
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In  keeping  with  the  imperial  government’s  view  Burgyonne  contended  that  the
primary responsibility should be shouldered by the provinces. The Colonel wrote “There can
be no doubt of the justice and propriety of requiring the colonies to afford all the means for
defence they can; let them even (particularly in the larger ones) provide the basis of defence,
and Great Britain act only as co-operating, which will confine the great efforts to be required
from her chiefly to the period of war, or to that when hostilities were closely threatened.” In
terms of building fortifications Burgyonne also endorsed the earlier resolution of parliament
that they were a financial waste when military progress and innovation threatened to make a
defensive work rapidly obsolete and advocated a less dogmatic approach writing “military
positions and posts should be fully studied and defined” but only “taken up and strengthened
by field works, temporarily perfected and armed during war.” Across all  of these defence
requirements  Burgyonne  avoided  a  short  term  view  of  the  question,  opting  against
permanent forts or imperial forces, and only endorsing the continental railway if it produced
long term benefits. Apart from on the Great Lakes where Burgyonne could not propose an
adequate solution to the military problem, security was not a pressing concern. 
Reconstituting the colonial militias
The same month, seeking to start solving the major issue Burgyonne had identified of
reaching an understanding on local defence, the imperial government attempted to initialise
the process. Believing that with the strain of the Trent affair the moment would be ripe for the
provinces  to  restore  the  militias,  the  British  War  Minister  contacted  Newcastle  about
encouraging them towards this end. Lewis told the Colonial Secretary that “I do not doubt
that the attention that recent events have drawn to the subject, will lead the governments
and people of the British provinces to desire to set on foot such a substantial force of militia
and volunteers as shall command a respect for their territory and provide for its security in
cases of emergency.”232 To this end the War Office suggested the employment of imperial
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regulars to assist  both in  bringing the militias about  and guiding their  training.  The War
Secretary asked Newcastle to “ascertain the willingness of the colonial legislatures to make
provision for the pay and allowances of the officers and non-commissioned officers whom it
may  be  desired  to  remain  in  colonial  employment.”  Gordon  was  cooperative  in  New
Brunswick where the Lieutenant Governor had always been pro-active in attempting to re-
energise the militia. Like the problems Mulgrave had experienced in Nova Scotia Gordon
had a serious issue with aging commanders. The volunteer militia companies were under the
leadership of lieutenant colonels; however no new appointments had been made to these
posts since the militia law had expired in 1854 and therefore a large number of commanders
were between the ages of 70 and 90 and unfit for active service. Under Gordon’s proposed
changes  all  officers  over  the  age  of  60  –  excepting  those who the lieutenant  governor
himself was satisfied still possessed the physical and mental attributes required for service -
would be placed on the retired list. Gordon also proposed to stand down the aging adjutant
general  and  deputy  and  replace  them with  officers  of  the  regular  army  residing  in  the
province but not on active service. Gordon was therefore keen to implement the imperial
government’s wishes, desiring to appoint non-commissioned officers from the British army
as drill instructors to instil this new professionalism in the militia.
Despite  this  initiative  however  the  home government  continued  to  be  frustrated,
Canada  in  particular  reticent  to  make  use  of  the  imperial  troops.  Lewis  sent  a  circular
despatch to Williams and Doyle on February 22 “that it had been intimated to him that there
is some hesitation on the part of the BN American colonies to employ the officers and non-
commissioned  officers  who  had  been  sent  out  to  assist  in  organising  and  training  the
volunteers.”  The War Secretary therefore requested that  Doyle and Williams confer with
Monck to try and make the arrangements themselves.233 Britain had to confront the problem
however that in the self-governing provinces the imperial governors had insufficient power to




impose such wishes. The under-secretary of the War Office wrote that “although Sir George
Lewis considers the present a most favourable opportunity for placing the militia upon a
proper  and satisfactory footing  and thus rendering it  efficient  in  the event  of  any future
emergency  it  must  of  course  rest  with  the  provincial  government  to  decide  as  to  the
measures to be adopted with this view.” The metropolitan government nonetheless felt that
the culture of Canada would make it  ideally suited to produce a formidable militia force.
According to the Foreign Office it was the “sanguine hope of the Home Government’ and ‘the
deliberate conviction of military critics in the Colony” that the rural population—a hardy race,
accustomed to field sport, the use of fire-arms, and an active self-reliant life—would, under
the command of trained officers and non-commissioned officers ... easily and in a short time
be  formed  into  a  most  efficient  body  of  troops  for  the  defence  of  their  country.”234 For
communities  reliant  on  an  agrarian  economy  however  the  months  selected  for  training
clashed with the hunting, fishing and tree-felling seasons from which men could ill be spared.
Indeed  according  to  reports  into  the  problem  “the  real  difficulty  connected  with  military
organization in Canada occurred in the rural districts’ as the volunteers primarily were found
in the towns.”
In  New Brunswick  at  least  the  new militia  act  was  passed.  Even  here  however
Gordon  remained  concerned  that  the  local  legislature  was  not  sufficiently  earnest  on
defence. One of Lieutenant Governor’s reservations was that the act would only stand for
three years. Gordon wrote “hitherto the Militia, however imperfectly constituted has been one
of  the recognised institutions of  the Province,  but  henceforward if  the Law regulating its
existence is to be passed for that period only, its continuance cannot be relied on with any
confidence.” The new act divided the male population into two forces, the ‘active militia’ -
including all  men between the ages of 18 and 45, and the ‘secondary militia’ - for those
between the ages of 45 and 60. Both the active and secondary militias were then split into
three groups,  ‘A’  being volunteers,  ‘B’  being single men and widowers,  ‘C’  consisting of
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married men and widowers with dependants. Training would begin with the first group, the
second two forming a reserve. A further concern of the imperial governor however was with
the  resources  allocated  to  train  and  equip  them.  On  paper  Gordon  could  call  out  48
regiments amounting to just over 40,000 men however there were merely 200 rifles available
to equip them. The overall expenditure allowed for the instructor and drill ammunition was
£2000, leaving a chronic shortage. The little artillery the militia possessed were obsolescent
smooth-bore, low-calibre models. Gordon, like Monck in Canada, felt effectively powerless to
impose himself on the provincial legislature writing: “I thought it better not to press this point,
as I should certainly have failed to obtain the assent of my responsible advisers, or of the
Provincial Legislature to such a suggestion.” The lieutenant-governor laid out explicitly his
view that the matter would be safer in imperial hands, writing: “It would in my judgement
have  been  more  conducive  to  the  efficiency  of  the  force  had  the  funds  granted  for  its
maintenance been placed at the disposal of the Commander in Chief, as in Newfoundland,
Nova Scotia & P.E. Island instead of at that of the Governor in Council.”
Gordon also set in motion a plan to appoint three commissioners to report on the
military defence of the province. On February 24 he wrote to Doyle requesting the names of
three officers deemed fit  for the task desiring one from the Royal Artillery,  one from the
Engineers  and  one  from  the  infantry.  Following  the  reports  the  imperial  government
tentatively  began  a  programme of  refortification  and  rearmament,  hoping  the  provincial
legislatures would emulate their efforts. The imperial government focused predominantly on
Halifax, the vital coaling station and naval base for imperial forces in North America. Halifax
was ostensibly  protected by Point  Pleasant  on the southern tip of the Halifax peninsula,
protected  by  the  Prince  of  Wales  Tower,  the  first  Martello  tower  constructed  in  North
America.  This  was  indicative  however  of  the  rest  of  Halifax’s  defences,  which  were
becoming antiquated and obsolescent.  The citadel of Halifax had had significant  imperial
funds pumped into it, however lacking rifled artillery it was by 1861 largely outmoded with the
changes wrought by new long-range artillery and ironclads. The Colonial Office set out that
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Britain should fund the work on Halifax, while work on Partridge Island should be a joint
endeavour between the New Brunswick legislature and the home government. It was to be
ringed  by  muzzle-rifle  loaders,  receive  rifled  guns  and  be  protected  by  ironclads.
Modifications were carried out to the George Island defences as well as those on Ive’s Island
to enable enveloping fire on attacking vessels. Moreover the initial work was undertaken on
Partridge Island, and another battery was to be placed at Red Head to the East and then
Negro Head to the west of the harbour, all to be manned by volunteer artillery companies.
This showed a British commitment; however the old fear resurfaced that it would encourage
the Provinces to renege on their own responsibility, especially when Gordon’s subsequent
despatches on the defence efforts showed further recalcitrance on the part of his province.
Gordon wrote  to  Newcastle  that  “The provincial  legislature  has not  formally  declined  to
contribute towards the expense of fortifying Partridge Island, but those who know its temper
best assure the Leuitenant Governor that no said contribution is to be anticipated.”
The imperial defence budget
Due to the question of responsibility for Canadian defence great pressure was put on
Lewis  when announcing the Army Estimates  in  February.  Given the wish to reduce the
imperial defence budgets there was admonishment that the government’s commitment was
too great, particularly in the light of the increased colonial obligations undertaken over the
past twenty years. Colonel Baillie for example was one critic, drawing attention to Britain’s
need to deploy forces to aid in conflicts in both New Zealand and South Africa in addition to
this reinforcement of Canada. Baillie stated “nobody could suppose that force had gone to
Canada  for  a  temporary  occasion;  because  it  must  be  perfectly  obvious,  when  we
considered the hostile feelings of the people of the United States, when we considered the
great anxiety they had always exhibited to annex Canada, and when we considered the
great  military  force  that  would  be  at  their  disposal  at  the  end  of  the  civil  war—it  was
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obvious ...  that  that  force must  be retained in Canada.”235 Due to the policy of  focusing
imperial  efforts  on  sea  power  not  only  were  members  rallying  against  the  increased
presence of regular troops in British North America but the commitment to building fixed
defences excepting those essential for the maintenance of the Royal Navy. Thus a fortnight
after the introduction of the Army Estimates a motion was brought in the Commons that “the
multiplication of fortified places in distant Possessions involves a useless expenditure; and
that  the  cost  of  erecting  and  maintaining  Fortifications  at  places  not  being  great  Naval
Stations, in self-governed Colonies, is not a proper charge on the Imperial Treasury.” 
It  was put bluntly to the Colonial Office that there were two categories of forts, ones
of imperial significance – and thus to be maintained by Britain - and those of purely ‘colonial’
importance which should hence forth be paid for by local means. The danger however with
devoting  resources  solely  to  such  ‘great  naval  stations’  was  risking  the  neglect  of  vital
maritime positions that would be critical in the event of war. Newcastle felt that partitioning all
of Britain’s naval outposts into purely ‘imperial’ and ‘colonial’ stations was far too simplistic,
and that they could be divided into five classes of varying commercial and strategic value at
least. This was particularly significant in North America given the American preponderance
likely to occur in time of war on the Great Lakes. Quebec for instance would in that case
become a vital naval station for keeping the St Lawrence open as a lane of communication.
This would be essential in order to bring up reinforcements or to use as a line of retreat prior
to an evacuation of troops. Arguing Britain’s need therefore in the case of Quebec, Vane
Tempest stated that “at that city there were fortifications, but it was not a naval port; and if
this Resolution were carried, no further appropriation could be made for those fortifications,
although they commanded the River St. Lawrence, and there was no naval station within
2,000 miles.”236 Gladstone was prepared to undertake defensive works provided their value
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was set out explicitly and completely, the Chancellor arguing that he was “afraid of ... not any
grand or comprehensive scheme of fortifications ...  but ...  of  minute demands insidiously
made to the House of Commons.”
The  government  nonetheless  faced  further  criticism  that  their  programme  of
rearmament and fortification severely compromised their aim of making the colonists taking
up more of the burden for security. Adderley questioned “Of what use were the fortifications
and garrison of Quebec when we were recently threatened with war? They were not enough
in themselves, and they had only prevented the colonists  from arming themselves.”  The
imperial government was challenged by this dilemma of deterring the United States without
giving Canada the impression that it was not their responsibility to protect themselves. The
recent Select Committee had heard “that for every soldier that England sent out she had
prevented 100 Canadians from arming themselves.” Thus it was argued “when danger lately
came the colonists were wholly unprepared; and their only chance of safety consisted in the
succours  despatched  from  this  country,  which,  but  for  the  remarkable  mildness  of  the
season, and the fact that our troops were not wanted for other duty, it might not have been in
our power to send out.” This need for the provinces to fend for themselves was imperative
because if  Britain faced a foreign emergency elsewhere,  particularly Europe, it  would be
forced  to  prioritise  its  interests,  probably  leaving  Canada  at  the  mercy  of  the  US.  The
concern about imperial  overstretch was such that the home government would not even
commit to stringently dedicating specific naval forces to colonial defence. The War Minister
himself admitted “as in time of war it is of the greatest importance to the country that the
Channel fleet should be powerful, and that our own shores should be protected against any
dangers of invasion,  it  is  impossible for us to lay down abstractedly any principle which
would make it necessary for us to scatter our fleet over the whole world, and to defend each
of our colonies by a separate squadron.” This reluctance of the government to make binding
naval commitments to individual colonies at the expense of home defence foreshadowed the
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Colonial  Naval  Defence  Act  which  later  enabled  provinces  to  raise  and  maintain  local
maritime forces for the assistance of the imperial navy.
Summary
The Trent affair and its aftermath had provided a decided wake-up call for the British
Empire. Palmerston’s policy was to deter the United States with a show of strength; however
it was proving increasingly difficult to enact this in so vulnerable a region as British North
America.  While  achieving  the overarching goal  of  securing Mason and Slidell’s  release,
during the  Trent crisis Britain had effectively had to back down in accepting a resolution
without an apology from the US. This was largely due to the fear of a war which would have
resulted in a military reversal in the provinces. The forces coming into being in the North
were more than could be withstood by the British reinforcements, meaning that should an
invasion occur the colonial militias would be required to supplement imperial forces. These
however were in no fit state for action, at present critically undermanned and underequipped.
It was therefore incumbent on the British government to encourage the provincial assemblies
to take responsibility for placing local defence in order, particularly given the imperial aim of
restricting its military budget in the colonies.
The military situation was also making it more urgent to begin the continental railway,
the responsibility for which was still a standoff between the home and colonial governments.
It was too becoming increasingly evident that Britain’s inability to match the United States on
the Great Lakes placed it at a tremendous military disadvantage in the event of an attack on
the provinces. Against the background of these strategic weaknesses the diplomatic and
political situation appeared to be deteriorating still further. The shared frontier with the US
placed  British  neutrality  under  constant  threat,  with  friction  being  caused  by  deserters
crossing the border in both directions. Issues with the Northern States were increasingly
divisive and growing calls to end the Reciprocity Treaty added to the economic problems
brought on by the Civil War. The blockade continued to have an adverse financial effect on
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the European powers. These political and strategic difficulties led to an increased clamour in
Britain to take the initiative in intervening to end the Civil  War and establish Confederate
independence. The dilemma over whether intervention would arrest the suffering or intensify
it reached its zenith between 1862 and 1863.
CHAPTER 5
THE INTERVENTION CRISIS, 1862-3
With the effect  of  the blockade becoming increasingly  felt  in Europe,  pressure to
intervene was put on the British government by France, still more anxious to act and restore
trade with the South. Merciér repeatedly intimated to Lyons that unless a significant Federal
military success took place the spring would be the ideal time to offer mediation.  British
postulations  both  for  and  against  intervention  were  primarily  influenced  by  strategic
considerations.  Even though France had made it clear its policy was to act with Britain to
bring about an end to the war, in attempting to cause division between the European powers
the Department of State conveyed that all  retaliation would be directed against England.
Lyons  reported  back  to  the  Foreign  Office  that  knowledge  of  the  French  proposal  for
mediation had caused consternation - particularly in light of Napoleon’s adventure in Mexico,
but that the press and public at large were refraining from expressing their feelings, it not
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being thought politic to convey hostility to both powers at the same time. Lyons wrote to
Russell that the French Ambassador had given him:
various  illustrations  of  the  intensity  of  the  displeasure  felt  towards
England, and of the goodwill with which France is regarded. He remarks that,
notwithstanding that it has been generally believed that the Emperor has been
for  some  time  willing  to  recognise  the  South,  but  has  been  deterred  by
England;  notwithstanding  the  Mexican  expedition  and  other  circumstances
calculated to create irritation, - no serious attack upon France has been made
in any newspaper, while the press has teemed with abuse of England.
The same remained true of Seward, the State Department persisting in its plan to
treat with Britain and France separately. Lyons wrote of  Merciér that “he observes ... that
while my position here has been maintained only be extreme prudence and reserve, he has
been able to use with advantage the freest language, and to tell unpalatable truths without
any disguise.” Rumours were also circulating that the North would aid the besieged Mexican
state by  allowing her  to  send out  privateers  from Northern harbours,  the  British  fleet  at
present  sealing  off  the Mexican coast.  Russell  was becoming highly  vexed by Seward’s
criticism of Britain’s postulation on the conflict.  The Foreign Minister had been told by Lyons
of a loaded remark made by Seward that the “European Powers, all professing the most
friendly  feelings  to the United States,  had been discussing its affairs among themselves
without taking the Cabinet of Washington into their counsels.” Russell bitterly instructed the
British envoy “to take an opportunity of observing to Mr Seward that without taking other
reasons into consideration, the perusal of the accounts of the distress in Lancashire, owing
to the want of cotton, which he will find in all the newspapers, will furnish him with enough
reason for the discussion of American affairs in Europe. Great numbers of Her Majesty’s




Imperial strategic concerns again did not simply rest on potential hostility from the
Union but also mistrust of the intentions of the third Napoleon.  In discussion with Lyons
furthermore Merciér alluded to a Federal belief that France still desired US strength to grow,
and that the opposition to intervention therefore had to be directed towards Britain. Lyons
wrote 
M.  Merciér fears that the Cabinet might avail  itself of the hostility to
England  in  order  to  rouse  the  national  feeling  against  the  whole  plan  of
mediation. The Americans, he says, believe that England is jealous and afraid
of  their  greatness,  and desires their  ruin.  They think,  on the contrary,  that
France wishes them to be great, in order to oppose them to England. The
Cabinet  (which  will  certainly  be  strongly  opposed  to  mediation)  would,  he
thinks, be able to count upon the support of a great mass of public opinion
against any proposal to which England is a party.238
The suggestion that France would side with the United States in order to oppose British
power was far from a revelation to Lyons in that, as covered in the previous chapter, he had
heard of  Merciér himself  telling Seward this was the case several months before.  In this
climate  suspicion  developed  of  French policy  which placed a  cloud  over  the  alliance  in
Mexico and by extension security at home and in the provinces. It was stated in parliament
that it was “not pleasant, either, to read of questions that were put in the French Senate as to
whether the English could be trusted in Mexico, nor the observations that they were tired of
helping England to redress her grievances, and that the money spent in the Crimea and
China  would  have  been  better  employed  in  invading  England.”239 Palmerston’s  residual
mistrust of the French added to the sense of insecurity. The Prime Minister told Gladstone
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that the French “hate us as a nation from the bottom of their hearts and would make any
sacrifice to inflict a dark humiliation upon England.”240 
This sense of insecurity grew when intrigues emerged that Napoleon was working on
a foreign policy with the pro-Southern British conservative Lindsay over the heads of both
the British government and his own foreign secretary Edouard Thouvenal.  Cowley informed
Russell of what he believed the conversation to have been, writing “my own conviction is
(Lindsay) has told the Emperor his own views, and that those views are supported by the
majority of the people of England, and by the present Opposition in Parliament, who would
denounce the blockade if in power” and “he has found a willing listener in the Emperor, who
would gladly obtain cotton by any means.”241 Lindsay and his fellow pro-Confederate MP’s
Gregory and Roebuck were hoping to use the evidence that the French were prepared to act
to bring on the long-awaited decision on recognition. Cowley told Lindsay that he “did not
think ... that Her Majesty’s Govt. would consent to send a squadron to act as the Emperor
had indicated ... which might be corrected if ... in error by Mr. Lindsay himself seeing Lord
Russell.”242 Perturbed  Palmerston  wrote  to  Roebuck  “The  British  Parliament  receives
messages and communications  from their  own sovereign,  but  not  from the sovereign of
other countries. I am very anxious that neither you nor Mr. Lindsay should mention those
matters any more, as any discussion about them must tend to impair the good relations
between the French and English Governments.” 243 
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Fears of Federal conquest of the South
The imperial government however also feared that, irrespective of the justice of the
blockade,  intervention would lead to an escalation of  the conflict,  destroying hopes of  a
bloodless  end to slavery.  Russell  already believed that  in  its  determination to defy both
Britain and the South, if foreign interference occurred Northern policy would be radicalised to
the point of initiating a servile war. The Foreign Minister stated that “if owing to the necessity
to  vindicate  our  honour,  if  owing  to  persuasion  that  this  blockade  could  not  be  legally
acknowledged, we had been obliged to take part in this war, any thought of ending this great
question of slavery by peaceable means would, I am persuaded, have vanished - the North
would have proclaimed a general emancipation and liberation of the slaves.” The argument
against  sparking a race war was also made in economic terms in that not only would it
initiate a humanitarian disaster, but it would also remove labour from Southern plantations
and thus exacerbate the cotton shortage and hardships in Europe. Forster – who it must be
said  was  also  a  champion  of  the  Union  -  implored:  “let  us  not  by  our  interference  be
instrumental in any way in helping to provoke a servile war. It was said that we should be
sure of cotton, but in six months after we interfered the able-bodied negro slaves would
probably be converted into Sepoys, acting with the army of the North instead of producing
the raw material for our manufactures.”244
The  Palmerston  ministry  believed  slavery  might  undergo  a  swifter  and  more
humanitarian  end  in  a  separate  Confederacy.  Therefore  Britain’s  strong  anti-slavery
sentiment in fact set in tow a type of reverse logic which held that the cause of those in
bondage  would  be  better  served  with  Southern  victory. The  long  history  of  Northern
compromises over the institution led to the conclusion in Britain that further concessions
would be have to be made in order to bring the South back into the fold. If North and South
became separate sovereign states however earlier safeguards which protected slaveholders
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such as the Fugitive Slave Law would become void. Slaves escaping across the border into
the North would be ensured freedom, Russell writing “for this reason I wish for separation”.245
Even though the Foreign Office wished to see both slavery and the South exit the Union;
early 1862 was arguably the only time until the very end of the conflict that British statesmen
felt  the  North might  be able  to achieve a knockout  victory.  Indeed following its  western
victories at Henry, Donelson and Shiloh and with McClellan beginning his massive crawl up
the Peninsula the Federals appeared to be on the brink of success. Russell summarised the
British view that the South would never be reconciled to the United States and therefore
slavery and with it the seeds for future conflict would persist. The Foreign Minister wrote to
Lyons that if  the North continued towards victory “the Union will  be restored with its old
disgrace and its old danger. I  confess I  do not see any way to any fair  solution except
separation – but that the North will not hear of – nor in the moment of success would it be of
any use to give them unpalatable advice.”246
The  present  Northern  dominance,  by  inhibiting  intervention,  at  least  acted  to
temporarily  lessen  France’s  readiness  to  recognise  the  Confederacy.  With  McClellan
besieging Richmond and Union armies advancing through Tennessee the British minister in
Paris wrote that “there could not be a more inopportune moment for mooting the question
both of the recognition of the South and of the efficiency of the blockade. The time was gone
by when such measures could, if ever, have been taken – for every mail brought news of
expeditions from the North acting with success upon the South; and every day added to the
efficiency of the blockade.”247 Following the momentous news of the fall  of  New Orleans
Cowley wrote that Napoleon now “agreed that nothing was to be done for the moment but to
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watch events.”248 This  allowed the Foreign Office to continue with the policy set  out  the
previous year, to attempt to remain in neutral concert with France and await the Civil War to
run its natural course. Russell wrote to Cowley that “her Majesty’s Goverment wish to take
no step in respect to the Civil War in America except in concert with France and upon full
deliberation.”249 
This meant hoping that even should they win the war, the Washington government
would realise that they would inevitably fail to win the peace. Convinced that this would turn
out  to  be  the  case,  the  attention  of  the  British  government  turned  to  the  feasibility  of
governing the re-conquered peoples and lands.  Russell wrote “the news from York Town,
New Orleans, and Corinth seems to portend the conquest of the South. We have now to see
therefore,  whether  a  few leaders  or  the  whole  population  entertain  those  sentiments  of
alienation  and  abhorrence  which  were  so  freely  expressed.”250 Russell,  believing  the
southerners could never be reconciled again to the Union but reiterating that recognition
would  likely  mean  war  until  Washington  had  accepted  it,  stated  ‘It  will,  perhaps,  be
impossible to renew the old feeling of union between the North and South ... I trust that—
whatever may be their military successes, whatever may be their naval victories, whatever
positions they may capture—that the North will consent to a peaceful separation.”251
Increasing  Federal  strength  and  the  resolution  that  self-governing  colonies  must
contribute to internal security
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The  Northern  ascendancy  on  the  battlefield  however  posed  a  double  security
concern for the defence of British North America. Not only did it  threaten to shut off the
strategic benefits that would accrue from Southern independence, but it also added to the
perception  of  an  improving  and  emerging  military  power.  Imperial  statesmen  were
increasingly having their eyes opened to the magnitude of the military host being bought into
existence under Lincoln and McClellan, Palmerston having received intelligence of the Union
military positions. The Prime Minister stated “it was but the other day that I saw a map sent
by the Quartermaster General of the Federal forces, on which were marked out the positions
of 720,000 Federal troops - we now hear that 300,000 more men are to be called into the
field  -  —making one 1,000,000 of  men.”  Palmerston remained instilled  with his  life-long
condescension towards the United States, assuming inherent American weaknesses that he
did not  wish them to receive help in  overcoming.  Palmerston therefore told Russell  that
British military attaches “should be strictly cautioned not to make any criticisms which might
be useful to the Federals in pointing out to them faults or imperfections ... The Federals are
luckily too vain to attach much value to the opinions of Englishmen, but our officers might be
told to open their eyes and ears and to keep their mouths shut.”
The  cabinet  however  were  receiving  reports  that  the  US  armies  were  indeed
increasing in quality as well as in quantity. Beginning to dispel the bad reputation they had
attained after Bull Run, observers of their forces were now sending serious warnings to the
home government. One wrote to Russell that “I have just seen a letter from an English officer
(a man who has seen a great deal of service) who has been taking a look at the Federal
Army. A finer one – or one better provided with all things necessary he never ... saw – and
he adds ... “that it would require a force of 100,000 men to keep them out of Canada”’252
Newcastle  was certainly  feeling apprehensive  of  the import  for  the continent  of  the new
Federal strength. The Colonial Secretary wrote “it is impossible not to feel that every month
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the  civil  war  in  the  States  continues  the  military  disparity  between  them  and  Canada
increases. Little more than a year ago they were equal. Now Canada has only an embryo
and untrained Militia – the States have a trained army, - and the temptation to aggression
whenever the war is brought to a close is proportionately increased.”253
Moreover  this  was a power  expanding into Britain’s  traditional  and vital  realm of
strength - the seas. The success of Union ships at New Bern, Ronoake Island and on the
Mississippi impressed on Britain the growing threat of Federal naval forces. The northern
mouth of the Mississippi had been opened by Grant’s capture of Forts Henry and Donelson.
This  was especially  worrying in  view of  Britain’s  weakness on the Great  Lakes.  Equally
momentous was the news of the first clash of ironclads at Hampton Roads. Russell wrote
“only think of our position if in case of the Yankees turning upon us they should by means of
iron ships renew the triumphs they achieved in 1812-13 by means of  superior  size and
weight of metal.”254 In London Adams wrote that it “has been the main talk of town ever since
the news came, in parliament, in the clubs, in the city, among the military and naval people.
The impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era in warfare, and that Great
Britain must consent to begin over again.”255 These threats to the Royal Navy made it all the
more important that Britain be spared the drain on its resources necessitated by costly land
defences. 
It  was therefore  growing more imperative  that  the colonies  take responsibility  for
defence on the ground. Britain faced a challenge however over how to bring this acceptance
about. Indeed, the Colonial  Office had already been frustrated by British North American
autonomy  restricting  their  ability  to  impose  measures  on  the  provinces  –  Monck  and
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Gordon’s hands having been tied over their respective militia acts. It was felt therefore that in
order to impress this responsibility  wider pressure was needed from the mother country,
possibly in the form of an act of parliament. Verbose speeches by cabinet ministers were
only likely to make the provinces defensive about their obligations, while not possessing the
unequivocal firmness of an official directive. In the lower chamber It was worried that endless
debate would be taken “practically as a lecture on self defence” and stated that Britain was
“not dealing with colonies governed as they used to be; and though it would be well for the
War  Office  and  Colonial  Office  to  lay  down  such  principles  ...  it  would  be  far  more
satisfactory  to  the  colonies  having  a  free  form of  government,  if  the  adoption  of  those
principles were the act of the British House of Commons.”
This led to a debate in March on the question of the provinces accepting greater
responsibility for defence. The previous annual returns in Britain had placed expenditure on
the Colonies  at  about  £4,250,000.  It  was thought  about  £3,000,000 might  be saved by
reducing the military commitment currently incumbent upon Britain. The debate especially
centred on the perceived injustice that Canada could levy a duty on British imports but still
expect military aid. It was asked “the question in the present day was no longer whether
Great Britain should tax her Colonies, but to what extent the Colonies should be permitted to
tax Great Britain”. Particularly given the hardship in Northern England this apparent double
standard could not be abided. Therefore Canadians must “undertake the duty of the own
defence ... as they were better able to bear taxation than the people of this country.” Canada
for instance levied a duty of 20 per cent on some of Britain’s most important manufactures.
Grey stated “I think it is a little too much for the Canadians to take our troops and not to take
our goods.”  The primary objective being for the provinces to take on the defence burden
however, the argument was inverted.  Thus it  was pointed out that “complaints had lately
been made of the high import duties levied in Canada ... but ... if the mother country insisted
upon larger contributions from Canada towards her military expenses, she could no longer
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object to those duties from which the funds must come.”256 This appeared a justifiable basis
for understanding, Britain accepting the tariff,  Canada paying for local defence. In March
therefore the Commons passed a resolution stating that colonies “exercising the rights of
self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal
order and security.
US expansion in the northwest
The  wish  to  increase  the  security  of  the  provinces  was  also  influenced  by  the
evidence that, as a result of the Civil War, the principles of protectionism and expansionism
were being increasingly harnessed in the North. In addition to enabling the passage of the
Federal  tariff  and  putting  the Reciprocity  Treaty  at  risk,  secession  had largely  removed
opposition to expansion in the Northwest. Previously southern congressmen had opposed
expansion to the north as likely to enhance the interests of the free-labour states as opposed
to the slave. In early 1862 however the rupture in the Union allowed for the passage of the
Free  Homestead  Act  and  the  chartering  of  the  Union  Pacific  Railroad.  This  in  general
concerned  the  imperial  government  as  a  risk  to  the  territorial  integrity  of  British  North
America. Work on the pacific railroad warned of continued economic strides by the US - and
therefore  further  potential  temptation for  the provinces to wish admission to the union -
particularly as the intercolonial railway scheme was still struggling to get off the ground. Free
Homestead made the acquisition of arable land in the northwest an attractive proposition for
Northern settlers. The imperial government too was becoming increasingly aware of efforts
to impart American culture and institutions into the great north-west. In May Lyons relayed to
the  Foreign  and  the  Colonial  Offices  a  Congress  report  which  contained  unsettling
comments on expanding the Union into British territory, particularly into the settlements in
the Red River district. One such passage stated that “the Americanization of this important
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section  of  British  America  is  rapidly  progressing.  Unless  the  British  parliament  acts
promptly ... I shall confidently expect a popular movement looking to independence or to
annexation  to  the United  States.”  Other  parts  of  the  report  relayed the growing  military
danger for the provinces. Russell and Newcastle also received the text of an editorial in the
Nor’wester which argued:
in regard to the Red River settlement ... no portion of the British territory on
this continent is so assailable, so certain of occupation by American troops in
case of  war  with England,  as Fort  Garry and the immense district  thence
extending along the valley of the Sakatchewan to the Rocky mountains. If our
struggle is to be, in the fullest sense, a struggle for national existence, against
foreign foes as well as domestic traitors, Minnesota, however remote from the
scene  of  the  southern  insurrection,  will  claim  the  distinction  of  a  winter
campaign for the conquest of Central British America.
The imperial government moreover was already receiving petitions from the region’s
authority, the Hudson Bay Company, to send troops to these western territories. The British
regulars that had been stationed there had been redeployed as part of the reinforcement of
Canada made in July 1861. The state of Minnesota had been extremely belligerent about
conquering Britain’s western territory and if war came there was evident fear about American
success in this theatre and victory overall. On May 1 the company’s proprietor wrote to the
Newcastle requesting the installation of a new force to protect the Red River/ Saskatchewan
district. He wrote to the Colonial Minister to inform him that contacts in that state believed
that  “in  case  of  a  collision  with  England,  Minnesota  is  competent  to  ‘hold,  contain  and
possess’ the valley of Red River to Lake Winnipeg. There are no British troops at Fort Garry,
the Canadian rifles whom I saw there in 1859 having turned to Quebec, by way of Hudson
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Bay, during the summer just passed.” This request was forwarded to Lewis at the War Office
where, owing to how thinly imperial forces were spread and wishing to discourage further
dependency on Britain,  it  was dismissed out  of  hand.  Attempting to press the issue the
company then wrote to Newcastle that:
Your Grace is aware that the small body of Canadian Rifles stationed
at Red River was withdrawn last year, and I confess that it would lend great
comfort  to  myself  and  my  colleagues  if  the  places  of  those  troops  were
supplied by a fresh detachment as this would evince a determination on the
part  of  Her  Majesty’s  Government  to  assist  the  company  in  holding  the
country against foreign invaders, and in maintaining peace and good order
among the British inhabitants of the Red River settlement.
The Colonial Office endorsed the policy of withholding imperial forces. Newcastle informed
Lewis that “I should drop the correspondence with the company and take no notice of the
application for  a fresh supply  of  troops to these remote regions” and added that  Monck
should be shown the letter.257
Failure of the Canadian militia bill
With  the  imperial  government  making  clear  its  policy  of  reducing  the  military
commitment to the provinces - including the resolution that self-governing provinces should
undertake the responsibility for their own security -  a committee was set up in Canada to
look  into  the reconstitution  of  the  colonial  militia  and to  conduct  a survey on Canadian
defences. The first findings were returned on March 15 and reported that nine key positions
required permanent defences. It was also urged that a gunboat flotilla should be established
on the lakes within the parameters of the Rush-Bagot agreement. In terms of defence on the
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ground the commission reported to the colonial parliament “that a militia force of 50,000 men
should be raised and trained, together with a reserve force of the same number.” These
recommendations  were  introduced  in  a  new bill  to  the  Canadian  parliament  on  May 2.
Despite the tense climate however legislators were taken aback by the proposals. Creating
the desired force would require $1.1 million dollars. The first  year was to cost $480,000
dollars and involve the calling out of 30,000 men for two weeks of drilling. This was a vast
sum  considering  that  the  Canadian  expenditure  at  this  time  amounted  to  around
$12,000,000 while the revenue stood at $7,000,000. The Canadian Assembly decided this
was too much for a people who had already been subjected to three tax-rises in recent
years.  Even  more  alarming  was  the  element  calling  for  compulsory  service,  especially
unacceptable to the French Canadians who in general felt less of an affinity to the mother
country.258 Partly as a result of the failed bill, the Canadian administration was given a vote
of no confidence and stood down from office, resulting in the infamous double shuffle.
When word reached England that the militia bill  had been voted down there was
incredulity and admonishment. That the incumbent ministry had fallen because of it caused
further consternation. The Colonial Secretary did not mask his disappointment. Newcastle
stated “It is deeply to be regretted that the Canadian Parliament should have rejected the Bill
which was proposed for their acceptance, or that they should have separated without having
passed some efficient measure for the defence of the colony.” The gulf of feeling between
the imperial  and the provincial  government  was displayed by the fact  that  though these
measures went further than any defence measure yet proposed in the Canadian ministry, it
was nonetheless far below what was hoped for by the Imperial Government. The incoming
administration  moreover  gave  no  reason  for  optimism.  Monck’s  perception  of  his  new
assembly was similar to that of Gordon in New Brunswick and derided its parochial nature to
Newcastle. The Governor General wrote that “the new ministers are a wretched lot. Not one
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of them is capable of rising above the level of parish politicians, and they are led away by all
the small jealousies and suspicions to which minds of that class are prone.”
In addition to the cost and compulsory element of it, part of the reason for the bill’s
failure went back to that which Head had informed the Colonial Office of the previous year,
the view that any military threat would arise from British foreign policy and that therefore it
should be imperial  forces who deal with it.  Within the British parliament’s assault  on the
Canadian  ministry  therefore  this  argument  was  deconstructed. As  foreign  policy  was
ultimately  the  preserve of  the  sovereign,  that  sovereign  represented and  ruled not  only
Britain, but the whole of the Empire. It was pointed out that “the foreign policy of the Empire,
according to the Constitution, did not rest with the people at Home or in any Colony, or in
any part of the Empire more than in another; it rested with the Crown, and the Crown was as
much resident in Canada as in England.” Semi-autonomous colonies such as Canada had
sufficient governmental functions to bring them into conflict with other states. Indeed “The
Parliament of Canada had unlimited powers, and might involve them in a war by enacting
hostile  tariffs.  Besides,  the  circumstances,  interests,  and  position  of  Canada,  were  not
unlikely to bring war on England on her account.” There was criticism of a Canadian writer in
England who had professed the province’s loyalty and its appreciation of being part of the
empire but held that it was down to ‘imperial’ and not Canadian troops to provide security for
it. Attacking the author the speaker stated; “in submitting that proposition, the writer did not
see, that if Canada was a part of the empire, Canadian forces ought to constitute part of the
forces of the empire. When there was anything to be got out of England, he argued the
claims of Canada as a part of the empire; but when invasion was to be resisted by the forces
of the empire, England alone was meant.”
Having already passed the resolution that semi-autonomous provinces must provide
for their own defence, Canada’s failure to do so left the imperial government facing its lack of
enforceability. One solution was threatening total abandonment by imperial garrisons unless
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they  acted. Grey,  drawing  on  his  own  experience  in  the  role  of  Colonial  Secretary,
highlighted that a similar impasse had been reached with the Australians. Grey stated that 
when  Australia  formerly  would  not  listen  to  the  proposal  to  pay  a
portion  of  the  expenses  of  the  British  troops  there,  I  myself,  as  Colonial
Minister,  let  it  be known that  the troops would  be immediately  ordered to
return home. The consequence was that the people of Australia immediately
came into the terms first proposed by England; and there could be no doubt,
that the embarkation of the first British regiment for the purpose of returning
from Canada to England, would make Canada take a very different view on
this question.259
A new local  force  was  coming  into  being  in  India,  and  the  same principles  should  be
extended to British North America. Grey argued that “it was not for this country to exempt the
Canadians from military service. It would be indeed astonishing that the eastern quarter of
the empire should maintain an army, but that the western ... leave the centre of the empire to
defend it.”260






With ministers now even threatening abandonment of the provinces, Newcastle wrote
to Monck suggesting that he should confer with the fellow governors and attempt to devise
some co-ordinated measure for defence that could at least be used as propaganda to stem
the negative reaction in Britain.261 The Governor General of Canada therefore gave a series
of speeches attempting to encourage action from the province on defence. These speeches
were described as being “distinguished by manly sentiments and moderate language ...
telling the Canadians that they must prepare to take some share of their own defence, and
that it would be impossible for this country any longer to consent to their contributing nothing,
in either purse or person, towards the security of their frontier.”262 Monck told one Canadian
audience that they possessed “practical independence ... protected at others’ expense.”263
The Governor General made clear that this was due to the transformation that was taking
place in  the United States,  a militarily  growing  and now diplomatically  hostile  power.  At
Montreal he stated “The plain truth had better be told and at once recognised ... there is but
one quarter from which Canada can apprehend any serious attack; that quarter is the great
Republic which lies upon our extended frontier.”
This  did  inspire  some action  as  under  the new ministry  a  more modest  bill  was
passed, appropriating $250,000. This, in addition to the force authorized by the Act of 1859,
created a ‘sedentary militia’  of  5,000. This limited the total  Volunteer force in Canada to
10,000 men. Falling way below the initial bill, let alone the 150,000 men the defence survey
had deemed necessary for a defence of the province, this act merely bought on an even
more vicious attack in the House of Lords. Many spokesmen picked up on the argument
previously advanced by Grey that the colonies should be coerced into providing for defence
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by  a  complete  withdrawal  of  imperial  troops.  Lord  Carnarvon  -  who  would  in  the  next
government  oversee  Confederation  as  Colonial  Secretary  -  gave  a  powerful  speech
reprimanding the province for its apparently half-hearted measures. He could 
not understand how Canada, when 1,000,000 troops were engaged in
a civil war in the country which adjoined her own frontier, and when threats of
conquest  and  annexation  were  continually  thrown  out  against  her,  could
possibly bring herself to believe that a contingent of 10,000 men was her fair
and equitable proportion of the force required for the defence of the territory
under the present critical circumstances ... if, indeed, this was her deliberate
opinion, it became our serious duty to consider whether it was right to leave
the flower of the English army in a position of acknowledged peril in order to
defend a country which would not contribute either money or men to its own
defence. 
It was stated very clearly that the onus should be on the province. If they desired
security  they  must  form a  strong  militia,  otherwise  the  British  regulars  were  completely
redundant. Indeed “if they were in peril, then they ought to have raised a larger force for the
defence of the province; ...  If  they were not in peril,  then they did not require 10,000 or
12,000 Imperial troops in Canada, whose expense was defrayed by the taxpayers of this
country.” This left the government with the prospect of facing a debate over whether the
imperial  forces should be withdrawn altogether,  leaving absolutely  nothing to oppose an
American  assault.  Indeed,  the  danger  was  perceived  as  so serious  that  it  appeared  to
warrant  Monck  being  instructed  to  call  the  Canadian  ministers  together  and  make  this
proposition clear. Adderley in particular asked whether “Her Majesty's Government did not
consider the present an emergency in which they should instruct the Governor to call the
Canadian  Parliament  together  ...  (as)  ...  it  was  worthy  of  the  consideration  of  the
Government whether a considerable body of our troops—including among them the flower of
156
our army—should be left  in  Canada without  adequate support  from the Canadian Militia
during a season when the communication between Canada and this country was practically
cut off.” He believed Monck should even be so firm with the local legislature as to present a
virtual  ultimatum  and  "before  the  termination  of  the  present  season  make  such
arrangements as will afford our troops such support as we have a right to expect for any
British force that ought to be left in Canada, or no British force will be imperilled by being left
in the colony".
In such a tense scenario it was declared that the session should not end without a
definitive  statement  laying  out  imperial  policy.  Charles  Buxton  stated  that  “it  was  most
desirable that Parliament should not separate without some distinct statement being made of
the intentions of the Government as to the defence of Canada ... (as) ... it was their right and
duty, as it was the right and interest of the Canadians themselves, to know what were the
intentions of the Government in view of the possible if not probable danger of invasion to
which they were exposed during the approaching winter.” Buxton believed it was time for
“putting an end to the undignified and unsatisfactory wrangling between the Secretary of
State and the Parliament of Canada, whether by the Canadians increasing their militia force
or the Government of England withdrawing the troops from Canada.”264 
This  threat  to  end  completely  British  military  aid  within  the  provinces  moreover
foreshadowed  the  wider  and  more  critical  debate  over  the  maintenance  of  the  imperial
connection at all. The Times for instance stated that “the present appears to us a proper time
for  plain-speaking  about  the  future  relations  between  England  and  her  more  advanced
colonies.”265 Indeed, the inadequacy of the measure could not be abided by the Colonial
Office, especially if  it  were causing a mutiny at home over whether to stand shoulder to
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shoulder with the province, or even to retain the imperial link. Newcastle told Monck that the
Canadian assembly had “succeeded in producing on this side of the water a feeling which
two months ago had no existence than in their imaginations and in the clever but eccentric
brain of Goldwin Smith.”  The Times lead editorial on June 6 declared that “the question is
not one for Canada of dissolving or maintaining its connection with Great Britain. That it can
dissolve almost at pleasure. The question is one of destroying or maintaining its own liberty
and independence – of being a self-governing Commonwealth, or a member, or perhaps –
as is talked of for the South, a subjugated  territory of the United States. The question is
much simpler than Canadians think. If they are to be defended at all, they must make up
their minds to bear the greater part of the burden of their own defence.”266 The only solution
to  the  present  impasse  appeared  to  be  concerted  action  by  the  provincial  authorities.
Newcastle wrote “I shall continue to give my earnest exhortation and advice to the Governor
General and the people of Canada, both privately and officially, not to rest till some effective
measure for the defence of Canada has been passed.”267 
Russell’s union plan
Canada’s  parochial  approach  to  the  militia  question  forced  a  new  policy  in  the
Foreign  Office,  based  on  the  concept  that  ‘greater’  political  entities  bestowed  greater
responsibility on authorities for their security. Russell wrote that the defeat of the bill meant
the need to resurrect the “plan long ago contemplated & then found impracticable, namely
that of forming a Federal Union of the British North American Provinces.”268 Thus the Foreign
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Secretary now believed that a more grandiose political idea was required to encourage the
provinces to desist in relying on the mother country. According to Russell’s plan each side
would  make  concessions,  these  being  intended  to  address  the  resentment  in  England
towards the Canadian tariff  and increase the defensibility of the province by creating the
continental railroad. Britain would accept the import duties - though a “perpetually binding”
contract would place a 15 percent limit on them – and the mother country would guarantee
the  loan  for  the  intercolonial  railway.  In  terms  of  the  political  nature  of  the  proposed
federation  the  Foreign  Secretary  envisaged  it  as  circumventing  the  militia  problems  by
creating a standing national guard. The provinces would submit to a central legislature while
retaining “an Assembly for local purposes”, the former paying for the latter, while the new
central government would provide a permanent “Federal Force” constituted from regular and
militia troops. Crucially the local assemblies would be strictly prohibited from interfering with
either  defence  or  the  tariff.  Thus  the  two  most  fundamentally  divisive  issues  in  the
relationship  between  Britain  and  Canada  –  security  and  the protective  tariff  -  would  be
alleviated  by  this  measure.  Therefore  although  during  the  previous  year’s  inquiries  into
imperial defence the Colonial Secretary had disassociated himself from the establishment of
a federal union - preferring the more ‘British’  system of  a legislative one – Russell  now
recommended the  implementation  of  a  federal  system under  the  pressure  of  Canadian
inaction towards security. Indeed the Foreign Secretary now wrote to Newcastle suggesting
that the Imperial Government should “make a public recommendation” to the colonies of “a
Federal Union of the British North American Provinces.” The strategic upheaval resulting
from  the  Civil  War  therefore  appeared  to  portend  that  a  change  was  required  in  the
geopolitical structure of the continent. Indeed, it was hoped that this new nation would offset
the emerging military force in the United States. The Spectator, regularly an organ of the
Prime Minister, saw union as meaning that “in a few years’ time the British American empire
might stand alone, and as one great country defy invasion, and preserve the balance of
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power in the New World.”269 In the Foreign Office this was seen as a means of relinquishing
some of Britain’s responsibility  and creating a new powerful  state, while still  keeping the
imperial connection intact. Russell stated that “the Federal Province might be constituted in
such a manner as to form a loyal constitutional State subject always to the British Crown.”270
Newcastle continued to see union as a step forward for British North America and
even a necessary outcome of the Civil War, but still held to the conviction it would be helped
by a smaller  unification of the Maritime Provinces and completion of the transcontinental
railway paving the way. The Colonial secretary wrote on June 22 “I have always been of the
opinion that the necessary preliminary to a Legislature Union of the Lower Provinces is an
Intercolonial Railway, and that the completion of both these schemes must precede a Union
with Canada.”271 Newcastle had this ultimate goal in mind and believed the Civil War might
accelerate its achievement though continued to believe in the need for the stepping stones.
The  Colonial  Secretary  reiterated  his  sentiments  made  to  the  Parliamentary  Select
Committee the previous spring writing that union “may be hastened by the present condition
of the neighbouring country but I do not expect success to any project which attempts it
without  first  settling (if  not  accomplishing)  both  the  smaller  Union  and  the  Railway.”272
Tellingly however Newcastle conceded that circumstances were so strained as to perhaps
justify a measure in the same direction aimed at improving provincial security. To this end
the Colonial Secretary advanced again his suggestion to Monck that the provinces attempt
to reach some understanding and co-operation on making British North America defensible.
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Speaking of the Foreign Secretary’s plan Newcastle wrote that “none of the objections which
oppose  it  seem  to  impede  a  union  for  defence.”  With  this  in  mind  the  Colonial  Office
continued  to  work  on  the  Intercolonial  Railway  scheme  as  this  not  only  promised  the
logistical  benefit  in terms of defence but also encouraged this practical  co-operation and
cohesion between the provinces hitherto lacking.  Indeed the Colonial  Secretary saw four
major advantages to the railway. Not only would it be a step towards ultimate political union
and  improved  defence,  it  would  also  create  more  efficient  postal  communication  and
increase  inter-provincial  trade,  all  of  which  by  definition  would  enhance  the  sense  of
commonality across British North America. The railway link with the seaboard would make
possible the transportation of goods and troops to Canada which currently was “practically
cut off from Europe during six months out of the twelve.” 
In this  respect  the Colonial  Minister’s  view of  the Intercolonial  Railway effectively
endorsed the recommendations  made by Colonel  Burgyonne in  his  report  three months
earlier.  Newcastle  considered the economic incentive as vital  as the military  in reducing
longer  term financial  pressure  on the provinces  to  join  the United  States.  The Colonial
Secretary  feared  the  commercial  aggressiveness  of  the  northerly  United  States  which
threatened to make the “poor & petty Dependencies ...  incapable of running the race of
competition.” The railway might also in future be connected to the US and therefore prevent
aggression from developing by forging links between the nations. Newcastle wrote that “a
continuous line of Railway through British Territory from Chicago to Halifax would be a most
valuable bond of amity between us and them, ensuring ‘good behaviour on their part.” 273
Moreover  the  Colonial  Secretary  recognised  that  the  conflict  being  fought  to  the  south
fundamentally threatened the balance of power of the continent, and saw the Intercolonial as
one  crucial  antidote  to  it.  Newcastle  believed  that  the  excessive  taxation  the Civil  War
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imposed would lead to further secession in the West  of  the US, thus the railway would
determine “whether it shall give us over our own territory a free and clear passage across
America (and thus in fact around the world) or leave us at the mercy of probably two or three
more  separate  republics,  one  or  other  or  all  of  which  may  often  be  in  hostility  to  us.”
Summing up the desired use for defence Newcastle wrote that “With a railway ... we should
wait & watch the turn of events, confident in our power of rapidly and surely reinforcing the
troops in Canada in case of necessity.”274
The increasingly apparent revision of the strategic landscape of North America was
now  feeding  more  and  more  into  pressure  both  at  home  and  abroad  on  the  imperial
government to intervene on the South’s behalf.  Despite the government having previously
warded it off out of fears of war with the North, Lindsay bought on the debate over Southern
recognition on June 18. The principal arguments put forward to justify recognition were that
the Confederacy had established a de facto government and slavery would be assured a
more humanitarian demise under  a separate South,  however  underlying these were the
more self-interested commercial and strategic benefits separation would give Britain. These
were summed up by Lindsay, the MP that had schemed with Napoleon for an intervention in
favour of the South. Lindsay desired 
to see the Southern States separated from the North because ... it was
for  the  interest  of  this  country,  both  politically  and  commercially,  that  that
separation should take place ... the South would be prepared to adopt a free
trade  policy;  that  they  would  be  prepared  to  enter  into  relations  with  this
country, and to exchange directly their cotton and the other products of the
South for our manufactures (and) it would be well for us that a vast power like
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the United States should be divided. We had been constantly receiving threats
of war from America; and therefore I am anxious for the separation, because I
believe it would be for the political interests of the people of this country.275
Arguments over whether recognition would help protect the colonies or provoke an
attack  on  them were  growing  in  bitterness  and  complexity.  Lindsay  argued  the  former,
writing to Russell that “if the question is settled without our recognition of the South, (you)
might rest certain that the Northern Armies would be marched into Canada.”276 In the first
year of the conflict however it had been made abundantly clear to the Foreign Office that war
would result from recognition in any case. With the North’s successes in the first half of 1862
moreover  the  Foreign  Secretary  knew  the  timing  for  intervention  was  particularly
unfavourable. Russell wrote “in the face of the fluctuating events of the war, the alternations
of victory and defeat .... between allegations so contradictory on the part of the contending
Powers, Her Majesty’s Government are still determined to wait.”277Around this time however
military fortunes dramatically shifted as Robert E. Lee began his famous career in the east.
Following  the  months  of  Northern  progress  and  widespread  feeling  that  the  Peninsular
Campaign would culminate in the seizure of Richmond, Lee’s audacious counter-offensive
reasserted British  belief  in  inevitable  Confederate  success.  Lyons,  at  home on leave  in
England, surveying public feeling wrote of the Seven Days that “I’m afraid no one but me is
sorry for it.”278 Following this, prematurely believing that the North might now come round to
Britain’s opinion that the cause was hopeless a cabinet was held on August 2 to discuss
mediation. 
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The imperial government still understood however that, due to the threat of war with
the Union, they could not proceed until Washington had truly realised that the North could
not succeed. Gladstone told Argyll that the cabinet meeting was to determine “to move or not
to move in the matter of the American Civil War (but) nothing shall be done until both parties
are  desirous  of  it.”279 The  imperial  government  -  and  Gladstone  in  particular  -  however
continued to believe that  the United States must  be broken up.   When Argyll  replied to
Gladstone that, despite McClellan’s withdrawal from the peninsula, the North did not look like
succumbing to war-weariness any time soon, the Chancellor replied 
I agree that this is not a state of mind favourable to mediation; and I
admit it to be a matter of great difficulty to determine when the first step ought
to be taken;  but  I  cannot  subscribe to the opinion of  those who think that
Europe is to stand silent without limit of time and witness these horrors and
absurdities, which will soon have consumed more men, and done ten times
more mischief than the Crimean War... but with the difference that there the
result was uncertain, here it is certain in the opinion of the whole world except
one of the parties.280
Gladstone was looking for a way to ensure Southern independence. The Chancellor
had been entertaining a number of Southerners in England at this time and been reading
material on the legal and political nuances of recognising independence movements.281 The
Times concurred with the Chancellor that the North could not perceive the inevitability of
separation,  positioned as it  was in  the eye of  the storm, and that  only  mediation would
ultimately make it see reason. The paper printed “one word has been in the hearts of men of
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reason and feeling for some time past, though the passions of the hour in America have
prevented it from rising to their lips. That word is “Mediation”. That North and South must
now choose between separation and ruin,  material  and political,  is the opinion of nearly
everyone who, looking impartially and from a distance on the conflict, sees what is hidden
from the frenzied eyes of the Northern politicians.”282 Britain desired for the Union to agree to
separation and the Confederacy’s run of victories through the summer in Virginia made it
appear possible. Of Jackson’s success in the Shenandoah Valley Russell wrote “it  really
looks as if he might end the war. In October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet.”283 
Preoccupied with the more publicised Eastern theatre of operations, the cumulative
effect of the Seven Days, the Valley Campaign and Second Bull Run led British statesmen to
contemplate whether the Union would now accept that the war had failed, especially as Lee
now looked poised to push the war into the North. The Prime Minister’s tone was almost
jubilant following the news of the second Confederate victory at Manassas writing to Russell
that “the Federals got a very complete smashing ... it seems not altogether unlikely that still
greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands
of the Confederates. If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether ...
England  and  France  might  not  address  the  contending  parties  and  recommend  an
arrangement upon the basis of separation?” With this proposal the Foreign Secretary was in
full  agreement.  Russell  replied  that  if  their  mediation  offer  should  be refused “we ought
ourselves to recognise the Southern States as an independent state.”284
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Maritime union, Confederate independence and the continental Balance of Power
In New Brunswick Gordon initiated a plan for maritime union in September, a policy
the  Governor  of  Nova  Scotia  was  similarly  inclined  to.  Gordon  wrote  to  the  Colonial
Secretary “I  should  like to prepare the way for  the union of  the colonies  the paramount
necessity  of  their  future.”285 As  had been  made clear  in  the  discussions  over  provincial
defence Gordon was highly frustrated with the parochialism and ‘petty politics’ of his local
legislature.  Following  the  latest  reshuffle  the  Lieutenant  Governor  wrote  that  “every
gentleman of education and position has lost seat and has been replaced by some ignorant
lumberer or petty attorney, or by some keeper of a village grog shop or grocery store.” 286
Much like the imperial government’s rationale for the wider continental union, confederation
of the Maritime Provinces alone would go some way to elevating the status and prestige of
the provincial government posts. This was relayed to the Colonial Office, and endorsed by
Newcastle  who  continued  to  view  it  as  one  step  towards  continent-wide  union  and
emphasised the preference for legislative over a federal structure. The Colonial Secretary
replied  that  “I  shall  be  glad  to  learn  that  you  have  taken  all  prudent  means,  without
committing  the home government  beforehand,  to  bring  about  a proposal  from the lower
provinces for a legislative union.” Considered as it was the other essential step towards with
eventual  union,  beginning  work on the continental  railroad  was paramount  and Gordon,
having watched the sleighs carry the troops across his province during the  Trent  Crisis,
recognised this in particular. The Colonial Secretary too concurred. Newcastle wrote that the
railroad  would  be a  crucial  precursor  to  maritime unification  which  would  then form the
perfect basis for a simple merger with Canada. Thus the railway “interlacing them from North
to South” would bring the Atlantic colonies into a harmonious state “when thus combined into
285
 Gordon to Newcastle, Newcastle Papers, 22 November 1862.
286
 Donald Creighton, The Road to Confederation, (Toronto, 1964), p. 5.
166
one Province for that more important union with Canada which as a British object ought in
my opinion to be always kept in view.”
Strategically, as part of the empire the new unified colony might provide that critical
counter to the growing American power to the south. It was believed that as the provinces
must ultimately become independent, perhaps sooner than later, Britain must help render
them as strong as possible to prevent their absorption by the US. Newcastle wrote “But with
the railroad made and the union with the Lower Provinces effected she would become to us
a strong & self-reliant Colony so long as her present relationship with the Mother Country
continues”, becoming ‘a powerful and independent Ally and a most valuable, I believe an
essential, makeweight in the balance of power on the American Continent.” This was the
essential  object;  to ensure the survival  of a strong North American nation outside of the
American union and that Britain might have a strong ally in the event of war. The Colonial
Secretary expanded on it thus: “I cannot imagine an object more clearly marked out for a
British Statesman to aim at than to secure the continued separation of  Canada and the
United States and the eventual  foundation of  a powerful  State out  of  the disjointed and
feeble British North American Provinces ... Indeed no one can fairly judge the question who
looks merely to the wants and wishes of the moment and does not look beyond immediate
results into the great future of our North American Colonies.”287 Creation of a wider nation
would increase the sense of responsibility and Gladstone therefore urged the measure to be
adopted, writing “efforts should be made, without delay, to ascertain whether it is practicable
to establish a Federation or Political Union of these Colonies.”
With  efforts  increasing  to  consolidate  a  new  state  in  British  North  America  and
address the balance of power on the continent, September 1862 also appeared to present
the ripest moment to intervene with a view to confirming Southern independence. Britain was




clash on Union soil or the capture of Baltimore or the capital predicted by Palmerston. The
cabinet  therefore  effectively  decided  to  let  their  policy  hinge  on  the  outcome  of  Lee’s
invasion of Maryland. Palmerston wrote “It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to
the North-West of Washington, and its issue must have a great effect on the state of affairs.
If the Federals sustain a great defeat they may at once be ready for mediation, and the Iron
should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it, we may
wait  awhile  and  see  what  may  follow.”288 Any  intervention  would  be  predicated  on  an
interruption of the blockade and the resumption of trade with the South. With the fear of
retaliation by the Union, it was understood that unless the North was completely convinced
of the pointlessness of continuing the war there was no chance of a termination of hostilities
to enable mediation. Thus Palmerston asked “... is it likely that the Federals would consent
to an armistice to be accompanied by a cessation of Blockades, and which would give the
Confederates  means  of  getting  all  the  supplies  they  may  want?”289 Once  again,  if  this
Northern acceptance was not present, British policy fell down on the weakness of imperial
security. This was because Britain would have to forcibly break the blockade if intervening,
an act of war with the North which would provoke an attack on the provinces. Palmerston
summed up the difficulty to Clarendon writing “The recognition of the South could be of no
benefit to England unless we meant to sweep away the blockade, which would be an act of
hostility  towards  the  North.”290 Lyons  was  communicating  the  same  message  from
Washington writing “foreign intervention, short of the use of force, could only make matters
worse here.”291 Derby stated that he “had been constantly urged to go in for recognition and
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mediation, but had always refused on the ground that recognition would merely irritate the
North without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a single bale of cotton.”
Intervention and the security of British North America
W.H Russell wrote in the Army and Navy Gazzette “next to the delusion of the North
that it  can breathe the breath of life into the corpse of the murdered Union again, is the
delusion of some people in England who imagine that by recognition we would give life to
the South, divide the nations on each side of the black and white line for ever, and bring this
war  to  an  end.  ..  over  and  above  all,  recognition,  unless  it  meant  ‘war’,  would  be  an
aggravation of the horrors of the contest; it would not aid the South one whit, and it would
add  immensely  to  the  unity  and  fury  of  the  North.”292 Not  only  were  the  government
concerned about hostility from the North if they took the lead in intervention however; there
also appeared to be a risk if they should refrain and be left behind by the other European
powers  due  to  the  weakness  of  Canada.  Britain  would  not  only  be  friendless  in  North
America, but again all the more vulnerable in Europe, particularly if facing a crisis in either
continent. It was stated “Suppose Great Britain held aloof completely in the present autumn,
while the other Powers of Europe, swayed by the French Government, employed their moral
force to terminate  the war  in  Southern  independence.  In  two months  Canada might  be
assailed, and Great Britain be without the least support on that continent.” Conversely the
fear  of  embroilment  and  particularly  the  weakness  of  British  North  America  were  only
exacerbated by the impression given by France that Britain must be the muscle behind the
approach.  Indeed,  Lyons  informed  Russell  of  comments  made  by  the  French  Minister,
writing “In speaking of a plan supposed to be entertained by Russia of joining France in
292
 Foreman, p. 1089, 6 June 1863.
169
offering mediation without  England,  he said that,  independently  of  other fatal  objections,
such a mediation would not succeed, because it would want the all-important element of
intimidation.”  Moreover  Lyons  conveyed  that  the  French  Minister  appeared  perfectly
sanguine about the use of force, writing that Mercier “always takes it as a matter of course
that the alternative offered is mediation, or the immediate recognition of the South; and he
would not be sorry that fears should be entertained that the rejection of the mediation would
be  followed  by  something  more  in  favour  of  the  South  than  naked  recognition.”293 On
September  21 Hammond told Cowley  “I  do not  believe  in  the honesty of  the French in
American matters.” 
Given this British concern, it was deemed particularly important to bring Russia on
board  if  proceeding  with  mediation  as  part  of  a  coalition.  This  was  because  American
relations with Russia were naturally less fraught because very little trade was conducted
between them and there were essentially no areas of interest they would come into conflict
over. This involvement was crucial, not only because there could be no question of Russia’s
motives coming from anything other than friendship and humanity, but also because Britain
felt the added moral weight of a Europe-wide alliance was needed. The Foreign Secretary
wrote “my only doubt (was) whether we and France should stir if Russia holds back. Her
separation  from  our  move  would  ensure  the  rejection  of  our  proposals.”294 The  Prime
Minister concurred in that. Palmerston wrote that “If the acknowledgement were made at one
and the same time by England, France and some other Powers, the Yankee would probably
not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like one against a European Confederation.
Such  a  quarrel  would  render  certain  and  permanent  that  Southern  Independence  the
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acknowledgement of which would have caused it’’295 It can thus be seen that the primary
British concern was avoiding war with the Union, particularly if they were without allies. The
imperial Government therefore attempted to cover all bases in terms of averting trouble in
North America. Not only would the cabinet make sure it possessed the support of the major
European powers but would simultanerously  reassert  its own neutrality.  Russell  wrote to
Palmerston that “Two things ... must be made clear: (i) that we propose separation.,. (ii) That
we shall  take no part  in  the war unless attacked ourselves.”296 Gladstone had given his
infamous speech that Davis had “made a nation” in early October – when the outcome of
Lee’s invasion was still unknown in England, and with Russell and the Prime Minister was
keen to establish  Confederate independence.  The Foreign Secretary told the Chancellor
therefore that “I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon enough for a Cabinet, if I
am free to communicate the views which Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in
the interval between this time and the middle of next month.” These ‘views’ were giving “the
offer of mediation to both parties in the first place, and in the case of refusal by the North, to
recognition of the South. Mediation on the basis of separation and recognition accompanied
by  a  declaration  of  neutrality.”297 The  Foreign  Secretary  wrote  that  “Palmerston  agrees
entirely in this course.”298 
The ambiguous results of Antietam however in which despite Federal victory Lee’s
army was allowed to retreat unmolested back to Virginia left the mediation plans in limbo.
Palmerston wrote “The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be cleared up by some
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more  decisive  events  between  the  contending  parties.”299 The  Palmerston,  Russell  and
Gladstone axis too faced strong opposition in the cabinet from those who continued to fear
war would be the outcome of recognition.  This anti-intervention faction in the Cabinet was
led by Lewis. The Secretary of War wrote that it was “Better to endure the ills we have Than
fly  to  others  which  we  know  not.”300 In  the  autumn  the  wisdom  of  mediation  was  also
questioned by  The Times in highlighting that an eruption with the North would cost more
than  continuing  to  endure  the  hardship  caused  by  the  blockade.  The  paper  endorsed
sentiments of Cobden’s who had criticised intervention as inherently hostile to the North
stating: “We quite agree with Mr Cobden that it would be cheaper to keep all Lancashire on
turtle and venison than to plunge into a desperate war with the Northern States of America,
even with all Europe at our back.” On November 13 following Antietam too Lincoln issued
the  Emancipation  Proclamation. The  announcement  did  not  make  Britain  less  likely  to
intervene, due to that English belief outlined earlier in the year that emancipation would most
likely represent a desperate last resort by the Union that would lead to, rather than abate, a
humanitarian crisis.  As it  applied only to slaves in Confederate controlled regions it  was
interpreted by the Foreign Office as  just  such a  cynical  ploy.  Lyons described  it  to  the
Foreign Secretary as “a measure of war, and a measure of war of a very questionable kind”,
as by only affecting it “makes slavery, at once, legal and illegal, and makes slaves either
punishable for running away from their masters, or entitled to be supported and encouraged
in doing so, according to the locality of the plantation to which they belong, and the loyalty of
the State in which they happen to be.”301 After the proclamation Russell’s secretary stated
that “we may see re-enacted some of the worst excesses of the French Revolution.”302 The
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Emancipation  edict  came  into  effect  on  January  1  1863  and  British  postulations  on
intervention persisted until the summer.
The greatest disincentive to act following the aborted invasion of Maryland was the
fear of war with the Union given the issues with addressing local security in the provinces.
The Times wrote “we very much doubt ... whether, if Virginia belonged to France as Canada
belongs to England, the Emperor of the French would be so active in beating up for recruits
in this American mediation league.” Indeed, until the North had given up the war recognition
would  invite  military  disaster  in  British  North  America,  particularly  with  the  winter
approaching, Russell wrote “As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns
following upon an acknowledgement of the Independence of the South, it is quite true that
we should have less to care about that resentment in the spring when communication with
Canada was open, and when our naval force could more easily operate upon the American
coast, than in winter when we are cut off from Canada and the American coast is not so
safe.” Palmerston fully concurred in this on the basis that Canada could not be reinforced for
much of the winter, writing to Russell that “I believe you are right in fixing next Spring for the
period  for  the  acknowledgement  of  the  Confederate  States.”303 Therefore  the  cabinet
postponed any decision on recognition until the following year when security on the border
could be better organised. Agreeing with Palmerston that they could mediate “with less Risk
[sic] in the Spring” Russell wrote “it should not take place till May Or June next year, when
circumstances may show pretty clearly whether Gladstone was right.”304 
The spring and early summer of 1863 witnessed a further critical - and ultimately
decisive - period in the crisis of potential imperial intervention. Post Antietam the North had
squandered its chance to attack Lee’s army in detail and in the ensuing months Confederate
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forces built  up strong momentum again,  at least in the more scrutinised eastern theatre.
Ironically, the Union’s apparent vulnerability, its need to reinvigorate the war effort, and the
present strength of the South now caused concern in Britain over security in North America.
Federal  enlistments  were  again  due  to  expire  and  the  Federal  Government  was  now
preparing  to  impose  the  draft.  Another  measure  compromising  American  freedoms,
opposition was expected which might be overcome by exploiting anti-British feeling. Lyons
even posited that in their current predicament the North might welcome conflict with Britain
as an excuse for failure in the war with the South. He wrote to the Foreign Secretary that:
if no military success be obtained within a short time, it may become a
party  necessity  to  resort  to  some means  of  producing  an  excitement  in  the
country sufficient to enable the Government to enforce the Conscription Act, and
to exercise the extra-legal powers conferred by the late Congress, To produce
such an excitement the more ardent of the party would not hesitate to go, to the
verge of a war with England. Nay there are not a few who already declare that if
the South must be lost, the best mode to conceal the discomfiture of the party
and of the nation, would be to go to war with England and attribute the loss of
the South to English interference.305 
The further problem with the North’s current travails was how this intensified the panic
over ‘compensation’. With the North having already ploughed immense resources into the
war effort, it was considered that having saddled itself with a vast debt and lost the Southern
States, the broken remnants of the US would have added incentive to unite themselves
commercially and politically  with the provinces of British North America.  Having from the
start believed Southern independence inevitable the compensation fear had long persisted.
Now however the strides made by the South industrially and technologically ironically led to
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fears in the opposite direction. Whereas previously the economic and strategic benefits of a
separate South had been widely heralded in terms of establishing a new trading partner and
potential military ally, now the region’s progress threatened to change substantively its future
relationship with Britain. The imperial government now faced new problems of a militarily,
economically  matured  Confederacy  emerging  independent  before  Palmerston’s  cabinet
extended  recognition.  This  was  deemed  a  particularly  issue  if  Britain  continued  to
procrastinate  over  recognition,  a  policy  which  had  already  embittered  many  in  the
Confederacy. The government was warned in parliament that having had to fight alone for so
long, the South was “being driven to be a manufacturing people ... They are making their
own guns; and if you keep them much longer in their present condition, they will produce
their own cotton and woollen goods. Thus interests will grow up which they will be obliged to
protect,  and we shall  have the protective system introduced into the Southern States of
America.”306 If  in  the  meantime  the  South  achieved  a  knockout  victory,  London’s
postponement  of  acknowledging  statehood  could  poison  British-Confederate  diplomatic
relations from their inception. This would not only leave the empire without that valuable
alliance on the continent in the event of war with the Union, but also put Britain’s Central
American  possessions  at  risk  from  the  South,  as  well  as  restrict  Britain’s  influence  in
addressing slavery in the new nation. Thus Addeley argued:
 from the moment separation was inevitable, no statesman could be
blind to our want of an ally on the other side of the Atlantic. .. if we allow the
war to close before we have acknowledged, both the separated Powers being
irrevocably hostile to us, we may be forced, now to guard Canada from one,
now the West Indies from the other. Our diplomatists, moreover, would have




resentments which the war had left behind it, to gain legitimate advantages in
trade, to deprecate aggressive views, or to improve the situation of the negro.
Another troublesome proposition was put forward. With Lee’s devastating victory at
Chancellorsville and prospect of another offensive towards Washington, should the capital
fall  the  Union  might  even  be  re-established  under  Southern  control.  Again,  if  British-
Confederate  relations  did  start  on  an  equitable  basis,  this  would  present  a  dangerous
eventuality strategically and politically. Adderley argued that it would leave British interests
endangered almost everywhere. Thus “if it were to take place, with their great armies, and
with their great navy, and their almost unlimited power, they might offer to drive England out
of Canada, France out of Mexico, and whatever nations are interested in them out of the
islands of the West Indies; and you might then have a great State built upon slavery and
war,  instead of  that  free State to which I  look,  built  up upon an educated people,  upon
general freedom, and upon morality in government.”
In the summer of 1863 the dilemma over recognition remained complex and baffling.
With the Army of Northern Virginia on the march, intervention on the South’s behalf was now
argued to carry with it a concurrent set of risks. One was the fear that it would be perceived
in the North that the Confederacy had not been able to establish independence for itself and
would therefore give a Federal pretext for future renewal of the conflict. It was suggested
therefore that intervention “would take from the South all the weight, the stability, the security
which they would enjoy, if they achieved their statehood alone. The Federal States would
always feel that the South had not been able to gain freedom for itself, and might therefore
be  again  re-conquered  whenever  a  fitting  opportunity  offered  itself.”  Indeed  it  seemed
premature to act just when the Confederacy was on the brink of finally proving itself fit for
independence.   Surveying  the  decisions  about  to  be  reached  in  Pennsylvania  and  at
Vicksburg, Gladstone stated on June 30 that “certainly there has not been a single epoch
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during the whole period of the war, which has now been raging for more than two years, at
which there were pending military issues of such vast moment, both in the east and the west
—issues so important with reference to the future position and interests of either or both
belligerents.” Gladstone did appreciate the progress made by the Federals in the Western
theatre and that balanced against Confederate feats of arms in the east mediation would be
practically  very  difficult.  Continuing  to  be  certain  of  Confederate  independence  the
Chancellor did “not say that the main result of this contest is ...,  in any degree doubtful”
however “during an armistice the two parties keep their arms in their hands; how could they
define the limits within which those parties should confine themselves? The limits now were
most uncertain; the north held New Orleans and the Mississippi;  the South held parts of
Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland.”307
Summary
Since the Trent Affair the British government had been increasingly concerned by the
progress  of  the  Civil  War.  Wishing  for  it  to  cease  and  the  Confederacy  to  become
independent, the North’s military success during the first half of the year came as a setback.
When the South had managed to reverse the tide and had appeared ready to win a major
victory on Northern soil the conflict again degenerated into an uncertain stalemate. It had
continually dissuaded Britain from intervening as until the North could see that its cause was
hopeless, British interference meant war and probable catastrophe in British North America.
This in turn had caused issues with Anglo-French co-operation as Napoleon was far more
headstrong to act and France had made clear it believed Britain to be the key intimidating
factor in the initiative. This left the British government wary of a split with France when facing
a crisis either in North America or Europe or both.
Of equal  concern was that  over this  period the Union’s  armed forces had grown
exponentially from the tiny regular US army before the war. This was also true, and perhaps
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more worrying, regarding the growing US navy. Britain was forced to note both the victories
it had won on the inland waters of the continent and the growing efficiency of the blockade.
These factors had proven still more alarming over the previous year due to the evidence of a
renewed drive by the US towards westward and northward expansion - unshackled as it now
was of the more conservative South. Moreover there remained a critical lack of action in the
provinces towards border defence. The failure of the militia bill in Canada was the signal
issue,  and from it  a  fierce political  debate  had begun on how to impress on the North
American colonies that it was their responsibility to address local security. This had led to
talk of either legislating to force the provinces to adopt  measures, or simply abandoning
them by withdrawing  imperial  troops.  The only  real  initiative  the British  government  had
taken was in supporting the union scheme, believed as it was to be a means of increasing
the  sense  of  responsibility  of  the  colonial  politicians  for  their  country’s  defence,  and
attempting  to  bring  the  continental  railway  about.  This  effort  to  address  security  in  the
provinces would increase between 1863 and 1864. Even though Britain’s movement towards
intervention  receded  to  a  neutral  stance,  the  intensifying  nature  of  the  Civil  War  made




THE NEUTRALITY CRISIS, 1863-64
As  the  Civil  War  progressed  the  problems  with  maintaining  neutrality  made
diplomacy increasingly difficult with the US and added to the sense of insecurity over British
North America. Deeper into the war moreover these issues with greater regularity sprung
from  the  provinces  themselves.  Early  in  1863  friction  was  caused  with  the  seizure  of
numerous vessels accused of violating, or attempting to violate, the blockade. In many cases
ships en route to or from Matamoros - a neutral Mexican port - were detained under the
principle  of  ‘continuous voyage’.  This  was the principle  that  the ships in  question,  while
entitled to transport their cargo to such neutral ports, contained goods or contraband that
would be forwarded to the Confederacy. One vessel seized by the Union in particular, the
Peterhoff, caused a serious backlash in Britain. The Times was singularly belligerent, stating
that “there are limits to the forebearance which even a great nation can exercise towards a
struggling but still petulant and presuming Government. In the case of the Peterhoff  these
limits have been passed.”308 This belligerence in the press was not replicated in government
as controversies over British neutrality through the middle years of the Civil War increasingly
led the cabinet to worry about imperial security. The contracting of English shipbuilders to
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produce vessels for the Confederate war at sea bought British-American relations close to
breaking point. Of these the Alabama with its record of destruction of Northern commerce
was most famous. The economic effect on the eastern seaboard states resulted in threats of
Northern privateers being sent out against British shipping. Lyons was told that the New
York Chamber of Commerce had protested that because of the ships fitted out in England
“no  American  merchant  vessels  would  get  freights  –  that  even  war  with  England  was
preferable to this – that in that case the maritime enterprise of the country would at least find
a  profitable  employment  in  cruising  against  British  trade.”  Predictably  the  issue  again
spawned suggestions that ‘mob’ rule or the Department of State or both would resort to war
with Britain.  Lyons received a letter from Seward on March 8 stating “I am receiving daily
such representations  from our  sea-ports  concerning  the depredations  on our  commerce
committed by the vessels built and practically fitted out in England, that I do most sincerely
apprehend a new element is entering into the unhappy condition of our affairs, which, with all
the best dispositions of  your Government and my own, cannot long be controlled to the
preservation of peace.”309
Lyons  speculated  that  the  Secretary  of  State  was  again  using  uncompromising
diplomacy in order to curry favour with the hardliners.  He wrote to Russell that “It looks like
a return to the old bluster. Whether he does it to recover his position with the Radical party
and with the people at large ... or.... he really thinks he can frighten England and France with
his privateers, I can not say.”310 Unnervingly however, if Seward’s comments were in earnest
it was a startling admission of that which Britain perceived, that the various lobbyists and
interest groups or ‘mob’ at work in Washington, “cannot long be controlled.” Ironically after
two years of fearing Seward too powerful in Washington, Britain had now come to rue the
fact  that  the  Secretary  of  State’s  voice  might  not  carry  sufficient  weight  in  the  Federal
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cabinet. Lyons told the Foreign Office that Seward “is not as much listened to as he ought to
be by his  colleagues in  the War and Navy Departments.”311 Indeed,  the British  Minister
exhibited concern at the influence of the chiefs of these military branches who, especially
given the general growth and enhancement of Federal arms, could not but become more
powerful in their roles. The fear had grown that politicians in the White House could now not
control the military juggernaut they had created, or that this immersion in power would make
them  headstrong.  The  strides  made  by  the  Federal  Navy  in  particular  added  a  new
dimension to the diplomatic problems Britain felt with the North. This now bred a confidence
amongst belligerent Northern authorities that the US could compete with British power at
sea. Lyons wrote: “a good deal of allowance must be made for the evident design of the
Government and indeed of the people to intimidate England, but there can be little doubt that
the exasperation has reached such a point as to constitute serious danger. It is fully shared
by many important members of the Cabinet – nor are the men in high office exempt from the
overweening idea of the naval power of the United States, which reconciles the people to the
notion of a war with England.”312
The British Minister reported to Russell that he was as much as if not more afraid of
the  “vexatious  proceedings”  of  the  United  States  Navy  Department  than  the  illegal
shipbuilding  practices  in  England  benefitting  the Confederacy.313 Lyons  however,  deeply
concerned about an American attack on British North America, urged Russell not to allow
the shipbuilding controversy to be used as justification and do all in his power to stop further
Confederate purchases without conveying the impression he had been intimidated by the
Union. He wrote to Russell “I would rather the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some
better ground for us than this question of the ships fitted out for the Confederates. The great
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point to be gained in my opinion, would be to prevent the ships sailing, without leading the
people here to think that they had gained their  point  by threats.”314 The next day Lyons
ciphered  Monck  in  Canada  to  warn  him  about  trouble  brewing  with  the  US.  Russell
concurred with Lyons’s view of the danger. Russell wrote “we must be neutral ... We do not
‘fit out ships by the dozen,’ and Mr. S must know the allegation to be untrue. One-two-three
ships may have evaded our laws, just as the Americans evaded the American laws during
the Canadian Contest.”  Following this however, the imperial  government tightened up its
monitoring  of  suspected infringements.  The Foreign Secretary wrote to Lyons that  “The
orders  given  to  watch,  and  stop  when  evidence  can  be  procured,  vessels  apparently
intended for the Confederate service will, it is to be hoped, allay the strong feelings which
have  been  raised  in  Northern  America  by  the  escape  from  justice  of  the  Oreto  and
Alabama.”315 The  Governor  General  of  Canada  already  appreciated  that  relations  were
becoming  more  fraught,  as  at  this  time  the  American  Ship  Company  requested  that
Canadian engineers in US territory swear an oath of allegiance to the United States or they
would  have their  licenses revoked.  In  retaliation  the imperial  authorities  made American
engineers working for the Canadian Board of Railway Commissioners do likewise.316 
Legislating on, or withdrawing from, the Colonies
When  the  War  Secretary  came  to  announce  the  Army  Estimates  in  1863,  an
intensive debate ensued over the burden of defence in North America and particularly the
commitment to Canada. Having resolved to reduce colonial military expenditure measures
were advocated to spare the imperial government the current costs. There were calls for the
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colonies  to  pay  for  the  ‘commissariat  expenditure’  of  stationing  imperial  troops  in  their
territory. This all  came back to legislating on the responsibility for defence. One concern
however was that if colonial assemblies were so contributing that they would expect, and
really be entitled, to have a direct say with what was done with those forces. Roebuck, using
the topical argument of the Canadian legislature, argued that: 
if they asked the Colonies to provide any portion of what was required
for the movement of the army in the Colonies, they gave to the Colonies a
voice  in  the  management  of  the  army  ...  Supposing  (Britain)  had  two
regiments at Quebec and wanted to move them to Toronto, they being partly
paid  by  the colonial  Government,  it  might  object  to  that  removal,  and the
management would in fact pass out of the Imperial Government's hands; and
if they put any portion of the management in colonial hands, they destroyed
the home management.317
Conversely if the present state of affairs persisted and Britain continued to bankroll
the imperial forces in Canada it might cause friction with other colonies, particularly Australia
and  New  Zealand,  who  already  made  contributions  to  their  own  security.  Therefore  “if
Canada, which was older than they were, was allowed to rely on the parent State, other
Colonies would complain with reason of the injustice of putting them on a different footing.”
Canada’s inaction was also apt, and dangerously so, to turn English popular opinion against
the colony and by association perhaps against the maintenance of an empire as a whole if
an attack on the provinces dragged Britain into a costly war with the newly militarised United
States. Roebuck argued that “at present public opinion was, generally speaking, in favour of
the connection with the Colonies; but if war were to break out with the United States, it would
not be war on a small scale. It  would become necessary to increase the burdens of this
country in order to defend Canada against invasion; and the effect upon public opinion would
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be  disastrous,  and  might  prove  unfavourable  to  a  continuance  of  our  connection  with
Canada, and afterwards even with other Colonies.”
The War Minister narrowed in on the essence of the choices facing Britain succinctly
and starkly. These were either passing an Act of Parliament in order to levy contributions
from the colonies as a form of taxation, or to simply reduce the forces stationed there. Lewis
stated that “there were only two practical courses open to the House and the Government
with  respect  to  the  diminution  of  colonial  military  expenses.  One was for  the  House  to
legislate on the subject, which would be departing from the rule religiously observed since
the American War; the other was to withdraw our troops from the Colonies.” One method
was  a  regression  from  the  granting  of  responsible  government,  the  other  was  an
abandonment of the provinces at an hour of need. Therefore each was likely to significantly
damage the relationship between the mother-country and the colonies.  The Secretary of
War’s stark comments struck a significant  chord however due to the dangerous ‘halfway
house’ Britain seemed to be occupying. This middle-ground was the maintenance of a force
in  the colonies  large enough  to cause complacency  by the locals  towards  defence;  yet
woefully insufficient to resist American attack, particularly given the vast increase in Federal
forces. Thus “It was evident that great standing armies and navies would henceforth become
habitual to North America, as they had hitherto been to Europe. It seemed a short-sighted
proceeding to take a half-and-half policy with respect to the defence of the Colonies, and to
throw  small  bodies  of  troops  into  them  merely  as  objects  for  attack.”  This  piecemeal
scattering of imperial forces in as vulnerable a region as North America was described as
‘dandling’  the  colonies. Some  in  the  Commons  therefore  called  for  “the  question  of
withdrawing our troops ought to be raised distinctly, and a Vote taken upon it.” 
The US Minister’s “This is War” comment
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With  this  unresolved however,  relations  further  deteriorated with  the Union  when
British neutrality came under renewed attack from the Federal Government. Anglo-American
diplomacy  appeared  close  to  breaking  point  when  new  iron-plated  vessels  built  for
Confederate use were not intercepted by the government, despite warnings from the US
minister that this was their intended purpose. Having taken advice from the law officers of
the crown the British government determined that without clear evidence that they had been
purchased as Confederate warships the vessels could not be confiscated nor the contractors
arrested. Rebuking Adams’s pressure to summarily seize the vessels the Queen’s solicitor
general stated “laws are usually enforced against British subjects on evidence, and not on
suspicion; on facts, and not on presumption; on satisfactory testimony, and not on the mere
accusation  of  a  foreign  minister  or  his  agents.”  The  Foreign  Secretary  received  a  note
however from Adams stating that “at this moment, when one of the ironclad war vessels is
on the point  of  departure...  I  trust I  need not express how profound is my regret  at the
conclusion to which Her Majesty’s Government have arrived. I can regard it not other wise
than  as  practically  opening  to  the  insurgents  full  liberty  in  this  kingdom  ...  It  would  be
superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war.”318
Palmerston was again occupied by the threat of conflict  with the US.  The Prime
Minister complained to Adams of these sentiments which “So plainly and repeatedly imply an
intimation of  hostile  proceeding toward Great  Britain on the part  of  ...  the United States
unless steps are taken by Her Majesty’s government which the law does not authorize, or
unless the law which you consider as insufficient is altered.” Federal pressure continued to
mount however, increasing diplomatic tension. Adams told Russell that British neutrality was
“nothing more than a shadow under which war may be conducted.” Reiterating the legal
complications  with  seizing  suspected  Confederate-bound  vessels,  the  Foreign  Secretary
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replied  that  Britain  could  not  “admit  assertions  for  proof,  nor  conjecture  for  certainty.”319
Palmerston having advocated tough diplomacy and use of deterrence throughout the Civil
War continued to believe that standing up to American threats was the only option.  The
Prime Minister wrote that he would “not be induced by any consideration, either to overstep
the limits of the law or to propose to Parliament any new law” and that he would not “shrink
from any consequences  of  such a  decision.”320 Understanding  that  Northern  resentment
continued to stem from giving the Confederacy belligerent status, the Foreign Secretary too
proposed taking a hard-line. Russell suggested to Lyons that the European Powers threaten
to withdraw the North’s belligerent rights unless the Union recognised those of the South.
Again however the issue was the aversion to having to use force. Lyons wrote that
such  a  declaration  might  produce  a  furious  outburst  of  wrath  from
Government  and public  here ...  then England,  France and Spain  must  be
really firm, and not allow their Declaration to be a brutum fulmen. If  on its
being met, as it very probably would be, by a decided refusal on the part of
the United States, they did not proceed to break up the Blockade, or at all
events to resist by force the exercise of the right of visit on the high seas, the
United States Government and people would become more difficult to deal
with than ever.”321
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Lyons then reiterated to Russell the problem of US readiness in case of diplomacy
failing, writing “I don’t think the Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel with us or
with any European Power – but the better prepared it is, the less manageable it will  be.”
British  discomfort  continued  to  be  particularly  exacerbated  by  the  growing  strength  of
Federal military forces and the British Minister could witness the Union’s new power at first
hand. Lyons told Russell “I doubt whether people in Europe are aware of the extent of the
progress of this country in military strength” and stated that a Federal invasion, given the five
to one advantage it  would probably enjoy,  could “not be repelled.”322 It  was not only the
Union’s mammoth forces on land, but their burgeoning iron-cased fleet that worried British
military-men  now.  Indeed  Britain’s  shortfall  was  critical  if  during  the  next  campaigning
season the North was free of the rebellion and able to turn on Britain. Somerset wrote to
Palmerston  “in  case  the  Feds  should  be  disposed  and  able  next  year  to  execute  their
threatened vengeance ... we are short of iron clads and it takes time to build them.”323 With
all this in mind, the Foreign Secretary now begun to show the strain of the constant bartering
between Britain and the States writing “I am more and more persuaded that amongst the
Powers with whose Ministers I pass my time there is none with whom our relations ought to
be so frank and cordial as the United States.”324 
The Chesapeake affair and reviving the union scheme
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These  relations  again  became  critical  when  a  Union  ship  was  hijacked  by
Confederates  in  Chesapeake  Bay  and  then  taken  to  Halifax  harbour.  The  incident
emphasised again the risk the imperial connection bought. When Doyle asked the head of
the Nova Scotia assembly Charles Tupper what  his response was to be if  the Northern
captain refused to cooperate the British commander was told “in that case, you must sink his
vessels from the batteries.”325 The Chesapeake Affair appeared the most dangerous threat
to British-American peace since the  Trent crisis.  As it  had done up to now the imperial
government maintained its policy of attempting to show strength and resolve in order to deter
the US from any precipitate action. Lyons wrote that “I don’t think it would be prudent to pass
over it lightly, because if we give the United States Junior Officers an inch in such matters,
they will be apt to go to such lengths, to force us into a quarrel at last. I should be very loathe
to make any specific demand without instruction.”326 
Seward  too  wrote  to  the  British  Minister  warning  of  the  dangers  of  continued
Southern support coming from the provinces. The Secretary of State told Lyons that the
present  state of  affairs  “must  bring  on border  collisions  and war  between her  Majesty’s
colonies and the United States.”327 Ironically given British efforts early in the Civil  War to
impress upon Seward that he must not communicate directly with the provinces Monck now,
realising the severity of the issues,  started his own direct dialogue with the Secretary of
State in November. Edward Cardwell succeeded the very ill Duke of Newcastle as Colonial
Secretary  in  April  1864  and in  the  wake  of  the  Chesapeake  Affair  carried  on the work
Newcastle had been engaged in of bringing about the intercolonial railway. Similarly given
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the security concerns, early in the year the Canadian assembly too had begun to make their
own efforts  to  revive  the railway  scheme.  Cardwell  stated “Rather  than risk  the loss  of
another year the Canadian government is about to proceed with the survey of the line of the
Intercolonial Railway at its sole cost.”328 Throughout late 1863 to early 1864 allegations of
breaches of neutrality cast a shadow in the minds of the Federal Government and made war
appear  a  constant  possibility.  Speaking  about  blockade  running  and  the  fitting  out  of
Confederate ships Adams told Russell that the “duty of self defence, against such a policy of
disguised hostility, becomes imperative.”329 The cumulative tension over these issues was so
severe that Lyons told Russell on May 23 that “I am out of heart altogether.”
The Atlantic colonies now revived the scheme advanced by Gordon and Newcastle in
1862 of entering into maritime union, hoping close political co-operation could help formulate
solutions to their financial problems. The leaders of the provincial assemblies sent requests
to their respective lieutenant governors to hold a conference on the subject of union. When
the proposal was relayed to Cardwell  he rapidly instructed the governors to endorse the
meeting, scheduled for September in Charlottetown. At this time however further political
turmoil in Canada with neither conservatives nor liberals able to command a viable majority
cabinet led to a coalition government pledged to achieve political reform. Their policy was
the establishment of a wider political union in order to end the continual political stalemate
created  by  the  equal  legislative  representation  of  Upper  and  Lower  Canada,  either  by
entering into a general union with the other British provinces, or failing this, by ‘applying the
federal principle’ to the two Canadas alone. As a result the Canadian coalition requested
permission to send delegates to the Charlottetown Conference and propose terms for the
larger union of British North America. 
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This  was  extremely  welcome  news  for  the  imperial  government,  it  having  been
repeatedly advanced through the Civil War that the new political system was necessary to
keep the provinces secure from the US. Monck enthusiastically sanctioned the plan and
notified Cardwell who wrote ‘‘I have no objection whatever to an union of the whole of British
North America in one great & important province: and I do not anticipate that the Cabinet, or
Parliament,  will  have  any.”330 Cardwell’s  immediate  endorsement  of  this  “great  and
important” union stood in contrast to his predecessor’s belief in the building blocks of the
intercolonial railway and maritime union coming first and indicated the imperial government’s
readiness to accelerate the process. This was a manifestation of believing a ‘greater’ nation
bestowed  increased  responsibility  for  managing  colonial  security.  Indeed  Gladstone
reemphasised  the argument  that  the  acceptance of  self-government  by  colonies  had to
correspond to the acceptance of responsibility for self-defence, and therefore union was a
vital measure. The Chancellor wrote of the provinces that “nothing can defend them except
the desperate energy of a brave, self-relying population, which fights for hearth and home”
and therefore British North America should be “detached, as to their defensive not less than
their administrative responsibilities from England.”331 Gladstone thus saw an early continent-
wide union as a means to devolve the onus for defence on the provinces writing that the aim
was  to  “shift  the  centre  of  responsibility”  and  that  the  colonies  must  grow  out  of  “the
sentiment and habit  of mere dependencies” and gain a “corporate and common feeling.”
Richard Graves MacDonnell took over as Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia in June, under
instructions that he was to advance the union scheme.
Indeed, in a more long term, far-reaching sense the intended benefit of union was to
address the regional balance of power, currently so uncertain given the vast conflict across
the United States. According to Adderley “the reason why the North American Provinces
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were at present a weakness to England was that they had been prevented from properly
developing their own resources”, however if through union “the whole strength of Canada
was  drawn  out  and  organized,  instead  of  being  an  embarrassment  and  a  source  of
weakness and anxiety at such a moment as this, she would add tenfold to the strength of
this country.”332 Indeed, as the US was now emerging as a rival naval power it was more
pressing than ever to consolidate the possession of the valuable naval bases and resources
of the Atlantic Provinces, and the St Lawrence River. Conversely, if British North America fell
to a victorious North, dominant and secure across the whole continent, the strength of the
US army would become virtually redundant – except in conjunction with a powerful navy.
Adderley  stated  that;  “it  was  the  interest  of  England  to  maintain  the  North  American
Provinces as an independent Power ... England was a great maritime nation, and in that
quarter of the world would gain a great accession of strength by an alliance with the Maritime
Provinces of North America, which we ought not to allow to accrue to the United States.” 
The intention therefore was the development of a great, friendly, quasi-independent
state to help keep in  check Federal  power  in  the region and beyond.  Allegiance to this
greater North continental nation would instil a wider sense of community, importance and
pride in British North America. Not only would this increased sense of national status make
the people more committed to its protection, but the greater the dissociation with Britain, in
theory the less hostility would be felt to and from the United States. Thus Gladstone believed
that “the true aim of all our measures at this important juncture should be to bring the people
of the North American colonies, regarded in one mass, as nearly to a national sentiment and
position as their relation to the British Crown will permit.” 
The St Albans raid and the responsibility for defence
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Lyons knew in the build up to the presidential contest that the North would again play
on anti-British feeling, writing to Russell that “we must be prepared for demonstrations of a
‘spirited  foreign  policy’  by  Mr.  Seward  during  the  next  fortnight,  for  electioneering
purposes.”333 Lincoln’s re-election confirmed that the war would be prosecuted vigorously
until  a victorious Federal conclusion.  In the interim however further crises with the North
occurred which gave rise to fears beyond Seward’s ‘spirited foreign policy’, and which added
to the urgency of addressing continental union and security at the planned conference on
confederation. Indeed, mid-way through the proceedings at Charlottetown the most serious
security crisis for the provinces since the  Trent  affair occurred, when Confederate raiders
used Canada as a base for launching an attack on the banks of St Albans, Vermont. Their
main goal, to provoke an armed American response into British North America and therefore
drag Britain into the war against the North, initially showed signs of succeeding. The Federal
Commander called to the town, General Dix, had ordered his troops to pursue the raiders
across  the  border  into  Canada  if  necessary.  The  Times called  General  Dix’s  order  “a
declaration of  war against  Canada.” 334 Monck wrote to Lyons concerned that  the orders
apparently issued by General Dix had “appeared uncontradicted in the public papers and
contains express orders on the part of an official of the U.S for the entry of the troops of that
power upon the territory of Her Majesty.” Monck therefore urged that the political and army
chiefs  in  the US attempt to seize control  of  the situation,  writing to Lyons “I’m sure Mr.
Seward  will  ...  see that  it  is  necessary  in  order  for  the maintenance of  these amicable
relations that no act should be done by any civil or military officer of the U.S which might
bear the construction of ...  an infraction of the rights of Her Majesty or a violation of the soil
of Her dominions and he will believe that this remonstrance is made in no unfriendly spirit
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and is prompted by a sincere desire to prevent any just cause of complaint between the
countries.” 
The Governor General therefore believed it his duty to ask Lyons to “bring the subject
under the notice of the Secretary of State of the U.S with the view that the order may be
disavowed  or  explained.”335 Lyons  passed  on  to  this  request  to  Seward;  however  the
Secretary  of  State’s  first  letter  however  was  simply  a  request  for  the  suspects  to  be
extradited for trial in Vermont. Believing in ‘mobocratic’ rule, again the imperial government
feared the general belligerent feeling in the public and press would make it impossible for
Washington to maintain peace. The concern was sustained by Seward’s own comments and
further reports from Monck in Canada. Lyons informed the Foreign Office that the Secretary
of State himself had alluded to this potential inability to restrain popular feeling, writing that
Seward “said it  would be impossible to resist the pressure which would be put upon the
government  ...  if  these  incursions  from  Canada  continued.”336 The  Canadian  Governor
General too communicated to Lyons an extract from the New York Post which stated that
“either the Canadian authorities should be called on to send the rebels, who are getting up
predatory enterprise against  us, out of Canada,  or we should have armed forces on the
frontier  ready to take summary vengeance on these marauders, and for that purpose to
follow them, as we have a right to do, across the lines, if the pursuit is instant.” This danger
was temporarily diffused when the Federal Government officially countermanded the order. 
The administrative powers possessed by the British colonies however continued to
risk drawing Britain into war with the US. Following a hearing in December a Canadian court
ruled that the Vermont raiders be freed. Pro-Confederate feeling in the province had helped
harbour the guerrillas and was potentially serving to protect them. Lyons stated that the affair
was perpetrated not by British North Americans but by “rebels, secessionists, of whom there
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are great numbers in Halifax.”337 Seward had written that if the raiders were released Lyons
could expect “spirited, hasty, popular proceedings for self-defence and retaliation.”338 Monck
was  panicked  by  the  prospect  that  the  US would  have  no  choice  but  to  seek  redress
themselves.  The depth of  Monck’s  concern was displayed in  the memoir  of  his  wife on
December  13,  a  night  when  the  Governor  General  was  entertaining  key  figures  in  the
Canadian ministry. Lady Monck wrote that “When the dinner was nearly over, the G.G was
mysteriously called out.” On taking his leave Monck said sorrowfully “I suppose this is an
invasion of the Yankees.” It turned out to be a false alarm and Monck urged Burnley, who
had stepped in as British Minister  in Washington in the absence of Lyons, to attempt to
conciliate Seward. Monck wrote to Burnley of the court’s decision on “grounds so absurd that
I cannot account for it” and to “convey my annoyance at what has happened with reference
to the Vermont raiders; and inform him that I shall do everything I can to remedy the effect of
Judge Coursol’s proceedings.”339 This increased the feeling of iniquity in Britain, in the sense
that the provinces exercised the power of the law, yet  refused to exercise the power of
national defence. 
In the aftermath of the St Albans raid furthermore the policies adopted by the Federal
government suggested a genuine threat  to British North America.  Alarmingly  Lyons was
notified that due to the tension caused by Confederate activities in Canada the United States
was  temporarily  placing  armed  vessels  on  the  lakes,  thus  abrogating  the  Rush-Bagot
agreement. Derby questioned the Foreign Secretary over the issue stating that “they have, in
violation of the treaty, placed a force upon the Lakes, which menace the security of Canada,
and they have not given, so far as I am aware, any reasons which might seem to render
necessary the infraction of the solemn conditions of the treaty.” Russell had to respond that
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the measure was “temporary” and “justified” to provide security given the trouble emanating
from the St Albans and Chesapeake affairs, and the seizure of United States vessels on
Lake Eerie.340 Further indication of hostility came with Lincoln’s directive on December 17
that passports be required on entering the US. As with the placing of vessels on the lakes,
Britain’s acquiescence in the measure for the sake of security helped to placate the Union.
Russell said of the measure that “if the effect should be to check the Canadian tendency to
favour the insurgents, there would be little harm in that.” Shortly after Russell had a note
forwarded to Seward that he had addressed to Mason and Slidell  in London, stating that
Confederate activity in British North America must cease, and suggested it  be forwarded
from Washington to Lee and Stephens in Virginia. Monck’s strong line in condemning the
raid and the British North Americans who protected them also helped smooth diplomacy
Seward thanking Burnley for “Lord Monck’s extremely energetic and conciliatory policy.”341 
In the provinces themselves at least St Albans had something of a galvanising effect.
Southerners had selected Canada for its proximity to the Northern States and had been
assisted by Confederate sympathisers therein. In previous crises, whether by transporting
Confederate emissaries across the channel or by allowing ships to be fitted for Southern use
in English ports, the colonies could ascribe the danger to British actions. In the present affair
the imperial government had played no role. The provinces therefore could not continue to
claim that military threat would arise solely  from British policy and dismiss it  as Britain’s
responsibility to deal with.342 This had a direct bearing on the resolutions of the conference
pertaining  to  colonial  defence.  Encouraged  by  the  progress  made  at  Charlottetown,  a
second conference was scheduled to be held in October at  Quebec.  From this  meeting
came the 72 resolutions, later called the ‘Quebec Scheme’, which ultimately came to form
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the basis of British North American confederation. One of these resolutions explicitly stated
that following confederation local security would be provided by the new central government.
This was Article no. 67 reading “All engagements that may before the Union be entered into
with  the Imperial  Government  for  the  defence  of  the  Country  shall  be  assumed by  the
General Government.”343 Key to Britain’s acceptance of the plan was this shift in the burden
of defence. Of the Quebec Scheme Monck wrote “the advantages whether looked at from
the point of view of administration, commerce or defence appear to me so obvious that it
would be a waste of time to state them.”344 Taking his lead from notes made on the scheme
by Monck, Cardwell had only two relatively minor quibbles with the scheme’s 72 resolutions.
One was with who would rest the right of pardon, Cardwell preferring to maintain the imperial
prerogative  by  having  it  vested  in  the  Governor-General.  The  other  was  the  potential
stalemate that could occur in the proposed Legislative Council, based as it would be on fixed
numbers and life membership - this type of deadlock in the existing Canadian parliament
being one of the major reasons necessitating change.
Legislative Union and Security
The more general imperial reservation however remained the preference for strong
legislative union over the derided ‘mobocratic’ federal structure now put forward. The Civil
War offered Britain a stark warning against a system that left too much power and impetus in
the hands of local, regional bodies.345 More importantly the security dilemmas bought on by
the conflict  in  the United States rendered this  element  critical.  The imperial  government
supported  confederation  as  a  means  of  relieving  itself  of  its  own  commitments  on  the
continent  -  particularly  in  shedding  its  obligations  on  defence  -  therefore  the  newly
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constructed central government had to be sufficiently strong and unitary to protect the whole.
From Britain’s perspective therefore the federal system threatened to compromise one of the
main rationales for unification. MacDonnell in Nova Scotia expressed the fear that in this
loose decentralised state while still under the imperial umbrella, the new federation would
remain  a burden and a  danger  to Britain.  The combination  of  weak provincial  authority
coupled with the connection to Britain would tempt American attack and necessitate huge
imperial  military  resources.  MacDonnell  wrote  that  the  proposed  system  of  government
came “with a similar complicated system of checks and counter-checks, the whole being just
sufficiently linked by the Governor-General to Great Britain to invite aggression from without
and justify demands on resources from the latter.”346
Furthermore this negated the great hope that confederation would turn in Britain’s
favour the balance of power on the continent. Indeed, for MacDonnell the federal structure
doomed the possibility  that British North America might found a nation as illustrious and
powerful as the mother country. The Lieutenant Governor wrote 
As one who had been sanguine enough to look for  the creation of
sufficient mutual confidence and the display of sufficient self-sacrificing spirit
amongst the statesmen of these Provinces on which to found in America a
real ‘New Britain of the West’, I am sorely disappointed at learning that so
pleasing a hope has ended in a proposal to establish a mere Confederation of
States, with every local demarcation strictly preserved, with petty Governors
and  Legislatures  almost  on  the  model  of  the  neighbouring  Republic,  and
unavoidably containing similar  elements of discord and dispute as to State
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Gordon  too,  remaining  highly  critical  of  the  parochial  nature  of  his  provincial
assembly members, wrote lengthy dispatches to Cardwell criticising the scheme’s adoption
of the federal principle over the infinitely more sound foundation of a legislative union.348
Gordon suggested that Britain should reject the Quebec Scheme and instead bestow all
power in a new central authority over the provinces’ heads. Gordon told Cardwell that “if the
British North American Provinces were united by Act of Parliament, or by Royal Charter, and
a General  Legislature  constituted,  that  General  Legislature  might  be empowered by  the
Act ... to confer on Local Legislatures such powers as it is now sought to secure for them by
the Resolutions of the Conference.”349 Like Russell,  Gordon was proposing a measure of
coercion in order to achieve a union legislative in nature, arguing that the local legislatures
should be disenfranchised, not because of any opposition to regional power per se, but from
of a conviction that the principle must be established which would assert the primacy of the
central over the provincial. He stressed this to Cardwell “I care little for the amount of powers
given, if the Central Legislature is the source from which they emanate: but I think almost
any  sacrifice  is  desirable  which  would  break  the  continuity  between  the  independent
Legislatures of the past and the Local Legislatures of the future.”350 It was felt imperative to
give a clear indication of the strength of the new central authority, the local governments
being unwilling to give up sufficient power; Gordon was advocating that such powers should
be passed down by the Sovereign instead. Careworn from his experience of the difficulties
during the Trent crisis and the petty politics of his legislature, Gordon’s concern was with the
establishment of a durable national power, signing off, “I write this despatch in great haste,









Reconciling the Federal Structure
At  the  helm  however,  reservations  over  the  federal/legislative  imbalance  to  the
scheme were overruled by pragmatism and realism. The Colonial Office acknowledged that
the formidable obstacles they faced to accomplishing a strong legislative union came from
the parochialism of the Maritime Provinces, and still more problematically the autonomous
desires of the French speaking community of Lower Canada. Under-secretary Sir Frederick
Rogers wrote that “the great difficulty is to arrange for a real union of the five provinces ... on
terms which shall make the central or federal legislation really dominant, so as to make one
body politic  of  the whole,  and yet  to provide security to the French Canadians that  this
dominancy would not be used to swamp their religion and habits.”352 In the Foreign Office
Russell realised that in order to accomplish confederation quickly special dispensation would
have to be given either  to  the Maritime Provinces or  to  the French Canadians  or  both.
Tellingly Russell was prepared to use not only compromise but even coercion to bring this
about. In a directive to Cardwell, the Foreign Secretary summed the matter up thus, “The
question  will  be,  whether  the  Maritime Provinces  should  be coerced in  order  to  form a
federal union, or whether the governor of Lower Canada should be forced to consent to a
legislative union, all their separate privileges and laws being secured to them in the Act of
Union. I incline to the latter plan.”353 Russell therefore, while preferring the implementation of
a tight legislative system, was prepared to yield either by enacting protective laws for the
French  Canadians  or  by  accepting  the  federal  principle  completely.  Despite  Russell’s
inclination towards his latter plan - a legislative union with unique mechanisms for French
Canadian self-governance -  Cardwell  recognised that,  with the Quebec Scheme already
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virtually  assured  passage  through  the  Canadian  legislature  (the  conference  and  its
resolutions having been driven by a coalition of the main parties), the far safer and faster
route was to bank on this acceptance as the basis of confederation. They would therefore
proceed under  the federal  principle,  if  necessary  overcoming  resistance in  the  Maritime
Provinces where leaders still needed to garner support from opposition parties. 
Gordon continued to petition for legislative union arguing that the multi-culturalism of
Lower  Canada  need  not  prove  insurmountable  to  achieving  it.  In  a  further  dispatch  to
Cardwell he appealed to the British example to show that it was possible. Gordon wrote,
“Scotland, like Lower Canada, has its own laws, its own Church and even in a manner its
own currency: but although all these are at the absolute mercy of the Imperial Parliament,
common sense and justice have sufficed to prevent any such assaults upon the peculiar
institutions of that portion of the United Kingdom as would be repugnant to the feelings of its
inhabitants.”354 Despite Gordon’s strength of feeling, the two cases diverged significantly for
several reasons. For one the Acts of Union in England and Scotland had followed nearly a
century  of  failed  previous  attempts,  a  time-frame  now  unacceptable  to  the  imperial
government.  Also in this instance there were not one but four minority groups that were
required to entrust the safekeeping of their institutions to the central authority, for in addition
to the Lower Canadians, the people and political culture of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and
Prince Edward Island also had to be factored in. Moreover unlike England in the Act of Union
with Scotland, Upper Canada would itself come to form a minority in the unified whole.
Cardwell  also  received  encouraging  dispatches  from  Lord  Monck  which  helped
reconcile him to that part of the Quebec Scheme. Monck wrote to reassure the Colonial
Secretary that while confederation must by necessity be entered into on federal lines, the
new nation would eventually evolve into that legislative union which Britain desired. Indeed,
Canada’s Governor General had already begun planning political manoeuvres to bring this
354
 CO 880, vol. 14, Gordon to Cardwell, 11 October 1864.
200
about. In one critique of the Quebec scheme, Monck had feared an anomaly if the colonial
architects persisted in having a ‘local administrator’, meaning a provincial legislature, in the
same  province  of  the  union  in  which  the  seat  of  the  central  government  was  to  be
established, in this case Upper Canada. Monck thought it better that the legislature should
be dispensed with in Upper Canada, and that the members returned from that province to
the central  government  should  by default  also  become the “local  authority”  to  deal  with
matters purely  Upper Canadian.  Ironically  enough,  to support  this  point  Monck cited the
precedent of the United States - that example which many were so desperate to avoid –
noting  that  the  District  of  Columbia,  home of  the  US capital,  was  governed  directly  by
Federal  authorities  in  Washington.  Monck  believed  that  a  recreation  of  this  American
template in British North America would ultimately assist in updating the new confederation
from a federal model into the legislative one that the imperial government preferred. Monck
wrote to Cardwell that, “I look upon this Confederation scheme, as it is called, as only a
transition state.  I  hope that  before many more years elapse it  may become a complete
Legislative Union, and I think this consummation would be facilitated and hastened, if one of
the sections, and that the most important and powerful, were already in all respects directly
ruled by the Central  authority.”355 Crucially  Monck believed he could  bring his  Canadian
subjects to agree to these changes, but required time to do so. Knowing that Brown was in
London as he wrote, Monck urged Cardwell not to disclose his sentiments to the Canadian
who, as ‘a Toronto man’, might immediately oppose the dissolution of the Upper Canadian
legislature.
Exerting pressure to pass Confederation
This latest protestation made no impact on Cardwell who aimed to motivate Gordon
by impressing on him that the cabinet unanimously  supported the scheme. The Colonial
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Secretary wrote “I think I may safely assure you that they are one and all most anxious to
promote the end in view, that they will allow no obstacle to prevent it, if those obstacles can
be surmounted: and that if there are provisions which they do not entirely approve, they will
be  very slow to consider  those provisions  as rising  to the magnitude of  insurmountable
obstacles.” The Colonial Secretary told Gordon therefore “I fully expect that I shall soon have
to instruct you in their name to promote the scheme of the Delegates to the utmost of your
power ... here there is but one desire, which is to prosecute to the utmost the work in which
you are engaged.”356 Gladstone had heard from Argyle that “This confederation of the N. Am.
British Provinces is (of) and immense significance and an immense surprise ... I trust it may
succeed. It will be as great a benefit to us as to the colonies themselves.”357 According to
Gladstone  in  terms of  uniting  the  colonies  Britain  should  assist  “by  every  means  in  its
power.”
Brown had arrived in London and was present when Gordon’s polemic was relayed
to the Colonial Office, giving the government an early opportunity to show their resolve in
making confederation a reality.358 That the passing of confederation had become critical was
evident from Britain’s assurance that they would quash the recalcitrance displayed by their
representatives in the Maritime Provinces. The Canadian was left in no doubt that Cardwell
would not prevaricate and intended union to take place along the lines already drawn up at
Quebec.  The  under-secretary  informed Brown that  “the  dispatch  going  out  on  Saturday
would settle it completely and if not Mr. Cardwell would not hesitate to see that the cordial
aid of  all  the Governors was given to the scheme.”359 The Colonial  Office’s  treatment of
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Brown  also  indicated  the  unequivocal  imperial  backing  for  the  Quebec  scheme.  Brown
informed MacDonald that “Our scheme has given prodigious satisfaction here. The Ministry,
the  Conservatives  and  the  Manchester  men  are  all  delighted  with  it  –  and  everything
Canadian has gone up in public estimation immensely.” Tellingly Brown noted how in the
many gala receptions he was invited to he was treated much as a foreign ambassador or
dignitary,  indicating  the  British  resolve  to  see  established  a  new  pseudo-independent
national state. Writing to his wife about how he and the confederation scheme were received
Brown wrote “nothing could be more laudatory. It outdoes anything that ever went to any
British colony – praises our statesmanship, discretion, loyalty and so on.”360 On December
22, Brown wrote to MacDonald that “there is a manifest desire in almost every quarter that
ere long the British American colonies should shift  for themselves and in some quarters
evident regret that we did not declare at once for independence.”361
The degree of responsible government entrusted to the provinces was such that the
matter ultimately resided with their colonial parliaments, who themselves might be forced to
take the question to a general plebiscite. Cardwell knew that the first piece of imperial weight
added was by ensuring that the British representatives in the provinces do their utmost to
promote the Quebec Scheme. He therefore sent a circular memo to Monck, MacDonnell and
Gordon stating even more unequivocally that all shades of opinion in Britain were unanimous
on confederation. Cardwell wrote that “it is the earnest desire of the Government that the
plan may succeed; and I think public opinion is undivided about it.”362 The memo made it
clear that, notwithstanding any personal reservations they may have, confederation was the
official policy of the imperial government and the Governor Generals should to impress the
cause of  the  Quebec Resolutions  on their  respective  provinces.  The Colonial  Secretary
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devised a further tactic with Brown and Monck however. It was agreed between the three
that when the new parliamentary session opened in British North America, the Canadian
legislature should  be the first  to assemble,  as its  expected endorsement of  the Quebec
Scheme might help smooth its passage in the Maritime Provinces where the result was less
certain.363
Summary
Since the very outset of the Civil War the presence of British North America along the
US  border  had  led  to  a  multitude  of  accidental  and  sometimes  deliberate  breaches  of
neutrality, constantly threatening an escalation of the conflict into the provinces. During 1863
the danger had stemmed not only been from the provinces but from also from shipbuilding
taking place in England for use as Confederate warships and disputes over British sailors
accused of running the blockade. Whereas before the great fear surrounding these issues
was that Seward would manipulate them for use as a cassu-belli,  the British government
now worried that  the Secretary of  State had been overtaken by still  more powerful  and
malevolent forces in the cabinet.
This was especially so as the Federal army and navy had now expanded beyond all
recognition in size and strength from that which they had been at the outset. In appearing to
be  forging  a  new  great  military  power  founded  on  the  abhorred  power-hungry  and
mobocratic US republicanism, the Civil War had threatened to realise the intense antebellum
British fear of US hegemony over North America. Over the previous year Britain had toyed
with intervening to make reality Southern independence as a counterweight to this power,
however the progress of the Civil War now made this prospect fraught with new dangers and
complexities. Having spurned the South’s advances for so long the chance existed that the
Confederacy might separate without friendship established with Britain, rendering it difficult
to address slavery in the new Southern nation.
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Economically, forcing the Confederacy to win its own war had necessitated the South
creating its own industry and manufactures, threatening to make it  a commercial  rival of
Britain  as much as a partner.  From a strategic  viewpoint  too this  held out  the alarming
prospect  of  British  North  America  facing  an  onslaught  from  the  North  without  Britain
receiving assistance from the South, and even put the British West Indies under threat from
the Confederacy. In 1864 therefore the continental balance-of-power had reached a most
critical juncture with the British provinces remaining inherently weak. Efforts made both to
delegate the burden of security to the provinces and establish a new continental power out
of them had as a result  continued to intensify. Britain’s policy on accomplishing this had
settled on colonial  union,  leading to a strong endorsement of  a provincial  conference at
Charlottetown to discuss its terms.
CHAPTER 7
THE FINAL SECURITY CRISIS, 1864-65
Confederation or withdraw
Having  agreed that  the Canadian  legislature  would  assemble  first  with  a  view to
passing  the  Quebec  Scheme,  should  its  passage  fail  the  alternative  remained  the
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replacement of their legislative system with a new federal arrangement for Upper and Lower
Canada. While in London to promote the plan, Brown exhibited confidence that the imperial
cabinet would consent, writing to McDonald that “If we insist on it, they will put the scheme
through just as we ask it.” 364 By July the Colonial Secretary wrote to Monck that “I cannot
undertake to ask the Imperial Parliament for its sanction of any scheme which does not unite
all  British  North  America  in  one  government.”365 The  home  government  were  therefore
increasingly  determined to implement the larger union,  and now explicitly  threatened the
provinces’ abandonment if  it  was not accepted.  Adderley argued that before the Quebec
Scheme was voted upon in the provincial legislatures it should be made clear that, in the
event of its rejection,  British North America could not expect the imperial  government to
continue to prop up its defence. Adderley said “these Provinces were very much mistaken if
they thought that by holding back from Confederation they would continue to receive from
England the same support in men and supplies as before.” Adderly informed Cardwell that
he “would tell them plainly that there never would be a Minister in this country strong enough
to induce the House of Commons, after an opportunity of independence had been offered, to
vote supplies for their special purposes, and the sooner they gave up any such idea the
better.”366 It was therefore insinuated that if the provinces wished to maintain imperial military
support they must now show their willingness to contribute to the upkeep of their national
security. On 21 January 1865 Cardwell sent Monck a despatch stating that Britain wished to
postpone negotiations on defence until after confederation had taken place. 
The home government also saw a need to extricate itself from what might be a vastly
increased  commitment.  This  was  because  the  course  of  the  Civil  War  and  increasing
evidence  of  Union  victory  panicked  Canadian  officials  into  now putting  forward extreme
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defence measures which would be expensive and impractical to implement. The Canadian
government desired gunboats to be placed on the lakes, which Cardwell could not allow in
peacetime as it would contravene the 1817 agreement. Equally the government would not
commit  military  resources  to  local  defence  when  in  the  event  of  war  they  would  in  all
likelihood be required for operations elsewhere.  The Colonial Secretary wrote to Monck that
“if that worst of all calamities, a War with the United States shall break out, we must be free
to  dispose  of  the  Navy  &  the  Army  according  to  the  exigencies  of  that  terrible  time,
unembarrassed by any precise stipulations like these.”367 The Canadians moreover wanted
additional imperial funding to improve the land defences. The provincial delegation desired
the imperial government to guarantee a loan which would then enable an act to be passed in
the Canadian legislature for fortifications to be built west of Montreal. Britain, still holding out
for a solid commitment from the province before allotting expense however, demanded the
reverse, Cardwell  asking for the assembly to reach agreement on the scheme and then
request the loan. Cardwell wrote to Palmerston of the Canadian’s now extensive defence
proposals stating that “I hope that when we meet for the transaction of business they may
not press their impossible demands.”368 This would mean further standoff and potential delay
to achieving British North American union. It was becoming increasingly pressing to take
some measures towards defence immediately.  Thus having desired to postpone defence
talks until arrangements had been made for union, the progress of the Civil War placed the
imperial  government  in  a  quandary  as  the  Union’s  ever  increasing  grip  on  the  South
rendered inaction dangerous.
This progress was causing as great concern in Britain and now Canada. Sherman’s
devastation  of  the  Southern  heartland  and  Lee’s  inability  to  launch  a  counter-attack  in
Virginia forced upon them the sense that hostilities could soon be ended, at which point the
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continent would then lay at the mercy of the Federal Army known to number in the millions.
Still  smarting from the Schleswig-Holstein crisis British statesmen even at this late stage
would not rule out that the North and South would undergo reconciliation partly by joining
forces against the North American provinces, much as Austria and Prussia had done against
the Danes. Fitzgerald highlighted that “why, it was only last year that we had the spectacle of
two  great  military  Powers  of  Europe,  who  had  objects  of  their  own  to  gain—thinking,
moreover,  thereby  to  establish  concord  between  themselves—turning  upon  a  third  and
defenceless Power and committing acts of violence and spoliation which will ever redound to
their  shame.”369 This  moreover was not  just  irrational  paranoia.  Part  of  a  despatch from
Seward had become widely circulated which advocated “a postponement of the question of
separation,  upon  which  the  war  is  waged,  and  a  mutual  direction  of  the  efforts  of  the
Government, as well as those of the insurgents, to some extrinsic policy or scheme for a
season, during which passions might be expected to subside, and the armies be reduced,
and trade and intercourse between people of both sections be resumed.”370 The fears were
also  sustained  by  rumours  that  during  Lincoln’s  aborted  peace  talks  with  Alexander
Stephens, the Confederate Secretary of State for War, one of the delegates had proposed a
joint  third  party  war  on  France  or  Britain.371 By  this  time  moreover,  reconciliation  or
otherwise, Britain was faced with the prospect it had looked on with trepidation throughout
the preceding years,  that  the South would  be conquered and Union troops freed up for
operations  elsewhere.  Palmerston  therefore  warned  the  Queen  of  “the  probability  that,
whenever the Civil war in America shall be ended, the Northern States will make demands
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imperial  government  by  its  representatives  in  the  provinces.  In  a  series  of  key
communications  between  Gordon  and  his  confidant  Gladstone  the  Lieutenant  Governor
wrote to the Chancellor that “the conquest of the South (which appears imminent) will be
followed by a war with England ...war here will very speedily follow peace there.”373
The Fenian fears
Insecurity over the American Irish population also intensified towards the end of the
conflict. The final three months of the war began with a note of caution from Palmerston to
Somerset which stated “The warnings of eventual hostility on the part of the United States
are not to be disregarded, and the Irish Fenians in North America would give us trouble in
Ireland if we had war with America.”374 The great problem now was that even if, as appeared
increasingly  unlikely,  the Confederacy became independent,  the remainder  of  the Union
would, militarily if not industrially and economically, emerge far stronger and more powerful
than it had been with the South before the war. This made the hostility towards Britain even
more concerning, particularly with the fenian influence in the North. Bright stated: 
Do not for a moment believe that because the United States are in this
great calamity—out of which they still will come a great nation—do not believe
for a moment that acts like these can be forgotten now, or forgotten hereafter.
There  are  people  in  America  interested  apparently  in  creating  ill-feeling
towards England. There are two millions of Irishmen in America, and wherever
an Irishman plants his foot on any foreign country there stands an enemy of
England.375 
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The New York Herald too was quoted in the Index stating 
In six months at the furthest, this unhappy rebellion will be bought to a
close.  We shall  then have an account  to settle with the Governments that
have either outraged us by active sympathy and aid which they have afforded
them. Let France and England beware how they swell up this catalogue of
wrongs. By the time specified we shall have unemployed a veteran army of
close upon a million of the finest troops in the world, with whom we shall be in
a position not only to drive the French out of Mexico and to annex Canada,
but,  by  the  aid  of  our  powerful  navy,  even  to  return  the  compliment  of
intervention in European affairs. 
Illinois Senator Lovejoy threatened that they would aid and support Irish, French Canadian
and  chartist  rebellion  against  England.  Russell  was  somewhat  embarrassed when even
forced to respond to rumours that following Lincoln’s March inauguration Britain would only
acknowledge him as ‘President of the Northern States.’
Military  security  therefore  had  to  be  addressed  alongside  the  question  of
confederation. The basis for defence was the second report compiled by Colonel Jervois,
laid before parliament in February 1865.  Jervois’s report indicated that the British threat of
pulling out unless union was achieved was calculated to reverse the inaction of local people
towards defence. It was observed “that the prospect of the withdrawal of the imperial forces
from the western districts in accordance with instructions from this country previous to the
confederation movement, has a depressing effect upon the efforts that are being made for
the improvement  of  the organization  of  the  militia  of  those districts.”  The report  argued
however that under the prospective danger regular troops should be maintained to protect
the key military positions in the east of the province, both in terms of sustaining a defence
and in providing an evacuation point if that defence should go awry. Indeed, the need to buy
time applied  to defence on the ground itself,  as the initial  Federal  onslaught  risked the
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annihilation  of  whatever  troops  stood  to  meet  them.  It  was  for  this  reason  that  Jervois
advanced the importance of bringing the fortifications into to an effective state, reporting that
“It is at the commencement of a war that the greatest danger is to be apprehended; and it is
submitted that ... only ... fortifications ... can provide against our troops being overpowered at
the first onset, or that time can be obtained for rendering the militia available for the defence
of the country.” Jervois’s argument therefore was that imperial troops, with fixed defences to
enable them to absorb the opening blow, had a vital role to play as a rallying point and core
for the local militia forces to supplement. 
The cities on the St Lawrence were the crucial hubs to at least give the breathing
space on the ground in Canada for Britain’s overarching naval strategy to take effect. Jervois
identified that “The positions of greatest military importance in the country are Montreal and
Quebec”. Quebec was vital as a conduit with the mother county, “the first point of military
communication between Canada and Great Britain, and the point to which the British forces
must  retire,  if  overpowered.”  Montreal  was  key  “because  being  at  the  head  of  the  sea
navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  focus  of  all  communication  by  land  and  water
between the eastern and western districts ...  it  is the commercial and strategic capital of
Canada, and, from its position on the frontier, is moreover the point upon which the enemy
could most readily make a grand attack.” This defence in turn therefore relied on imperial
naval  superiority.  The report  concluded “With those two points  placed in  a condition  for
defence, and the river between Montreal and Quebec commanded by iron-plated vessels, a
successful resistance could be made to any attempt to subjugate the country, so long as
Great Britain had the command of the sea.” With the current pressure making the provincial
government more willing to participate in the defence measures  the principle was agreed
that Britain would take responsibility for building the works at Quebec and maintain a body of
10,000  troops to  help  drill  the  75,000-strong Canadian  militia  while  Canada  themselves
would undertake the fortifying of Montreal.376 Cardwell justified the division as such “We think
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that is a right division;  that the position which is the gate of Canada, through which the
military and naval forces of England are to enter to defend Canada, should be fortified by the
mother country; and that Montreal, the strategic and commercial capital of Canada, should
be fortified at the expense of the Canadians themselves.”377 The next problem however was
gaining support for the measures with the public and with parliament. Indeed,  The Times
stated in February 1865 that “When the public hear of Canadian defences, they experience
nothing but a feeling of uneasiness and perplexity.”378
The debates on the fortification scheme
The imperial government bought the proposals for the fortifications at Quebec into
Parliament the same month. Paradoxically however, the issues at stake were felt so serious
that it threatened to stifle the debate itself. The underlying fear was so prevalent that it was
worried  that  even having  the debate  itself  threatened  to bring  on American aggression.
When Derby rose to speak in the upper chamber he gave the prefix: “My Lords, I feel the
present state of our relations with the Federal States of America to be so critical that for my
own  part  I  should  have  been  desirous  of  maintaining  an  absolute  silence”  though  the
opposition leader wished to “leave to Her Majesty's Government the responsibility of dealing
with  this  difficult  and delicate  question,  lest  any interference on our  part  should  tend to
increase the difficulty of their task.” 379 Almost to a man, every speaker who rose between
February and May 1865 did so by initially expressing a strong conciliatory message to what
he hoped would be future peaceful  relations between Britain and the United States. The
issue was compounded by doubts about the chances of defending Canada even with the
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new  fortifications  installed.  Opponents  of  the  government’s  plan  harboured  strong
reservations about holding 1500 miles of border which might be assailed from numerous
points and which was isolated from Britain geographically. As Lord Elcho put it, “there was
an  instinct  which  told  everyone  that  such  a  country  as  Canada,  with  a  population  of
2,500,000 persons and an extended frontier could not be defended by England, which was
4,000 miles distant, against America, furnished with all the munitions and requisites for war,
and  also  with  railways  capable  of  transporting  at  any  moment  those  munitions  to  the
Canadian frontier” and that “Not even with the assistance of England was it  possible for
Canada to defend herself against America.” 380 
Indeed, opponents of the government’s proposals – refuting Jervois’s conclusions -
called on other military experts to argue that British North America could not be held. One
was Major Anson whose own distinguished service record included action in the Crimea,
China,  and  the  Indian  Mutiny.  Anson  moreover  had  accompanied  General  George
McClellan’s army as an observer early in the war and knew the country of Canada well.
Anson believed “that Canada in a military point of view and in the sense pointed out by
Colonel Jervois, and adopted by the Government, was utterly and entirely indefensible.”381
Indeed,  as tokenistic  as they  were accused of  being,  the  argument  was made that  the
government’s  measures threatened merely  to  provide an irresistible  allure  to  Americans
tempted by an easy win. It was argued for example that “Surely it stood to common sense
that  a little  British army stationed there,  3,000 miles away from its base,  would seem a
glittering bait to American ambition.” 
Defenders of the fortification scheme argued the reverse however, finding it absurd to
believe that by refraining to defend Canada the province would be made safer. Questioning
“that the presence of ... regular troops would be nothing but a temptation to the Americans to
380




make war in Canada for the sake of the honour and glory to be acquired by their defeat or
capture” one proponent of the measures therefore asked “was there no temptation on the
other side of the account, supposing the ... advice be taken and every red coat withdrawn
from British North America? Surely by withholding British forces from North America the
United States would be allured by the prospect of an even more simple campaign to annex
the provinces.”382 In terms of the logistical problem of waging war so far from home, there
were also defiant counter-arguments. Sir Frederick Smith, whose own military experience
went as far back as service in the Napoleonic Wars, claimed that he had never heard “an old
term so much abused as was ‘the base of operations’.” Smith asked “Where was General
Sherman's base of operations when he marched through Georgia and Carolina? Our base of
operations in respect of the defence of Canada must, of course, be on the other side the
Atlantic. Our base of operations would be at Halifax, where our stores would be collected.”383
A further report on defence, conducted by Arthur Simmons, argued war on land should be
almost exclusively  carried on by colonial  troops, whichever part  of  the empire they were
drawn  from.  Simmons  even  suggested  assembling  an  invasion  party  from  India  and
Australia which would be cheaper than deploying British regulars, arguing that:
probably the most effective means of attacking the United States, and
carrying war into her territories, would be by a well-planned expedition from
India, in which Her Majesty’s Indian subjects could be employed with effect
without drawing on her European subjects, who are more difficult to procure in
numbers and more costly to maintain. Her Majesty’s Australian subjects might
also be inclined to assist in such an enterprise, which would tend greatly to
the security of the rising cities on their coasts, and of their trade.384
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This issue also hinged on Jervois’s conviction however that witholding imperial troops
was inadvisable due to them being a focal point  from which the local  militia  could draw
strength, inspiration and guidance. The Captain in this respect emphasised the moral value
of British ground presence, as much if not more than the physical, writing “if the works now
recommended be constructed ...  the regular army would become a nucleus and support,
round which the people of Canada would rally to resist aggression, and to preserve that
connexion with the mother country which their loyalty, their interests, and their love of true
freedom alike make them desirous to maintain.”  
Jervois  had summed up this  dilemma to the imperial  government:  “The question
appears to be; - whether the British force now in Canada shall be withdrawn, in order to
avoid the risk of its defeat, or whether the necessary measures shall be taken to enable that
force to be of use for the defence of the province.” Palmerston, continuing to regard any
abandonment of empire as reprehensible - especially in the face of intimidation by the United
States - stood against the notion that a British military presence would do more to invite an
American attack than prevent  it,  arguing “Sir,  there is  no better  security  for  peace than
strength to resist  attack,  if  attack should  come.  That  is  no provocation.”385 The Colonial
Secretary defended the need to adopt Jervois’s recommendations by reiterating the policy
that conspicuous strength was the best basis for security. Cardwell stated that “whatever
may be the prospects —and I hope the prospect of relations between the United States and
Great Britain is not one in which we are obliged to see hostilities—it is not on the justice or
goodwill  of  any  other  country,  nor  on  the  forbearance  of  any  other  country,  we  are  to
calculate for our defence. It is on our own position, on our own inherent strength and means
of defence that we must ever rely.”386 
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Palmerston moreover vehemently stood by the government’s claim that British North
America  could  be successfully  defended and moreover  was not  alone in  his  conviction.
Disraeli  stood  up  for  the  fortification  scheme  and  rallied  against  those  who  doubted
Canada’s  defensibility  due to the problem of  holding the vast  border,  denying any such
necessity.  It was intoned, “When we are told it is impossible to defend a frontier of 1,500
miles,  I  ask  who  has  ever  requested you to  defend such a  frontier?  ...  Austria  has  an
immense frontier, but Austria does not defend it all. She takes care that when she is invaded
there shall be forts round which her troops can rally for her defence. That is all we wish to
see.”387 Indeed, the report confirmed exigent British appraisals that a wholesale defence of
the  province  was  unworkable,  and  therefore  sought  to  offset  a  total  capitulation  by
maintaining control of the St Lawrence. In addition to the fortifications therefore the report
highlighted  that  measures  would  have  to  be  taken  to  arm  the  river  and  enhance  the
communications. Summarising his report Jervois wrote that:
I observed that, although, owing to the length and nature of the frontier
of  Canada,  it  was impossible  to  protect  it  throughout  its  whole  extent,  an
enemy must nevertheless acquire possession of certain vital points before he
could  obtain  any  decided  military  advantage  ...  and  that,  if  proper
arrangements were made for the defence of those places by the construction
of  fortifications,  the  provision  of  gun-boats,  and  the  improvement  of
communications,  the militia  and volunteer  forces of  the country,  if  properly
organized,  and  aided  by  British  troops,  would  be  enabled  to  hold  those
positions during the period, (only about six months in the year), when military
operations on a large scale could be carried on against them.
The Divisiveness of the Measures
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Those who took the problems of North American defence to spell  ultimate British
capitulation therefore were accused of failing to distinguish between the tactical and strategic
and even the offensive and the defensive. Thus while Britain might have to fight a rearguard
action in Canada, it did not necessarily follow that it could not overwhelm the United States
elsewhere. Some statesmen therefore lost patience with the idea that Canada’s weakness
equalled Britain’s weakness. Alexander Kinglake, who not only was an MP but a historian in
the process of publishing an eight volume study of the Crimean War argued that “It was one
of  the  common mistakes  of  belligerents  to  confound  the  cause  of  the  quarrel  with  the
business of the war, while, in point of fact, they were quite distinct things.” Therefore while it
seemed inevitable that the United States would open hostilities in Canada, it was foolhardy
to accept this gauntlet and attempt to force a victorious result at such vulnerable point. An
effective analogy was made, contending that to limit the military focus to contesting Canada
rather than carrying the fight to the United States would be like an “unskilful boxer” who “put
his hands to the parts where he felt the blows instead of striking at the vital parts of his
adversary in return.”388 At the same time it  did not follow however that Canada must be
forsaken. This was especially the case as whatever the state of Canadian defence, the point
would remain that the province represented Britain and the empire. To the suggestion that
Britain should exclusively look to strike a blow at America and leave the Canadians to fend
for themselves General Peel contended 
There is ...  a great difference between not fighting another person's
battle and not fighting our own. It would be no question of our going to war for
Canada; but, that if war should be declared against us, and that Canada was
attacked on our account ...,  that we should assist  her to the utmost of our




deserving of being designated "foul weather policy" and "small talk" as that of
those who proclaim to the world that we do not intend to defend ourselves.389
While  it  was  agreed that  offensive  operations  should  be boldly  and aggressively
prosecuted against the United States therefore, honour dictated that Canadian defence must
not be neglected. As Kinglake put it, “We must do our worst elsewhere, but, at the same
time, we must do our best in Canada.”390 As a result the fortification plan remained crucial.
As Jervois’s recommendations and the government’s defence plan were being dissected
Kinglake issued a reprimand to the dissenters. He pointed out that the Colonel had merely
been carrying out  his remit  of surveying the conditions for local  defence, not  planning a
strategic offensive against the United States. Thus “The question put to Colonel Jervois had
been how best to defend Canada. If that gallant officer had been asked what, in the event of
war  between England and the United States,  would  be the best  policy  for  England,  his
Report  would  perhaps have contained different  matter.”391 Indeed,  while  the  survey was
primarily concerned with local security in Canada, Jervois had sounded a note of caution
about the difficulties that the Civil War had rendered over Britain’s main offensive strategy in
the event of war with the Union, the use of blockade. Given Federal progress the Captain
warned of the scale of blockading force Britain would require, especially in iron-plated ships.
The Colonel reported that “Considering the development of the American navy during the
present civil war, this blockade can only be maintained by powerful ships, capable of moving
at high speed, with a proportion of iron-clad vessels which could hold their own against the
iron-clad navy of  America.”  The report  compiled by Simmons also drew attention  to the
problems that might inflict upon the Royal Navy and therefore Britain’s ability to effectually
sustain both its offensive operations against US commerce, and its defensive duties in the
389






provinces. Garrisons and fortifications must also therefore be kept in a state of readiness at
the key naval stations in the provinces, the West Indies and Bermuda. Simmons wrote that
“without these fortified bases of operations off the coast of North America, a blockade would,
on  account  of  its  great  length  –  3,000  miles  –  and  distance  from England,  be  almost
impossible,  (even with  them it  would  be most  difficult),  and American ships  of  war  and
Alabamas would swarm; so that the operation of maintaining supplies and maintaining an
army in Canada, even when the navigation was not closed by the rigour of the climate,
would be attended with great risk and vast losses.”392 Again, the Civil War had engendered
and displayed the Federal ability, particularly with their growing iron-cased fleet, to carry vital
enemy harbours and ports.  Simmons conveyed that “The fall  of New Orleans, and more
lately that of Fort Fisher, has clearly shown, that in presence of the means of attack which in
the course of four years of war have been developed in America, works for the defence of
these dockyards must be of the most substantial character and of large extent, and that they
must be defended by numerous garrisons,  probably  not  much less than 15,000 men for
each.”
Under  the compelling  circumstances,  the £50,000 asked for  to begin the work at
Quebec was voted, however this bought on an entire fresh bout of controversy. As there was
such a clamour for the colonies to fund their own defence parliament would almost certainly
have baulked at a large appropriation for defence. However by doing the opposite and only
committing £50,000 Cardwell left himself and the government open to accusations on both
sides of the Atlantic of  selling the provinces short.  The government was therefore in an
invidious position. Indeed, when word reached Canada not simply of the amount to be spent
but  the debate  and bickering  needed  even to allot  that,  spirits  in  British  North  America
plummeted. In the Canadian legislature John A. MacDonald even told parliamentarians that
the reports must have a misprint and the actual amount intended was £500,000. This news
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in turn invited more censure on the home government. Firstly the imperial government was
accused of demoralising the British North Americans, and secondly Cardwell was exposed
to vicious questioning over whether he had misled the country on the agreement reached
with the Canadian ministers on the defence plans. Grey stepped in to argue that the £50,000
was merely an initial grant based on all the work that could be carried out in the coming year,
and that this figure would eventually raise to at least £200,000. This however then bought on
the question of whether, if the entire defences were not to be completed for a number of
years, they were any worth when the danger with the United States was said to be imminent.
Debate partly hinged on US intentions, and here the issue was clouded by argument
and counter-argument. Fitzgerald claimed confidence that the Lincoln Administration had no
designs on British North America but placed less faith in popular feeling among the Northern
‘mob’. Fitzgerald urged the government to undertake construction of the forts so that: “the
population of America—and I am speaking now not of those placed at the head of its affairs,
or of those who might have influence—but I say emphatically, the population, intoxicated
with success, should not allow themselves to be led into a war with this country under a
belief  that  Canada is  incapable  of  making any defence.”393  Forster  and Bright  however
continued to defend the Northern cause and its system. Denying the contention that the
Federal government could not control the people Forster pointed out that the executive of
the United States was even more independent than that of Britain and that consequently the
American President possessed more power than the British Prime Minister. The fact also
that the House of Representatives sat for considerably longer than Britain’s own House of
Commons provided a greater check against “temporary influences.” Forster therefore argued
that “If an English Ministry had made the failures which have occurred in the conduct of the
American armies and of American policy the English people would not have shown the same
long-forbearing patience, but we should have had change after change of Administration.
Therefore the fear that the American Government is likely to plunge into war through any
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temporary irritation on the part of the people is totally unreasonable.”394 Even in terms of the
‘mob’ themselves Forster highlighted that the emotional dynamic in invading British North
America  would  be  vastly  different  to  that  of  the  Civil  War,  and  therefore  would  inhibit
aggression. He argued that “The Northern people believe that they are fighting to prevent the
destruction of their country; and in any attack upon Canada they could not feel that they
were  fighting  in  anything  but  an unprovoked war  for  empire,  and  that  would  be  a  very
different feeling from that which now animates them.”395  
Whether the end of the Civil War would spark conflict over British North America was
therefore  not  only  a  question  of  popular  passion  against  government  restraint  but  also
exhilaration versus exhaustion. Whereas Fitzgerald believed the Union would be swept into
Canada on a wave of victorious adrenaline, Disraeli perceived entirely the reverse. Disraeli
said of the American public: “I cannot believe that with the debt and the sacrifice and loss of
life which war has imposed on them, they will inaugurate peace amongst themselves by an
unprovoked war against a nation that is more powerful than the Southern States, and which
would  be  attended  with  burdens  far  greater  and  sacrifices  much  larger  than  they  now
experience,  even  though  their  attempt  against  Canada  was  in  the  first  instance
successful.”396 He dismissed the temptation that British North America might hold for the
United States, and believed rather its own war-weariness after four years of combat would
inhibit  any  expansionist  aggression  towards  Canada.  Disraeli  argued  that:  “being  a








favourable  to  the  prosecution  of  an  enterprise  requiring  great  resources  and  immense
exertion.”397
In  spite  of  such  denials  about  Federal  intentions,  the  problem  was  that  the
uncertainty would persist until the close of the Civil War settled matters one way or another.
Watkin, now in London, spoke of the astronomical expenditure that would be required to
even  approach  parity  with  the military  forces  now at  the  disposal  of  the  United  States.
Warning against entering into an arms-race that would only serve to cripple both economies
while  increasing  tension  and hostility  between  them,  Watkin  argued that  the  security  of
British North America should be sought by purely diplomatic means. Describing the Rush-
Bagot agreement that had kept armaments off the lakes as “a precedent of happy history
worthy of all gratitude and all imitation” Watkin urged Palmerston “to try negotiation. Place
before  the minds of  American  statesmen the neutralization  of  the  Lakes and ask  if  the
frontiers could not be neutralized also. Was it not possible that if Her Majesty's Government
took Brother Jonathan in a quiet mood, he might be disposed to save his own pocket and
thereby to save ours, and unite with us to set a bright example to surrounding nations?” 398
One  problem  however  was  the  United  States’  announcement  of  temporary  security
measures on the lakes which was already putting the treaty of 1817 in jeopardy. With the
continued danger of border violations, especially with the St Albans Raid a recent memory
they were unlikely to assent to demilitarising the frontier.
Increased Canadian Co-operation
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Moreover  the  concerns  had largely  already had their  effect  and  momentum was
moving strongly towards the Canadians agreeing on the union scheme and taking on the
agreed portion of local defence. Despite having spent most of the period from November to
January  fulfilling  the mission to  England  to discuss  Confederation,  security  appeared  to
unravel so drastically in the early part of 1865 that Brown had no choice but to join a further
delegation sent to London in the spring.399 That climax arrived very shortly after in April. Two
days after Appomattox Macdonald wrote to Brown that:
“The surrender of Lee and close of the war bring matters to a crisis
between England and Canada. Either the United States, flushed with success,
with their armies full of flight and their fleet in prime condition, will at once put
the pistol to England’s breast and demand satisfaction for the Alabama and
Florida affairs, or, we may look to peace for a series of years. Should the first
contingency arise, it will be sudden and speedy and no time is to be lost in
putting  on  our  armour  of  defence.  Should  peaceful  counsels  prevail,  we
should settle now the gradual and systematic growth of a defensive system, to
be carried on steadily until we find ourselves strong enough.”400
The delegation also contained Canadian Minister Cartier who summed up that the overriding
focus of imperial policy now was towards Canadian security and confederation, writing that
“any one conversing with Englishmen, or reading the English papers, will see the question
which prevails there is the defence of the country.” Cartier furthermore informed the Colonial
Office that he too saw confederation as a response to the military problem, telling Cardwell
that  “Singly  the two Canadas cannot  defend themselves,  but  if  united with the Maritime
Provinces;  a  perfect  system of  defence  can  be  devised  in  connection  with  the  mother
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country.”  Indeed  the  Canadian  assembly  had  essentially  reached  a  like-mind  with  the
imperial government that in its design to make the provinces more self-sufficient the scheme
would render the new nation significantly more valuable to the empire. Cardwell was told by
the  Canadian  finance  minister  that  confederation  was  “not  in  any  way  to  weaken  the
connection with the Mother Country, but rather to remove those causes which now afforded
many  parties  in  England  arguments  for  asserting  that  the  connection  was  mutually
disadvantageous.”401 
Following the building realisation of potential American aggression therefore bought
on by the St Albans raid and the imminent cessation of hostilities in the US, Canada had
already begun to accept more responsibility for security. $2,000,000 had been voted for the
defence  works  and  20,000  already  enrolled  for  the  militia.  In  terms  of  the  province’s
population and resources this was the equivalent of Britain receiving 240,000 volunteers and
allotting £20,000,000 for military purposes. Of the plan to form a volunteer force only Monck
wrote “If we can get nothing better we must put up with it and try to do the best we can with
the instruments with which we are supplied.”402 The strength of the militia was bought up to
25,000 effectives and Colonel Sir Patrick McDougall assumed responsibility for training. The
Canadian Legislature now declared it was ready to undertake settlement and governance of
the arable  sections  of  the North West,  and would  construct  the defences at  Montreal  if
Britain would address Quebec and arm the pair.403 The Canadian legislature now however
suggested adopting measures much more promising. Particularly given the inherent British
weakness on the lakes the provincial legislature now put forward a plan to reconstruct the
harbour  defences at  Kingston to enable  possible  passage of  armed vessels.  As Jervois
reported: 
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“Last year there appeared to be no probability that measures would be
taken by which a Naval force could be placed on any of the lakes, and without
such force it  would  be impossible  to suggest  any  plan for  the  defence of
Upper  Canada.  Now  however,  it  is  understood  that  the  Government  of
Canada  contemplate  making  provision  for  a  fortified  Harbour  and  Naval
Establishment at Kingston, with a view to a Naval force being placed on Lake
Ontario for the protection of the western districts”
Partly to encourage such contributions, on May 11 the Colonial Naval Defence Act
passed through the imperial parliament, enabling colonies to supplement the naval strength
of the empire in times of war and thus contribute to their own maritime security. This was
particularly valuable given the weakness on the Great Lakes. Palmerston was spooked by
the American purchase of vessels from British North American shipbuilders, believing it a
prelude to invasion. The Prime Minister wrote “There is something mysterious about these
launches, Could they not have got them sooner, more cheaply and as good in their own
dockyards? What they are really meant for one cannot say. Their size is quite enough for
carrying guns, and it  is probable they are destined to cover the landing of troops on our
shores in the Lakes.”404 Putting this construction work to imperial  use would be far more
welcome. Cardwell hoped “it  would be the foundation of a naval force maintained by the
energy and at  the expense of  the colonies,  constituting a most  valuable  addition  to the
Imperial defences.”405 Adderly said “the recent example of the Canadian volunteers showed
how excellent a feeling pervaded our colonies, and it was surprising that it should be only
now that a Bill should be proposed to give power to the colonies to provide vessels of war,
weapons, and volunteers for their own defence.”406 These measures to relinquish some of
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the  government’s  responsibility  towards  imperial  defence  therefore  passed  with  near
universal approval. The under-secretary for the Colonies believed it “to be the best measure
relating to the colonies that had been passed during his Parliamentary experience.”407 For
Cardwell  the  act  served  “to  enable  Her  Majesty's  colonies  to  make better  provision  for
maritime defence”, saying that “no subject had of late years attracted more attention than the
development of the qualities of self-reliance in our colonies and the means of enabling them
to make provision for their own defence, and so relieve this country from a part of a great
burden  which  had  pressed  upon  it  in  former  times.”408 The  Act  was  in  this  respect  an
extension of the intended purpose of the unification scheme.
Recalcitrance in the Lower Provinces
Indeed, in describing Britain’s approach to accomplishing the new union the Colonial
Minister summarised this imperial motivation of passing on some of this burden of security.
The idea was that a greater state would give an enhanced sense of national importance and
therefore  an increased  sense of  duty to  its  new statesmen to protect  it.  Only  once the
provinces had embraced this could they call on British military assistance. When Cardwell in
June therefore drafted the imperial view of the Confederation scheme he told Monck that “it
treats  Canada  as  a  quasi-independent  country,  primarily  responsible  for  the  measures
chiefly necessary for its own defence, though assured of the powerful support of England
when doing its duty to itself and to her.”409 It thus intimated again that unless the colonial
politicians kept up their side of the bargain Britain would withhold military assistance and in
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scheme.  Thus the Colonial  Minister  wrote that  with  the scheme for  local  defence set  in
motion  Britain  would  accept  “the  reciprocal  obligation  of  defending  every  portion  of  the
Empire  with  all  the  resources  at  its  command”  and  Canada  the  maintenance  of  her
connection  with  the  mother  country.”  The  Canadian  legislature  had  adopted  the  union
scheme under the demands of its own internal dysfunction and the security scares bought
on  by  the  Civil  War,  however  agreement  remained  less  forthcoming  in  the  Maritime
Provinces where parochialism and a lesser feeling of military urgency prevailed. 
Ironically  therefore  while  the  pressures  of  defence  were  leading  the  imperial
government  to  encourage  the  provinces  to  unite  in  one  continental  ‘nation’,  the  same
security dilemma was helping discourage the Atlantic Provinces from throwing their lot in
with Canada. Britain redoubled its efforts therefore to overcome resistance in the maritime
colonies. This began with attempting to quash the resistance of Gordon who had continued
to gripe against the Quebec Scheme for its ‘federative’ features.  Indeed, Cardwell strongly
impressed upon the Lieutenant Governor that on this issue the provinces must defer to the
wishes of the imperial government. The Colonial Minister informed Gordon that the cabinet
wished to “avoid all appearance of undue pressure, or of dictation, but at the same time to let
it be thoroughly understood that this question of Confederation is one in which the Home
Government is quite earnest: & considers that its wishes ought to have & will have great
weight with the Provinces.”410 This ‘great weight’ was added to by utilising the influence of
Gladstone, who as Gordon’s long-term mentor held considerable influence over him and
moreover was front  and centre of  the imperial  drive to impress greater responsibility  for
defence  onto  the  provinces.  Gladstone  thus  wrote  to  Gordon  on  July  11  stating  that
Confederation is “a great measure: and one which  ... it is the right and duty of England to
press forward in a special manner.”411 Following the directives of the home government, and
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especially  following  the  encouragement  given  by  Gladstone,  the  Lieutenant  Governor
acquiesced in promoting the Quebec Scheme, writing that “I am prepared to do my utmost to
promote the wishes of Her Majesty’s government and to act in furtherance of the public
pledges they have given.”412
Despite Gordon’s conversion however the leader of the New Brunswick legislature
AJ Smith continued to resist the feared erosion of his province’s identity by entering into a
union  with  the  others.   To  this  end  Smith  journeyed  to  England  to  protest  against
Confederation  in  July.  The trip  however  produced further  evidence  of  how and why the
imperial government were determined to accelerate the union scheme. Smith found not only
a dearth of willing listeners but an apparent unanimous public opinion weighing down on the
provinces  to  enter  into  union.  More  emphatic  was  the  stark  conveyance  that  imperial
protection  was  becoming  contingent  on provincial  union.  In  an  interview with  the Prime
Minister himself Smith was told by Palmerston that “the pivot on which the future Defences
of Canada by England & themselves turned was Confederation.”413 It was thus insinuated
that  unless the Maritime Provinces agreed to enter into the political  union Britain  would
withhold military support. Speaking of New Brunswick it was stated that she might “reflect
well on the great effect which her course may produce in regard to our responsibilities for her
defence.” One of the further crucial  factors enabling Britain to impress its wishes on the
provinces was the evidence that pro-unionism crossed party lines, Smith meeting with the
leader of the liberals and being told that the shadow minister fully backed union. Cardwell
was told that Derby had spoken to Smith which “will put an end to any idea that the English
opposition will  assist him in resisting Confederation.”414 The Colonial Secretary also wrote
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that  “I  am  further  directed  to  express  to  you  the  strong  and  deliberate  opinion  of  Her
Majesty’s Government  that it  is an object much to be desired, that all  the British North
American Colonies should agree to unite in one Government.”415 
Following Smith’s visit therefore the imperial government determined that one means
of  converting  sceptical  maritime  politicians  to  the  union  scheme  was  to  bring  them  to
England  in  order  to  impress  upon  them  firsthand  how  determined  Britain  was  for  its
implementation.  This  included  Joseph  Howe  who  had  been  heavily  engaged  with  the
provincial delegation to negotiate the terms of constructing the intercolonial railway but in the
provincial  legislature  of  Nova  Scotia  had  stood  against  the  policy  of  union.  Cardwell
therefore worked to summon Howe to London, ostensibly to discuss Reciprocity, whereby on
arrival the true subject to be addressed would be union. The Colonial Secretary wrote to
Russell that “if Mr.Howe could be sent for to come here, on business connected with the
Reciprocity  Treaty,  he  might  easily  be  converted  into  a  supporter  of  Confederation.”
American  notice  to  terminate  reciprocity  was  already  beginning  to  sway  thinkers  in  the
Maritime Provinces that a better system of trade would now be required with Canada. The
Foreign Minister therefore wrote to Howe on July 21 instructing him “to come to England at
your earliest convenience, on business connected with the Reciprocity Treaty.”416 Howe had
already been the target of pro-unionists in Canada and Britain in an effort to convince him to
take  up  the  cause  of  Confederation  in  Nova  Scotia.  One  message  from  the  Canadian
legislature stated that: “I believe the only safety for the Whole is Union, the Intercolonial
railroad & the erection of certain strong fortifications together with a thorough organization of
the local forces & then with the assistance which I  am sure England would under those
circumstances  willingly  render  I  believe  you  might  rest  in  peace  &  bid  defiance  to  the
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Yankees.”417  Equally the Government used the loan for the intercolonial railway as leverage
to attempt to make the Maritime Provinces assent to the union scheme. Cardwell called the
loan “the means of applying the requisite pressure, as the Guarantee depended upon her
assent  to  the  terms  upon  which  the  Government  had  undertaken  to  recommend  it  to
Parliament.”418 As both political union and the railroad formed part of British policy towards
making the colonies more defensible, the Colonial Secretary wrote that “Canada cannot for
ever – perhaps not for long – remain a British Colony. Upon this Railroad in my opinion
depends in  great  measure her  future destiny.”  Watkin also argued that  the railway  was
imperative to the provinces’ place in the empire and therefore that it was essential for the
home  government  to  support  British  North  America  on  the  railway  scheme.  Watkin
questioned “Is this great work, the Canadian Pacific Railway, to be left as a monument, at
once, of Canada’s loyalty and foresight, and of Canada’s betrayal: or is it to be made the
new land-route to our Eastern and Australian Empire?”419 
The imperial government however determined that continuing to deny resources until
confederation was agreed upon offered the best chance of success. Russell wrote that “I
incline to the opinion, that in order to preserve our North American Provinces they must be
united,  and that  some coercion will  be necessary.”420 It  was not  just  official  government
policy that produced this effect but the general vocal professions in Britain that the imperial
tie should be cut off  if  the colonies refused to co-operate. All  the while the scheme was
progressing  these  voices  were  quietened  down.  The  Canadian  Governor  General  for
example, having been on a visit  to London and surveying the atmosphere, believed that
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little-Englanders were “for the moment, choked off by the proposal for our Union, but if that
fails I believe they will return to the charge with redoubled energy.”421 
The effects of imperial tactics
That imperial policy met with some success in the Maritime Provinces can be seen in
the  transformation  at  the  beginning  of  the  1866  session.  The  conveyance  of  British
reluctance to continue military and financial support unless union be agreed upon - and that
this was a unanimous feeling across both government and the opposition - had an evident
effect in the Nova Scotia legislature. The pro-union leader Williams noted that “since the
members  have  assembled  here,  very  great  change  has  taken place  in  their  manner  of
viewing  the  question  of  confederation.”422 Encouraged  by  this  Monck  urged  Williams  to
proceed  to  attempt  to  pass  the  union  scheme  through  the  Nova  Scotian  legislature
regardless  of  New  Brunswick’s  progress.  The  Governor  General  wrote  “Could  you  not
venture  to  go  on  without  waiting  for  Gordon?”423 This  Williams  did.  The  provincial
administrator cited both the cross-party consensus in London and the influential opinion of
The Times stating that “I won many a man to our side by this proving that whichever side
was “in”, the scheme would be persevered in” and was “glad to find the “Times” so zealous
and talented in supporting the good cause.”424 Indeed, this political unanimity in Britain was
evident  when  Russell’s  ministry  (Russell  having  succeeded  as  Prime  Minister  following
Palmerston’s death) was replaced by a Conservative administration under Lord Derby. Lord
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Carnarvon was welcomed into the Colonial Office as new Colonial Minister by Cardwell who
made clear to him that the outgoing Prime Minister would continue to help ensure that the
union scheme was passed through as quickly as possible. Cardwell told Carnarvon that:
 “Lord Russell asked me today if I thought the new government would
carry Confederation through this year. I told him ...  I thought you could not
reasonably be expected to do so. To this Lord Russell replied that perhaps
you would wish to do so, as it is a very important measure, & it is impossible
to say what accidents might occur if months were permitted to elapse: - & that
with our assistance you would have no difficulty in carrying it.”425 
This was relayed to the lieutenant governors in the provinces in order to further portray the
unanimous  British  desire  for  union.  Even  on  leaving  office  the  former  Colonial  Minister
continued to emphasise that the imperial prerogative of funding security should translate into
making the recalcitrant Maritime colonies accept the confederation scheme. Cardwell  wrote
that  “considering  how John Bull  pays  the piper  in  the  matter  of  defence  for  the  Lower
Provinces, there is something almost ridiculous in the idea of their standing upon an opinion
of their own in such a matter against ours, and against that of Canada with five or six times
their population.”426 Sir Frederick Rogers too told Carnarvon to impress on Howe “that Union
was the proper thing for the interests of British North America, and for the interests of this
country, and that it was a step which this Country had a right to expect from those who relied
on her for  defence.”427 In part  due to the efforts of Gordon, in 1866 the New Brunswick
legislature too came to agree on the union scheme. Anti-confederation was also defeated
due to the impossibility of re-establishing strong trade ties with the United States. Reciprocity
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ended in 1866 and the Western Extension scheme was dead.428 Indeed, the backlash on the
American side of the border from those who valued the reciprocal use they had been entitled
too of the British North American fisheries had an impact in London too. Watkin made MPs
aware of a passage in the report to the Revenue Commissioners of the United States for the
year 1865-66 which stated “If the Maritime Provinces (of Britain) would join us ... with their
hardy population, their harbours, fisheries, and seamen, they would greatly strengthen and
improve our position, and aid us in our struggle for equality upon the ocean. If we would
succeed  upon  the  deep,  we  must  either  maintain  our  fisheries  or  ABSORB  THE
PROVINCES (sic).”429
The aftermath
Movements  towards  national  unification  were  also  giving  rise  to  a  new wave  of
militarism  and  imperialism  in  Europe,  notably  in  Italy  and  among  the  German  states.
Therefore with changes to the balance of power taking place closer to home, it was even
more critical for Britain to find an answer to Federal militancy in North America. Despite the
imperial and colonial desire to match the American nationalism emerging from the Civil War
with  a  national  consciousness of  their  own,  the  irony  remained  however  that  the home
government continued to try and avoid replicating the federal nature of the US system in
their  framework  for  Confederation.  Indeed,  despite  its  federative  appearance  the  new
structure  contained key  differences which  reconciled  the British  government  to  the form
union took.  It  was not  like US federalism where the power  contained in the constitution
emanated from individual liberties and states rights. Here the model was the ‘second empire’
of the old colonial system whereby the new colonial parliament provided a strong central
body and the local assemblies were ancillary to it. It also involved the first official use in the
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colonies of the term ‘parliament’ for what would be the new central legislature. In terms of
the nature of its authority, rather than the power surging upwards from the people and the
states as in the US, it was passed downwards from the sovereign in the form of the British
North America Act.430
The  imperial  government  thus  portrayed  the  union  of  the  provinces  as  the
establishment  of  a  great  continental  state  with  its  own  sense  of  national  identity  and
possessing territorial and economic power. In announcing the passage of the British North
America Act Disraeli spoke of the colonial peoples’ progress towards this aim: “There has
already  developed  a  formidable  confederation,  with  the  element  of  nationality  strongly
evinced  in  it.  They have counted their  population;  they feel  that  they are numbered by
millions; they are conscious that they have among the possessions of the Queen in North
America  a district  of  territory  which in  fertility  and extent  is  equal  to  the unappropriated
reserves of  the United States.”431 Eulogising over the meaning of  union and lauding the
British North American people no doubt contained a degree of propaganda in an effort to
repair the damage of several years of British frustration at the lack of co-operation in the
provinces  towards  defence.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  it  emphasised  the  national  and
independent  character  of  the  scheme.  The  terminology  behind  Confederation  too  was
intended to push the concepts of nationality and power. ‘Kingdom of Canada’ was rejected
out  of  further  fears  of  provoking  the  US with  an  overtly  monarchical  title  and  therefore
‘Dominion  of  Canada’  was  conferred  upon  the  new  nation  instead.  Indeed,  given  the
preponderance of American power Confederation represented a means with which Britain
could speed up its disengagement from the continent. Intended to increase the provinces’
ability  to  survive  outside  of  the  US,  Confederation  had  been  pushed  by  the  imperial
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government to increase British North America’s sense of national importance and therefore
encourage the people to offer more assistance to its security. 
With this now in place some continued to desire that imperial power might take its
place again in North America. Watkin for example fondly hoped that with Britain standing by
Canada, together they could forge national security for the new union writing that “a line of
Military Posts, of strength and magnitude, beginning at Halifax on the Atlantic and ending at
the Pacific, will give power to the Dominion, and, wherever the red-coat appears, confidence
in the old brave country will be restored.”432 As Confederation was from Britain’s point of view
a means of delegating responsibility for security to the new dominion however, the ultimate
aim was to reduce imperial troop presence. Thus in terms of Confederation’s objective to
offset Federal power, for British North America to become a viable counterweight to the US
still represented a long-term strategy. Union in itself did little to improve provincial security,
certainly  in  the  immediate  wake  of  the  Civil  War.  Indeed,  it  is  ironic  that  following
Confederation much the same fears and pressures resumed themselves as had existed both
before and during the conflict. Until the settlement of the Alabama Claims in 1870 insecurity
remained that unless the Federal Government was satisfied in its compensation they would
attack  Canada  for  recompense.  Indeed,  throughout  the  negotiations  on  the  terms  of
settlement Gladstone complained of the “submissiveness” that Britain was forced into due to
the vulnerability of the Canadian border.433 Moreover instability in Europe renewed the fear
that  the  US would  pounce  if  Britain  was  drawn  into  conflict,  especially  as  the  Wars  of
German Unification took place through the decade. Clarendon wrote to Queen Victoria in
May 1869 that “there is not the smallest doubt that if  we were engaged in a Continental
quarrel we should immediately find ourselves at war with the United States.”434 This again
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merely  renewed  the  drive  to  reduce  the  imperial  military  commitment  to  the  provinces.
Indeed, in 1870 as the Franco-Prussian war further destabilised the established continental
order  Gladstone  anticipated  getting  “rid  of  all  drafts  upon  the regular  army for  Colonial
purposes,  in  ordinary  circumstances,  except  in  the  four  cases  of  Malta-Gibralta-Halifax-
Bermuda.”435
Unable  to  better  address  the  strategic  dilemma  caused  by  the  Civil  War,
Confederation was a step towards abdicating Britain’s role on the continent. That it could in
itself enhance British North American security was a fallacy, or even an exercise in self-
delusion that existed at the time. In 1865 for example the  Saturday Review printed that it
was impossible that “an efficient defensive organisation will ever be brought about without
political amalgamation.” For years the imperial government had faced the problem of how to
make the provinces themselves assume the burden of defence. Unification was one means
with which to do this. The Civil War had occurred at a time that Britain was looking to reduce
its  imperial  military commitments,  and the increased demands the conflict  put  on British
North America’s defence requirements only intensified this drive. Confederation was a policy
intended  to  make the provinces  more self-sufficient,  and therefore  remove  some of  the
burden for defence from the imperial government in London to a new national government in
Canada.
Summary
The  fall-out  from  the  Civil  War  had  therefore  made  the  imperial  government
determined for the British North American provinces to carry through Confederation. Indeed,
colonial agreement on the union scheme had been portrayed by the home government as a
prerequisite for continued imperial military support. When it  became clear that the South
would  be  defeated  however,  the  resultant  security  crisis  made  achieving  some  sort  of
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measure towards imperial defence a necessity. The British cabinet faced an intense debate
over erecting fortifications at Quebec which hinged on the dilemma of whether these would
truly protect the provinces or actually provoke an attack on them, and also whether they
would continue to render the colonial population complacent towards their own defensive
duties.  The Canadians however,  like Britain realising  that  the victorious Northern armies
might turn on the provinces at the war’s conclusion, agreed to fund the fortifications slated
for Montreal. The scares of fenian influence in the North furthermore increased the sense of
importance regarding the defences, as did the actual fenian raids that took place into the
provinces a few months later. The Quebec appropriations were therefore eventually voted in
the imperial parliament, especially under the uncertainty bought on by the diplomatic issues
with the US, though this was only undertaken on the tacit understanding that the provincial
government proceed with the union scheme.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The imperial government had worked steadfastly to accomplish the Confederation of
British North America since they had been presented with the Quebec Resolutions in 1864;
though bringing forward the union project had been mooted throughout the Civil War. The
British motivation for developing a unified political  structure was the conception that with
mutual  institutions  and  leadership,  not  only  would  the  provinces  be  better  practically
equipped to orchestrate defence;  but  with the shared sense of community and territorial
standing they would also have an increased moral, emotional sense of duty to protect the
new ‘nation’. The metropolitan wish to accelerate this process was a short-term response to
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the strategic security dilemmas posed by the growth of Federal military power during the
Civil  War, combined with the breakdown of Anglo-American relations arising from issues
within  it.  This  has  been  overlooked  in  the  literature  however  between  on  the  one  side
diplomatic and strategic studies which neglect the position of British North America: and on
the other histories of Confederation which downplay the role of the mother country and the
vital imperial context of British policy towards the Civil War. 
When Britain’s policy on unification is touched upon, it  is generally regarded as a
simple withdrawal in the face of the preponderance of American power on the continent.436
As this study has argued, this interpretation is flawed: the policies both of uniting the North
American provinces and of reducing the imperial military commitment were products of the
antebellum  period  and  therefore  both  predated  the  Civil  War  and  possessed  more
substantive  influences  alongside  it.  In  both  respects  the intention  was  to impart  greater
responsibility  on  the  provinces  themselves  with  a  view  to  preparing  them  for  a  strong
independence separate from the United States. Establishment of a ‘greater’ nation was seen
as  a  basis  to  simplify  and  delegate  defence  and  to  counteract  annexationist  sentiment
towards  the  republic.  Sir  Edmund  Walker  Head  for  example,  who  was  to  be  Governor
General of the province when the Civil War broke out, argued that “Canada will never be
annexed to the United States if we give her freedom enough ... & foster her own sense of
self importance.”437 This reference to the province’s “sense of self-importance” moreover is
revealing in itself in regard to how it played into the policy of unification. Prior to the Civil War
it  was even hoped this  new nation  state  would  over  time grow to  challenge  and  offset
Federal hegemony in North America. It was therefore posited that union, self-governance
and,  ultimately,  independence could redefine the continental  balance of power. Far from
beginning as a ‘retreat’  in fear of American power this scheme was considered possible
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because  British  military  thinkers  held  little  regard  for  the  war-making  capabilities  of  the
United States. The fluctuating power-balance in  the Civil  War however together with the
growing impression made by Union militarisation and diplomatic belligerence, led imperial
statesmen to sanction Confederation far sooner than expected. 
Diplomatic arguments
Diplomatic  histories  conversely  have  generally  debated  whether  Britain  tacitly  or
overtly sponsored Confederate independence as a means to arrest the growth of the United
States,  and  have  subsequently  missed  that,  in  fact,  the  imperial  government  already
favoured the emergence of British North America in this role. This study has argued that the
imperial government tacitly supported the South, but that this was largely founded on the
simple pragmatism that British statesmen were convinced that no other possibility existed
except separation, a belief also in part influenced by their initially derisory perceptions of US
military capability. This however played a major part in poisoning British-American relations
and  helped  initiate  the  great  security  fears  which  encouraged  the  premature  resort  to
enacting Confederation. 
This interpretation refutes that reached by Ephraim Douglass Adams that Britain did
not favour the Confederacy and that the Civil War’s bearing on the potential extension of the
franchise and ultimately the Second Reform Bill was the crucial issue determining of British
policy.438 As Brian Holden Reid has argued,  even the pro-Northern MP Richard Cobden
accepted secession was a Southern right and both Cobden and fellow radical John Bright
believed the Union’s efforts futile, at least at first.439 This study has shown that even despite
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the tension and instability that pervaded British politics leading up to the Second Reform Act,
there  was a staggering  degree of  consensus  amongst  imperial  statesmen in  regards  to
supporting  and  enacting  the  Confederation  of  Canada.  Whereas  Adams  professed  the
salience of the democratic reform issue for Britain’s reaction to the Civil War, this thesis has
suggested that English appraisals of the Federal system held far greater import for imperial
policy in North America. British revulsion of the republican ‘mobocratic’ system influenced
strongly the imperial  wish to prevent  the United States acquiring British North America -
forming a central  tenet  of  the policy of  Confederation – while  the warning the Civil  War
provided of the weakness of federal structures caused a dilemma over whether to resort to a
federative version of unification over the apparently more sound legislative preference held
in the metropolis. 
This imperial aim to counter republican growth in North America through provincial
unification, which evolved out of the fears of Federal annexation that existed at least from
the time of the Canadian Rebellions,  persisted right up to the Civil  War. For this reason
Adams and Kenneth Bourne were incorrect to conclude that Britain reconciled itself  to a
marginal role on the continent in the antebellum period. As this thesis has shown it was not
until the Civil War that imperial strategists truly began to feel the military balance had swung
decisively in favour of the United States and that this portended a disaster in British North
America. Bourne reached this conclusion because his work placed too early a date on the
imperial realisation that British North America had become a ‘hostage’ to Federal power.440
This study has argued however that prior to the Civil War Canada was not considered as
weak or  vulnerable  as has been portrayed in  the historiography,  largely  due to the low
opinion of the US army and even lower verdict on its navy. The Canadian Governor General
for instance in 1845 wrote “I presume that war may be carried on in North America on the
same principles, and with the same results, as in Continental Europe. (Suppose) Napoleon
(June 2003), pp. 56-7.
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Bonaparte had possession of Canada with the resources of Great Britain and the command
of the ocean. He would,  it  may be imagined, make short  work of a war with the United
States, if his object were as moderate as ours would be, namely an honourable peace. Why
might not England do likewise.”441
Strategic arguments
Bourne argued that the British North American Act was a final acknowledgment of
Federal  preponderance  and  a  means  of  the  empire  ‘withdrawing’  from  its  role  on  the
continent, an argument which this study has challenged as too simplistic. Strategic histories
emphasise  the  role  (or  intended  role)  of  the  Royal  Navy  as  Britain’s  chief  means  of
deterrence in protecting its empire in the period between the Napoleonic Wars and Anglo-
American rapprochement. Those studies that refute that the Civil War was a watershed for
British arms or power therefore argue that the Royal Navy carried on containing potential US
aggression in the era.442 This study on the other hand has argued that preoccupation with
extinguishing the Southern war effort was the major factor determining Northern preference
for peace with Britain as opposed to fear of the Royal Navy in of itself. 
Certainly by the latter stages of the war the United States had ironclads and harbour
defences  which  made  imperial  statesmen  question  their  ability  to  bring  their  favoured
strategy  to  bear  of  unleashing  British  warships  against  the  US  eastern  seaboard.
Furthermore, rather than the United States being held to ransom by the Royal Navy, during
the  Civil  War  British  North  America  ended  up  becoming  the  ‘hostage’  historians  have
erroneously  claimed that  it  was prior  to  it.  This  was because the prospect  of  US naval
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superiority on the Great Lakes revealed a critical anomaly in the impression of overriding
British  maritime  strength.  Imperial  strategists,  influenced  by  reports  from  their  military
experts,  came to  comprehend  that  American forces  on the lakes -  combined  with  their
million-strong  army  now  proven  in  battle  -  eventually  would  make  an  invasion  of  the
provinces practically irresistible. 
Both of these prongs of the attack would be serviced too by the far more extensive
and sophisticated network of canals and railways in the northern United States than that
which existed to defend British North America. It was summed up by Robert Lowe when
discussing the unique threat the imperial government now faced as compared to the last
time the nations had clashed fifty years previously. Lowe asked:
Are we going to embark on the defence of Canada as if the principles
which we deemed sound in 1813 and 1814 were still to be relied on, and as if
railroads had not been laid down over the whole of American territory? Take
the Lakes. If America was more than a match for us in 1813 and 1814 on the
Lakes, what must she be now, when by means of the New York Central and
Erie Railroads she can transport both men and means to the scene; when she
can carry down gunboats, as many as she pleases; when to one man of ours
she can oppose ten, and if ten will not do, twenty?443
The US capacity to convert its greater merchant marine into armed vessels on the lakes
concerned Britain, as did its ironclad programme. The new iron vessels provided a threat on
the St Lawrence and to the defence of the empire’s Atlantic naval stations. The Federal
logistical advantage both in canal navigation and network of railways better enabled them to
bring a force to bear, not only on the lakes, but also in putting an army across the Canadian
frontier.  This  was  especially  problematic  given  relative  US/British  North  American
manpower. It was this host that drew Britain back from intervention, made clear as it was by
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Seward that any interference would lead to military retaliation by the North, and this caused
Britain to turn urgently to their long held plan for attempting to create a balance against
United  States  hegemony  through  a  confederation  of  the  provinces.  As  Lyons  wrote  to
Russell early on, “They would, no doubt, declare war immediately upon any European Power
that recognised the Southern Confederacy. Such a war could have but one result, and would
probably  be  very  short;  still  it  would  be  well  to  avoid  it.”444 The  British  Minister  in
Washington’s statement that a British-American war could only have “one result” displayed
military confidence in the imperial hierarchy, at least early on and at least at the top. 
Indeed,  belief  in the superiority of  British sea power  remained the imperial  trump
card. Even post the intervention deliberations in the late summer and early autumn of 1862,
threats to Anglo-American peace bought on by breaches or alleged breaches of neutrality -
such  as  the  actions  of  the  CSS  Alabama  -  inspired  similar  sentiments.  This  was
characteristic defiance from Palmerston. The Prime Minister’s dismissal of the Federal Navy
however did not represent British military views of American maritime power by the war’s
end, particularly in regard to a defence on the Great Lakes. A Federal report on the state of
security on the Great Lakes for example had been transmitted to the Colonial Office in 1864
and made unnerving reading in terms of emphasising the local advantages which all fell to
the US. It stated that “there is already a considerable commercial marine upon the four great
lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron and Michigan, which are open to the enterprise of our citizens.
And this will increase with the augmenting population which is flowing in upon the regions
washed  by  these  internal  seas.  It  is  obvious  that,  from  natural  causes,  the  physical
superiority will be found upon the southern shores of these lakes.” It went on to state that “A
victorious fleet upon these lakes could disembark an army at almost any point. If a harbour
were closed by fortifications, they would only have to seek the nearest beach and land their
men from boats, so that no defences we could construct would secure us against invasion.”
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While Lambert might argue that no rival had the military capacity to coerce Britain,
this study has argued that the imperial government had to temper its response to the Trent
affair, as well as its policies on intervention and towards crises over neutrality, out of fear for
the security of British North America.  Brian Holden Reid too considered that Britain was able
to maintain a policy of deterrence and was undaunted by the United States throughout these
years,  believing  that  US  military  potential  had  yet  to  be  fully  realised.445 It  has  been
contended here that its mobilisation in the Civil  War demonstrated that the United States
could convert dormant peacetime manpower and industrial resources into a viable military
force, and do so with such a relative speed as to cause great concern over the security of
the empire. This study has also suggested that the transferral of “latent military power” to
“actual” as Brian Holden Reid argued hampered the United States as a genuine strategic
threat to Britain, might in fact be applied to the failure to convert the provinces into a state of
readiness  prepared  to  undertake  the  duty  of  defence  themselves.  In  this  respect  the
mounting  sense  of  vulnerability  about  British  North  America  was  also  attributable  to  a
continued frustration on the part of metropolitan statesmen over the lack of action taken by
the colonies themselves towards their own protection. It was to address this need for the
provinces to assume greater responsibility for defence that the imperial government turned
so unanimously towards Confederation. This was not because Britain wanted to escape its
own share of fighting a war with the United States if this was necessary, but simply to relieve
itself from the burden of local defence when its own war-winning strategy – viable by 1865 or
otherwise – would be based on offensive action by the Royal Navy. Britain was thus looking
to mitigate the demands that would be placed on imperial military resources if forced to go to
war with the US. For this reason too the notion of Confederation as an ‘abandonment’ of the
provinces is misleading and over-simplistic. This study has argued that British statesmen
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were determined to defend the provinces both on point of honour and due to their wish to
secure  it  from  republican  expansion;  however  this  prospect  became  so  multiplied  in
difficulties as the Civil War and Federal strength developed that Confederation was appealed
to as a means to cushion as much of the blow as possible.
Confederation arguments
In this respect historians of Confederation have oversimplified the imperial attitude to
British North America, interpreting the metropolis to have been driven by a ‘little-England’
mentality  and have subsequently  misrepresented the British policy  on unification.446 This
study has challenged such conventional historiographical views of British anti-imperialism
and argued that the reason for opposition to the proposed fortification scheme in 1865 – the
money for which was nonetheless voted by parliament – stemmed not from the fact that
MP’s wanted rid of Canada, but a more complex array of factors relating to the imperial
position in North America. One was the longstanding aspiration for the provinces to bear
responsibility  for their  own local defences  as part of  the empire, a policy goal which,  as
stated, led to British support for Confederation. Also some parliamentarians wavered as the
works appeared to be so modest as to make them entirely inadequate given the military
force the United States had built up. The works moreover were unlikely to be ready for at
least  five years and therefore of  little immediate value.  The dissenters were also largely
radicals  such as John Bright,  supporters of  the Federal  cause, and they were wary that
entering into programmes of military construction might provoke the North into hostilities.
The  tendency  in  the  literature  however  to  portray  the  mother  country  as  anti-
imperialist provides a mechanism with which to present unification as a triumph by provincial
statesmen in overcoming resistance from both within and without to accomplish continental
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union. Donald Creighton for example argued that the imperial government might have drawn
back  from  the  union  scheme  due  to  little-Englander  opposition  to  further  colonial
politicking.447 This  study has argued that  anti-colonialism was not  so vocal  as Creighton
suggested when it came to British North America. The dominant government figures in fact
were steadfastly against ‘abandoning’ the provinces. As late as July 1864 when Gladstone
advocated union of the provinces as a means to advance their self-sufficiency and to keep
imperial troops at home, the Prime Minister had railed against the idea of abdicating the
responsibility when he refused to “admit that it is a question for consideration and decision
whether our North American Provinces are to be fought for or abandoned. There may be
much to be said for the theory put forward by some, that our Colonies are an encumbrance
and an expense, and that we should be better without them, but that is not the opinion of
England, and it is not mine.”448 That the provinces were a burden was “not the opinion of
England” reflects on the fact that imperial prestige was something that the public invested in.
Russell told Lyons as late as October 1864 that if the US attempted to annexe Canada, “they
must look to a fight with us.”449 
What these studies also overlook, and what again goes back to Adams’s claim about
the divisiveness of British politics at this time, is the broad-based imperial  consensus on
achieving union. When specialist studies however do acknowledge widespread metropolitan
support on union, they reach a different conclusion about the importance of the Civil War in
accelerating British action. Ged Martin for instance denied that the problem of British North
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American security was central to imperial endorsement of Confederation. Martin based this
claim on the fact that the province of Canada would be the focal point of union and that that
province’s lack of contribution to defence convinced the mother country that they could not
be  trusted  to  orchestrate  security.450 This  study  has  demonstrated  that  because  Britain
supported  union  as  a  means  to  impart  greater  responsibility  on  the  provinces  towards
defence,  Martin’s  argument  in  fact  should  be  inverted.  It  was  precisely  because  of  an
imperial will under the spectre of Federal attack for Canada to display urgency towards self-
defence that Britain advanced the need for confederation during the Civil  War. This was
particularly so after the defeat of the Canadian militia bill in 1862, following which even the
Foreign Minister stepped in to advocate a federal union of the provinces. Martin still placed
the chief explanation for union with the Canadian statesmen John A. Macdonald and George
Brown, and argued that they merely appended the defence argument to their scheme in
order to shame and/or scare opponents into accepting it. For Brown this was primarily to
achieve a greater role for Upper Canada than that it held in the existing Canadian assembly;
for Macdonald to preserve his role in the coalition government. Martin therefore considered
the security issue secondary.451
Martin asserted that, in fact, the logical imperial approach in the context of the Civil
War would have been to have blocked the unification of British North America, as it was a
course of action likely to enrage and provoke a US reaction.452 As this thesis has shown,
imperial endorsement of the Quebec Scheme was borne of an acute security dilemma that
had built over three years of Civil War, extensive Federal militarisation and damaged Anglo-
American relations. Martin overlooked the Committee on Colonial Defence’s advancement of
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union  as  early  as  March 1861 as  a  means  to  increase the provinces’  responsibility  for
defence and the Duke of Newcastle’s  subsequent  statement that  union might indeed be
“hastened .. by the condition of the rest of the continent”, as well Russell’s advocating of a
similar scheme following the defeat of the militia bill in 1862, and even Gordon’s plan for
maritime  union  the  following  autumn  –  the  plan  which  was  resurrected  by  the  Atlantic
Provinces in 1864 and subsequently turned into the Charlottetown Conference on general
British  North American union.  By  the time the Quebec Scheme was presented imperial
statesmen had already long anticipated a US attack to help reunite themselves with the
South or in compensation for losing it, or in retaliation for Britain’s stand over the Trent crisis,
intervention or neutrality. It was not a case of the British government fearing provocation of
the North by sponsoring union - that provocation was already perceived to have happened - ;
rather Confederation was considered a means of mitigating the security problems posed by
the dilemma. 
Thus when threats to its neutrality in the middle section of the war again seriously
endangered British North America the imperial government displayed willingness to revise
the timetable  of  railway,  followed by Maritime Union and then wider  union,  and instead
advocate  the  larger  confederation  with  immediate  effect.  Earlier  preferences  for  a  tight
legislative system were now passed over in the process, and efforts were made to quash
any  displays  of  reluctance  either  from imperial  representatives  in  the  provinces  or  from
colonial politicians themselves. Britain’s adoption of Confederation as a policy to this end
was evident  from the efforts of  the Colonial  Office when the North really  had the South
hemmed in during 1864. Indeed, one of Cardwell’s telling despatches to the provinces in
June of that year stated that “the Colonies must recognise a right, and even acknowledge an
obligation, incumbent on the Home Government to urge with earnestness and just authority
the measures which they consider to be most expedient on the part of the Colonies with a
view  to  their  own  defence.”453 References  to  the  imperial  government’s  “right”  and
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“obligation”  to  impress  Confederation  upon  the  provinces  display  the  moral  pressure
attempted  by  Britain,  the  Colonial  Minister  writing  that  “all  the  British  North  American
Colonies  should  agree to unite  in  one government.”  Great  pressure  was placed on the
lieutenant  governors to impress the scheme on their provincial  legislatures. Gladstone in
particular  used  his  influence  on  Gordon  to  make  sure  it  was  carried  through  in  New
Brunswick. It was also made clear to colonial politicians visiting England that Confederation
was the earnest view of both the serving government and the British opposition. 
These concerns were given a special  foreboding by Federal militarisation and the
fact that this was a time in which the imperial government was under pressure to reduce its
colonial defence budget. British statesmen therefore turned to a policy of Confederation to
attempt to make the provinces more ready and willing to help meet this threat. This was
because unification was bound up with the idea that a vast union would enhance British
North America’s sense of identity, co-operation and willingness to protect the new nation. As
Watken wrote “the cure ... was to provide, for all, a bigger country – a country large enough
to breed large ideas.”454 Confederation was a political response to the problem, as militarily
no quick-fix appeared to present itself. In this respect it was an acceleration of a long-held,
long-term goal of attempting to challenge US hegemony and establishing a balance of power
in North America.  Greater government was a further step towards their self-sufficiency and
the distant hope that they might rise to the strength to provide a counterweight to the power of the
United States. 
Indeed, the vague but nevertheless compelling rationales for Britain to largely break
with common imperial policy and seek to unite its colonies: that they might find strength
through union; build their own economic system and prosperity; and therefore be able to
stop absorption into the US; were not so much altered in character by the Civil War, as they
were magnified  and given  greater  urgency.  For  example  revulsion  and suspicion  of  US
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mobocracy  had  long  encouraged  British  statesmen  to  resist  the  spread  of  Federal
republicanism  over  the  provinces  much  less  the  rest  of  the  Americas.  Mistrust  of  the
American ‘mob’ was ramped up during the Civil War, particularly following the Trent crisis
after which many in the cabinet believed that Northern bitterness would carry the US into an
attack on Canada.  The British desire to stop the United States gaining control  of  British
North  America  never  changed;  however  the  forces  at  the  disposal  of  the  Federal
government, as well as the enmity towards the empire encouraging an attack did. Indeed,
industrially  and militarily,  in  armaments and weapons manufacture,  and in  the drive and
ingenuity  to  produce  a  vast  land  army  and  powerful  navy,  the  US had  been  markedly
enhanced as a power by 1865. The growth of Federal power in the Civil War had given the
imperial  government  an acute strategic  problem,  a  problem which led  to the immediate
sponsoring of British North American union. The Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia the
Earl of Mulgrave for example had stated in 1858 that “ultimately, the British North American
Provinces will become one great, and, independent Country, but, I do not think that the time
has arrived when they could stand alone”455 wrote in  1863 that  “the state of  things has
however sadly changed over the last two or three years” as the US was now “a Military, a
warlike & very aggressive power.”456 
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